cryptography  

Messages by Date

• 2008/05/05 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/05/05 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/05/05 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Ben Laurie
• 2008/05/05 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Florian Weimer
• 2008/05/05 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Eric Rescorla
• 2008/05/05 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) James A. Donald
• 2008/05/05 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2008/05/05 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" James A. Donald
• 2008/05/05 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Ed Gerck
• 2008/05/05 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" James A. Donald
• 2008/05/05 RE: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Scott Guthery
• 2008/05/05 RE: New result in predicate encryption: disjunction support Scott Guthery
• 2008/05/04 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/05/04 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/05/04 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Marcos el Ruptor
• 2008/05/04 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Ian G
• 2008/05/04 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2008/05/04 RE: New result in predicate encryption: disjunction support Jonathan Katz
• 2008/05/04 RE: New result in predicate encryption: disjunction support Scott Guthery
• 2008/05/04 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/05/04 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Ray Dillinger
• 2008/05/04 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Ben Laurie
• 2008/05/04 Re: New result in predicate encryption: disjunction support Ben Laurie
• 2008/05/04 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Jacob Appelbaum
• 2008/05/04 Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) Alexander Klimov
• 2008/05/03 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/05/03 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/05/03 RE: New result in predicate encryption: disjunction support Scott Guthery
• 2008/05/03 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Jeff Simmons
• 2008/05/03 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/05/03 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" Peter Gutmann
• 2008/05/03 New result in predicate encryption: disjunction support Ivan Krstić
• 2008/05/03 Re: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/05/02 SSL use Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• 2008/05/02 RE: Microsoft COFEE Dave Korn
• 2008/05/02 Re: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Arcane Jill
• 2008/05/02 Re: User interface, security, and "simplicity" James A. Donald
• 2008/05/01 Re: Microsoft COFEE Adam Shostack
• 2008/05/01 User interface, security, and "simplicity" Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2008/05/01 OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts) zooko
• 2008/05/01 Interesting attack vector Peter Gutmann
• 2008/05/01 Pentagon looks for 'Killer Switch' Ali, Saqib
• 2008/05/01 Microsoft COFEE Arshad Noor
• 2008/04/30 Re: privacy expectations Was: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/04/30 privacy expectations Was: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Alexander Klimov
• 2008/04/29 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" James A. Donald
• 2008/04/29 Re: Doubts about efficiency of Shor's factoring algorithm in quantum computers Ray Perlner
• 2008/04/29 Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software Jonathan Thornburg
• 2008/04/29 Re: Declassified NSA publications Ilya Levin
• 2008/04/29 Re: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Jack Lloyd
• 2008/04/29 Re: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/29 Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/29 Shor's algorithm in danger? Rod Van Meter
• 2008/04/29 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" COMINT
• 2008/04/29 Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software Ivan Krstić
• 2008/04/29 Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software Ivan Krstić
• 2008/04/29 Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software Stephan Neuhaus
• 2008/04/29 Re: Just update the microcode (was: Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software) Sebastian Krahmer
• 2008/04/29 Re: Just update the microcode (was: Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software) John Ioannidis
• 2008/04/29 Re: Just update the microcode (was: Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software) alex
• 2008/04/29 Re: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Victor Duchovni
• 2008/04/28 Just update the microcode (was: Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software) John Ioannidis
• 2008/04/28 SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software Ryan Phillips
