Robert Sheridan
Sat, 30 Jan 2010 14:08:22 -0800
Humbach, Prof. John A. wrote:"... However, when a speaker solicits another to commit a crime *with the speaker*, the solicitation is part and parcel of the speaker's own attempt to *do* a criminal act--i.e., partakes of conduct and is not mere speech. It is therefore essentially no different from saying, for example, "gimme the crowbar" to an accomplice during the course of a break-in..."
***I'm not sure that this interesting proposition quite gets us out of the woods, such as if the speaker haranguing the excited crowd says, "Workers of the world! Unite with me to overthrow the capitalist order, violently if necessary. Let us march on Washington and let our feelings show. Who is with me? You have nothing to lose but your chains. Cast off those chains and let us march!"
The speaker is located in Brandenburg, Ohio. rs
Well, I would have thought that Brandenburg superseded Yates, Scales and Noto on the
doctrinal point that there is an "imminence" requirement, even if it did not
overrule them as holdings. But I agree that Williams certainly gives a lot of reason to
doubt this conclusion.
Eugene makes a great point in suggesting that the distinction turns on whether the proposed transaction is "with
the speaker." This does indeed seem to represent a genuine fault line dividing the cases. What, though, is the
constitutional significance of the "with the speaker" distinction? Maybe it's this: In soliciting crimes that
don't involve the speaker, a person is not doing anything other than what anybody does in uttering "pure
speech." However, when a speaker solicits another to commit a crime *with the speaker*, the solicitation is part
and parcel of the speaker's own attempt to *do* a criminal act--i.e., partakes of conduct and is not mere speech. It
is therefore essentially no different from saying, for example, "gimme the crowbar" to an accomplice during
the course of a break-in.
On this analysis, Phipps should have had the benefit of the imminence
requirement.
Does this make any sense?
John A. Humbach
Professor of Law
Pace University School of Law
78 North Broadway
White Plains, New York 10603
914-422-4239
Personal website: humbach.net
________________________________________
From: Rosenthal, Lawrence [rosen...@chapman.edu]
Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2010 3:25 PM
To: Humbach, Prof. John A.; Renz, Jeff; conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: RE: The law of "attempt" and imminence in Brandenburg
Yates, Scales, and Noto reject the view that the First Amendment imposes an
"imminence" requirement with respect to punishing advocacy of illegal conduct.
Brandenburg does not purport to overrule any of these cases, and the approach taken in
that trilogy was reaffirmed as recently as Williams.
As I read Yates, Scales, and Noto, speech can be punished as a form of criminal
solicitation when the speaker specifically intends to produce unlawful conduct, with
independent judicial review required to ensure that the speech cannot be fairly
characterized as a mere statement of belief as opposed to an effort to produce unlawful
action, imminently or in the future. To that extent, I agree that the First Amendment
constrains the law of criminal solicitation, and to that extent as well Debs and Schenck
are no longer good law. To be sure, Professor Volokh's "Crime Facilitating
Speech" article frets that a test that turns so much on intent may deter some
valuable speech, but thus far, it appears to me that the Supreme Court has not found this
argument warrants anything more than independent appellate review of the evidence
supporting a finding of specific intent to produce unlawful conduct.
Larry Rosenthal
Chapman University School of Law
________________________________
From: conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Humbach, Prof. John A.
Sent: Sat 1/30/2010 11:45 AM
To: Renz, Jeff; conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: The law of "attempt" and imminence in Brandenburg
I'm still trying to understand the First Amendment status of crimes like
criminal solication (and since I'm teaching it Monday afternoon, I'm feeling a
little urgency).
Jeff says correctly that neither Debs nor Schenck has been overruled. But does this mean that, in 2010, we
can still expect that the Court might allow laws to punish words having a mere "tendency and
intent" to produce criminal acts, even if that "tendency" is so remote that no crimes are
"imminent"?
I would have thought that, after Brandenburg, the answer was clearly no. In 2002, moreover, the
Court in Ashcroft v. FSC reconfirmed the "imminence" requirement (citing Brandenburg)
when it rejected the "whet the appetite" argument against virtual child pornography.
