Scott Guthery
Mon, 28 Apr 2008 10:28:34 -0700
>>Adding a backdoor to chips is a different story, though, since that would require cutting a second set of masks. >>I am assuming that there must be no backdoor in the legitimately produced chips since the client would detect >>it as a slight violation of some of their timing simulations. The client also often inspects the masks before >>the chips are produced and basically reverse-engineers the whole chip on that level. A backdoor -- hardware or software -- in a smart card or TPM would be difficult to detect by either of these means. In the case that nation A is buying these from nation F, don't you think that nation F would be motivated to slip in a couple extra lines of code or a couple extra 100 gates just in case? If A got into a tangle with C, F would in a very strong position. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]