• 2008/04/28 Re: Doubts about efficiency of Shor's factoring algorithm in quantum computers Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/28 Re: defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/28 Doubts about efficiency of Shor's factoring algorithm in quantum computers Charles McElwain
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Ed Gerck
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/28 defending against evil in all layers of hardware and software John Denker
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Ed Gerck
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Ed Gerck
• 2008/04/28 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/28 RE: more on malicious hardware Scott Guthery
• 2008/04/27 matt blaze on evil hardware Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/27 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Ivan Krstić
• 2008/04/27 Re: more on malicious hardware Peter Gutmann
• 2008/04/27 Re: more on malicious hardware Allen
• 2008/04/27 Re: more on malicious hardware Karsten Nohl
• 2008/04/26 more on malicious hardware Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/26 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Adam Fields
• 2008/04/26 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• 2008/04/26 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Karsten Nohl
• 2008/04/26 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" John Gilmore
• 2008/04/26 RE: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Crawford Nathan-HMGT87
• 2008/04/26 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/24 Re: "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Jacob Appelbaum
• 2008/04/24 "Designing and implementing malicious hardware" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/24 Re: Declassified NSA publications Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/24 Declassified NSA publications Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/04/24 Re: [Fwd: Secure Server e-Cert & Developer e-Cert. Comerica TM Connect Web Bank] Peter Gutmann
• 2008/04/24 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Ian G
• 2008/04/24 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Sandy Harris
• 2008/04/23 Re: [Fwd: Secure Server e-Cert & Developer e-Cert. Comerica TM Connect Web Bank] Thierry Moreau
• 2008/04/23 Re: no possible brute force Was: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/23 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Jack Lloyd
• 2008/04/23 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/23 no possible brute force Was: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Alexander Klimov
• 2008/04/23 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Allen
• 2008/04/23 Re: [Fwd: Secure Server e-Cert & Developer e-Cert. Comerica TM Connect Web Bank] Arshad Noor
• 2008/04/23 [Fwd: Secure Server e-Cert & Developer e-Cert. Comerica TM Connect Web Bank] Arshad Noor
• 2008/04/22 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Sandy Harris
• 2008/04/22 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/22 Re: Snake oil crypto of the day: BabelSecure Samurai james hughes
• 2008/04/22 Re: Estimated 10 million dollars lost in parking meter fraud James Muir
• 2008/04/21 quantum cryptography broken? travis+ml-cryptography
• 2008/04/21 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/04/21 Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff Victor Duchovni
• 2008/04/21 TextTell - 1983 - Encrypted Text Transmission Nap van Zuuren
• 2008/04/21 Re: 2factor Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/04/21 Re: Double Encryption Q Martin James Cochran
• 2008/04/18 Mark Dowd's Flash NULL Pointer Vulnerability Exploit Ryan Phillips
• 2008/04/18 Re: Double Encryption Q Pehr Söderman
• 2008/04/18 New results against the Mifare cipher Peter Gutmann
• 2008/04/18 Snake oil crypto of the day: BabelSecure Samurai Ali, Saqib
• 2008/04/18 Re: Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data Arshad Noor
• 2008/04/18 Re: 2factor [EMAIL PROTECTED]
• 2008/04/18 Re: 2factor [EMAIL PROTECTED]
• 2008/04/18 Re: Still locked up Shannon crypto work? Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/04/18 Re: 2factor Ed Gerck
• 2008/04/18 Re: Double Encryption Q Jack Lloyd
• 2008/04/18 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Nicolas Williams
• 2008/04/16 Pi, randomness, entropy, unpredictability travis+ml-cryptography
• 2008/04/16 Double Encryption Q COMINT
• 2008/04/16 2factor Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/04/16 Privacy as Contextual Integrity - A lecture by Dr. Nissembaum of NYU Ali, Saqib
• 2008/04/16 Still locked up Shannon crypto work? Ed Gerck
• 2008/04/16 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Peter Gutmann
• 2008/04/16 Re: Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data Ali, Saqib
• 2008/04/16 Re: Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data Richard Clayton
• 2008/04/16 Re: Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data Philipp Gühring