However, in 2008, the United States v. Williams case seems to say the "important distinction [is] between a proposal to
engage in illegal activity and the abstract advocacy of illegality," specifying that a "proposal" includes a
"recommendation" to an illegal act "with the intent of initiating" the act. As I read Williams, such a
"proposal" can be criminalized even though there is no chance that the words in the proposal will actually lead to any
illegal act--and even if no illegal act would even be factually possible. (In the case of the Williams statute, a proposal to
transfer child pornography could be severely punished even if there were no child pornography that could be illegally
transferred. The mere words, or words-plus-intent, were punished.)
Of course the analogy to the Model Penal Code law of attempt should be apparent (as my
colleague, Audrey Rogers, has written at length). And this raises an interesting
possibility: Using the law of attempt (which punishes intent-plus-futile-efforts alone),
the post-Brandenburg Court could effectively go back to Schenck, Debs and even Whitney by
upholding bans on words having a mere "tendency and intent" (without imminence)
as an *attempt* to produce some illegal result.
Because nothing prevents the penalties for attempt from being as severe as
those for consummated crimes, the law of attempt could serve as a highway
around Brandenburg. While this is a result that I would greatly dislike, I fear
that United States v. Williams may have already paved the way.
Phipps is would be an obvious example of such a case and possibly, too, the
claims being made against John Yoo.
John A. Humbach
Professor of Law
Pace University School of Law
78 North Broadway
White Plains, New York 10603
914-422-4239
Personal website: humbach.net
________________________________________
From: conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On
Behalf Of Renz, Jeff [jeff.r...@mso.umt.edu]
Sent: Friday, January 29, 2010 4:58 PM
To: conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: "Imminence" in Brandenburg
Let me first note that neither Debs nor Schenk have been overruled and that I know that
counsel in pending appellate cases in which there is a "speech crime" issue
fear the two, to try to avoid triggering a discussion of either, and focus on Brandenburg.
My sense of Phipps is that there was more than advocacy taking place. Phipps
was selling tax evasion kits. Setting aside other violations of the law, this
does not differ too much from one sending plans for a bomb to another along
with encouragement that the recipient assemble and activate it.
The distinction then may be advocacy on the one hand, protected by Brandenburg,
and, on the other hand advocacy + means to carry out the crime.
Prof. Jeffrey T. Renz
School of Law
The University of Montana
32 Campus Drive
Missoula, Montana 59812
406-243-5127
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2010 15:30:03 -0800
From: "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu>
To: "'CONLAWPROFS professors'" <Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu>
Subject: RE: "Imminence" in Brandenburg
Message-ID:
<e7aaec684f9e3641b8cfc2b9a0bd965ac1a6783...@uclawe2k7.lawnet.lcl>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
It's certainly true that Brandenburg did not entirely (or perhaps even
largely) invalidate the law of aiding or abetting, criminal solicitation, or
conspiracy. At the same time, it doesn't seem to me to follow that they have
no effect on the constitutional boundaries of such laws. I take it, for
instance, that we'd agree that Schenck and Debs are no longer good law (or
would Prof. Rosenthal contend that they are still constitutional)? Yet Schenck
involved a conviction for conspiracy to cause and attempt to cause
insubordination, and might well today be treated as a solicitation matter
(since the Court took the view that the defendants were intending to cause
others to commit a crime). Debs involved causing and inciting and attempting
to cause insubordination, disloyalty, munity, and refusal of duty, as well as
obstructing and attempting to obstruct recruiting and enlistment -- again, the
theory being that the defendant was intending to cause others to commit a !
cr!
ime.
Likewise, though Hess v. Indiana involved a disorderly conduct prosecution, can it really be that if the
government had simply pled the case as a solicitation case, the prosecution would have been constitutional? The trial
court, after all, found that Hess "was intend[ing] to incite further lawless action on the part of the crowd"
-- which might well constitute solicitation -- but the Court concluded that even if "We'll take the fucking street
later [or again]" constituted "advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time," the speech
remained protected. (The Court did say that "the uncontroverted evidence showed that Hess' statement was not
directed to any person or group of persons, it cannot be said that he was advocating, in the normal sense, any
action"; so perhaps the constitutional limit on solicitation is that the statement must be directed to a
particular group of persons, but this would indeed be an important constitutional limit.)
We can come up with plenty of other examples. Say someone says "All of us should infringe
copyright any chance we get." That's "advocacy of action," to quote the post below, rather
than just "mere statement[] of belief" -- is that really constitutionally unprotected under
Brandenburg, if the prosecution rests on some broad state law solicitation theory? Or aiding and abetting:
Say a newspaper reporter publishes an article about copyright infringing sites, which includes the names of
some such offshore sites, and there's evidence that the reporter is actually a foe of copyright law and might
therefore want people to use such infringing sites. Can that really be punishable on an aiding and abetting
theory, if the jury concludes that the reporter had the intent of helping people commit criminal copyright
infringement? What if the relevant aiding and abetting law requires a mens rea of mere knowledge rather than
purpose (some states and some federal circuits take!
t!
his vie! w) -- would the reporter be punishable as an aider of copyright infringement simply based on a finding that he knew it was very likely that some people who read the article would use the information to infringe copyright? Perhaps Prof. Rosenthal's theory is that all this speech is indeed punishable, as solicitation or aiding and abetting, because it goes beyond "mere statement[] of belief." If so, I'd like to hear more about this. But if there are constitutional constraints on such punishment, I'd like to hear just what they might be. I should add, by the way, that I appreciate that the line between punishable solicitation and protected speech is not well understood, and neither is the line between punishable aiding and abetting and protected speech (though I tried to deal with the latter question in my Crime-Facilitating Speech article, http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/facilitating.pdf). I just don't think that the line that seems to be proposed by the post below is the right line. Eugene-----Original Message----- From: conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:conlawprof- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Rosenthal, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2010 8:25 AM To: Humbach, Prof. John A.; CONLAWPROFS professors Subject: RE: "Imminence" in Brandenburg As the recent holding in Williams suggests, Brandenburg did not modify the law of aiding or abetting, criminal conspiracy, or criminal solicitation, all of which permit liability based on an actor's statements urging the commission of unlawful acts without any requirement of imminence. At most, the decisions in Yates, Scales and Noto indicate that the First Amendment prohibits liability based on mere statements of belief, unaccompanied by advocacy of action now or in the future, but Brandenburg does not purport to overrule any of those cases. The First Amendment problem in Brandenburg and Hess, I have always believed, arose from the fact that the statutes at issue did not proceed on a theory of aiding and abetting, criminal solicitation, or conspiracy, but instead made advocacy itself the crime. I do not know what the evidence established in Phipps, but I suspect that the law of aiding and abetting provides a far sounder basis to uphold the conviction than the court's claim that Brandenburg's imminence test was satisfied. Yates, Scales and Noto make clear that imminent unlawful conduct is not always required to impose liability for a defendant's advocacy of unlawful conduct. Larry Rosenthal Chapman University School of Law ________________________________ From: conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Humbach, Prof. John A. Sent: Wed 1/27/2010 7:28 AM To: 'CONLAWPROFS professors' Subject: RE: "Imminence" in Brandenburg Well, I think Hess said some "indefinite" future time, which may imply an even greater degree of contingency than "unknown" future time. But the question I have is what verbal formulations would best capture the relationship between issues like this one and the whole law of criminal solicitation in general, which I presume is not under any particular First Amendment cloud. The New York Penal Law, for example, talks of one who "importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct." I'm guessing that the whole answer may be what Scalia wrote in United States v. Williams: "Many long established criminal proscriptions--such as laws against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation--criminalize speech (commercial or not) that is intended to induce or commence illegal activities. See, e.g., ALI, Model Penal Code ? 5.02(1) (1985) (solicitation to commit a crime); ? 5.03(1)(a) (conspiracy to commit a crime)." Does Brandenburg constitute a qualification of (or, worse, is it superseded by) this principle, reaffirmed in 2008? Ideas? John A. Humbach, Professor of Law Pace University School of Law 78 North Broadway White Plains, New York 10603 Tel. 914-422-4239 -- jhumb...@law.pace.edu personal homepage: humbach.net -----Original Message----- From: conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:conlawprof- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Monday, January 25, 2010 5:14 PM To: 'CONLAWPROFS professors' Subject: "Imminence" in Brandenburg Any thoughts on this opinion decided today, U.S. v. Phipps, 2010 WL 254983 (5th Cir.)