• 2008/04/02 Re: Want to drive a Jaguar? Stefan Kelm
• 2008/04/02 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Victor Duchovni
• 2008/04/02 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Peter Gutmann
• 2008/04/02 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Steven J. Murdoch
• 2008/04/02 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered -- salting and key-strengthening zooko
• 2008/04/02 Re: presentations about encrypted storage Arshad Noor
• 2008/04/02 Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data Danilo Gligoroski
• 2008/03/31 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Peter Gutmann
• 2008/03/31 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered Ivan Krstić
• 2008/03/31 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered -- salting and key-strengthening Ivan Krstić
• 2008/03/31 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered James A. Donald
• 2008/03/31 Re: convergent encryption reconsidered Ludovic Courtès
• 2008/03/31 Re: [tahoe-dev] convergent encryption reconsidered -- salting and key-strengthening Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/31 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered Victor Duchovni
• 2008/03/31 convergent encryption reconsidered -- salting and key-strengthening zooko
• 2008/03/30 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered Ivan Krstić
• 2008/03/30 Hagelin cipher machine for sale on Ebay Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/03/30 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/03/30 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered Ivan Krstić
• 2008/03/30 Re: presentations about encrypted storage Ivan Krstić
• 2008/03/29 NSA declassified histories, cryptographic quarterly articles, online Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/03/29 presentations about encrypted storage travis+ml-cryptography
• 2008/03/28 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards James A. Donald
• 2008/03/27 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Allen
• 2008/03/27 paper enigma machine Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/03/27 Re: How is DNSSEC Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/27 Re: How is DNSSEC Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/03/26 NSA domestic intelligence "vacuum" Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/03/26 announcing allmydata.org "Tahoe", the Least-Authority Filesystem, v1.0 zooko
• 2008/03/26 Re: Protection for quasi-offline memory nabbing Alex Alten
• 2008/03/26 Re: [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered zooko
• 2008/03/26 Re: [mm] How is DNSSEC Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/26 Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/26 Re: [mm] How is DNSSEC Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/26 Re: [mm] How is DNSSEC bmanning
• 2008/03/26 Re: [mm] How is DNSSEC Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/26 Re: How is DNSSEC bmanning
• 2008/03/26 Re: How is DNSSEC Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/26 Re: How is DNSSEC Ben Laurie
• 2008/03/26 Re: How is DNSSEC Florian Weimer
• 2008/03/26 Re: How is DNSSEC Dave Howe
• 2008/03/21 Re: How is DNSSEC bmanning
• 2008/03/21 Re: convergent encryption reconsidered Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/03/21 Re: Protection for quasi-offline memory nabbing Jon Callas
• 2008/03/21 Center for Cryptologic History at the National Security Agency: Schorreck Memorial Lecture Charles Jackson
• 2008/03/21 Fwd: [tahoe-dev] [p2p-hackers] convergent encryption reconsidered zooko
• 2008/03/21 How is DNSSEC James A. Donald
• 2008/03/21 convergent encryption reconsidered zooko
• 2008/03/21 Re: Protection for quasi-offline memory nabbing Jack Lloyd
• 2008/03/21 Re: Firewire threat to FDE David Malone
• 2008/03/21 Re: Protection for quasi-offline memory nabbing Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/03/21 Re: NSA approves secure smart phone David G. Koontz
• 2008/03/21 Re: NSA approves secure smart phone David G. Koontz
• 2008/03/21 RE: Firewire threat to FDE Dave Korn
• 2008/03/21 how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards Perry E. Metzger
• 2008/03/19 Re: delegating SSL certificates Dave Howe
• 2008/03/19 Re: Firewire threat to FDE Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/03/19 Protection for quasi-offline memory nabbing Jon Callas
• 2008/03/19 Firewire threat to FDE Hagai Bar-El
• 2008/03/19 Re: delegating SSL certificates Bill Frantz
• 2008/03/19 Re: delegating SSL certificates Jon Callas
• 2008/03/19 NSA approves secure smart phone Steven M. Bellovin
• 2008/03/19 Re: delegating SSL certificates John Levine
• 2008/03/17 Re: delegating SSL certificates Bill Squier
• 2008/03/17 Re: delegating SSL certificates Leichter, Jerry
• 2008/03/17 Re: RNG for Padding "Hal Finney"
• 2008/03/17 Re: [mm] delegating SSL certificates Dirk-Willem van Gulik

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