? In particular, I wonder whether it's consistent with Brandenburg and Hess v. Indiana to hold that this speech incites "imminent lawless conduct" -- isn't it more like the advocacy of illegal conduct at some unknown future time, which doesn't satisfy the "imminence" requirement, according to Hess? (I set aside the question whether the speech could be restricted on other grounds.) Eugene For over twenty years, Phipps has operated self-styled "educational programs dedicated to teaching others how to eliminate their debt and live within their means." Despite notice from the United States Postal Service ("USPS") that both of his prior, similarly structured endeavors were considered illegal pyramid schemes, Phipps created the instant program, Life Without Debt ("LWD"). Members were encouraged to contribute between $2,000 and $100,000; Phipps claimed that a larger contribution would engender larger returns. As with prior schemes, members were required to recruit two new members prior to receiving any payments; they also received educational literature and tapes with anti- income tax messages. Notably, Phipps told participants that the income received through LWD would not need to be reported to the IRS. Phipps himself did not report any of his LWD income to the IRS. During his ten years of operating LWD, Phipps received notices from the states of Georgia, Oklahoma, and Maryland that LWD constituted a pyramid scheme, and he may be subject to civil or criminal enforcement actions as a result. Indeed, six LWD members were arrested in Florida for felony and misdemeanor promotion of and participation in an illegal lottery. Despite these warnings that his activities might be illegal, Phipps continued to recruit new members through mass mailings, teleconference calls, and seminars in major cities. Phipps sent periodic small payments to members to encourage them to remain in the program, recruit new members, or reinvest in larger payment plans. Though Phipps marketed LWD as a compound-leveraging investment program that would generate large sums of money for its investors, less than nine percent of LWD's approximately 31,000 participants made a net profit above their initial investment. Phipps "earned" $4,606,396 from LWD, $1,381,683 of which wa! s "participation income," and $3,224,782 of which he paid to himself under aliases within the scheme. A jury found Phipps guilty of mail and wire fraud and aiding and abetting, corrupt endeavor to obstruct and impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws, and income tax evasion. [FN1] Phipps was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Phipps was also ordered to pay $1,402,446 in restitution. Phipps now appeals the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and whether his sentence was properly calculated.... Phipps alleges that his tax evasion advocacy was protected by the First Amendment. This allegation is without merit. Telling his adherents that he did not report his LWD income to the IRS and encouraging them to do the same place Phipps' speech within the sphere of proscribed speech likely to incite or produce "imminent lawless action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also United States v. Kelley, 864 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting First Amendment protection of "more than mere advocacy" where defendant told clients to keep tax shelter information secret from the IRS and received commissions from sales); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir.1978) (rejecting First Amendment protection of activity that went "beyond mere advocacy of tax reform" in explaining to others how to avoid income tax liability). Phipps has not shown that his behavior advising and advocating tax evasion to LWD participants should be entitled to First Amendment ! protection.... _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2010 14:43:38 -0500 From: "Miller, Darrell (mille2di)" <mille...@ucmail.uc.edu> To: "Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu" <Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu> Subject: Outsourcing Legislation from WH to the House of Representatives Message-ID: <4dea66fecaf51547840ce95566b4c46d1c63cc8...@ucmailbe3.ad.uc.edu> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >From Politico, full link here: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/32192_Page2.html Cantor criticized Obama for last year's "outsourcing of the legislative activity from the White House to Nancy Pelosi here in this House," which he said has resulted in "a bill shift and an agenda shift way to the left and outside the mainstream of this country." To me, this seems like a fairly gross exploitation of people's ignorance of our system of divided government, and an indictment of partisan gerrymandering which makes this kind of statement politically resonant. Darrell A.H. Miller Assistant Professor of Law University of Cincinnati College of Law PO Box 210040 Clifton Avenue & Calhoun Street Cincinnati, OH 45221-0040 v: 513-556-0133 f: 513-556-1236 e: darrell.mil...@uc.edu<mailto:darrell.mil...@uc.edu> faculty page: http://www.law.uc.edu/faculty/profiles/miller.php SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author=1107305 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/conlawprof/attachments/20100129/1a7df8a3/attachment-0001.htm> End of Conlawprof Digest, Vol 75, Issue 15 ****************************************** _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.