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• • Re: One Laptop per Child security Ivan Krstić
  • Re: One Laptop per Child security Shawn Willden
  • Re: One Laptop per Child security Ivan Krstić
  • Re: One Laptop per Child security Ivan Krstić
  • Re: One Laptop per Child security Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: One Laptop per Child security Ivan Krstić
• FW: Entropy of other languages Trei, Peter
• Discrete logarithms modulo 530-bit prime Max Alekseyev
• quantum computer announcement dan
• What fresh hell is this? Laptop lockdown from afar Saqib Ali
• man in the middle, SSL James Muir
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Ivan Krstić
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Ivan Krstić
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Erik Tews
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Leichter, Jerry
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL ... addenda 2 Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL Scott G Kelly
  • Re: man in the middle, SSL ... addenda Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• convenience vs risk -- US public elections by email and beyond Ed Gerck
  • Re: convenience vs risk -- US public elections by email and beyond Ed Gerck
• deriving multiple keys from one passphrase Travis H.
  • Re: deriving multiple keys from one passphrase Leichter, Jerry
• Chaos on a chip Sean McGrath
• length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes Travis H.
  • Re: length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes Amir Herzberg
  • RE: length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes Jeremy Hansen
• News.com: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source Higgins John Gilmore
  • Re: News.com: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source Higgins Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: News.com: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source Higgins Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: News.com: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source Higgins "Hal Finney"
  • see also credentica announcement about U-prove (Re: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source) Adam Back
  • Re: see also credentica announcement about U-prove (Re: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source) Ben Laurie
  • announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials (Re: see also credentica announcement about U-prove) Adam Back
  • private credential/ecash thread on slashdot (Re: announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials) Adam Back
  • New digital bearer cash site launched Steve Schear
  • Re: New digital bearer cash site launched Adam Back
  • Re: private credential/ecash thread on slashdot (Re: announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials) Steve Schear
  • U-Prove features (Re: announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials Christian Paquin
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Matt Blaze
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Leichter, Jerry
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Matt Blaze
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Leichter, Jerry
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Alexander Klimov
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Ed Gerck
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Ed Gerck
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Andrea Pasquinucci
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Andrea Pasquinucci
  • Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Ed Gerck
  • RE: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure. Anton Stiglic
• study shows "extended validation" TLS certs ineffective Perry E. Metzger
• block cipher modes and collisions Travis H.
• "IEEE 1667" approved Perry E. Metzger
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems Travis H.
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Victor Duchovni
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Peter Gutmann
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Victor Duchovni
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Peter Gutmann
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Victor Duchovni
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Victor Duchovni
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Peter Gutmann
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Victor Duchovni
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Peter Gutmann
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Victor Duchovni
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Arun Varghese
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Erik Tews
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Massimiliano Pala
  • Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Stefan Kelm
  • RE: OT: SSL certificate chain problems Geoffrey Hird
• Forwarded: Request for Comments on primality testing Steven M. Bellovin
• more on NIST hash competition Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: more on NIST hash competition Ivan Krstić
  • Re: more on NIST hash competition Paul Hoffman
  • Re: more on NIST hash competition Peter Gutmann
  • Re: more on NIST hash competition Paul Hoffman
• Fw: NIST announces Draft Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for New Hash Algorithms Steven M. Bellovin
• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild. Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild. Derek Atkins
  • Re: "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild. Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild. James A. Donald
  • Re: "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild. Roy M. Silvernail
  • Re: "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild. Matthias Bruestle
  • Re: "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild. Florian Weimer
• MS responds to Gutmann's Vista paper Ivan Krstić
  • Re: MS responds to Gutmann's Vista paper Peter Gutmann
  • MS responds to Gutmann's Vista paper Ivan Krstić
• analysis and implementation of LRW Roland Dowdeswell
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW james hughes
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Travis H.
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Peter Gutmann
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Alexander Klimov
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Andrea Pasquinucci
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW David Wagner
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Ben Laurie
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW David Wagner
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Peter Gutmann
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Peter Gutmann
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW David Wagner
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Allen
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Victor Duchovni
  • data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Travis H.
  • Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Allen
  • Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Vlad "SATtva" Miller
  • Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Allen
  • Entropy of other languages Allen
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Travis H.
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Nicolas Williams
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Travis H.
  • RE: Entropy of other languages Trei, Peter
  • Governance of anonymous financial services Steve Schear
  • Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Allen
  • Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Steve Schear
  • Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Ian G
  • Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: *AEI-SPAM-MARK* Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: Governance of anonymous financial services Hagai Bar-El
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Sandy Harris
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Travis H.
  • Re: Entropy of other languages Sandy Harris
  • Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Leichter, Jerry
  • OTP, was Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW Travis H.
  • Re: analysis and implementation of LRW "Hal Finney"
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Saqib Ali
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Saqib Ali
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Saqib Ali
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Saqib Ali
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Chris Kuethe
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Damien Miller
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Allen
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Saqib Ali
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Victor Duchovni
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Victor Duchovni
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steve Schear
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Bill Stewart
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? james hughes
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? james hughes
  • encrypting files with lots of different keys Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steve Schear
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Saqib Ali
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Brian Gladman
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Nicholas Bohm
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steve Schear
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Saqib Ali
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? David I. Emery
  • Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE? Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Molecular Keypad Lock silvio
• SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce) Richard Powell
  • Re: SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce) Erik Tews
  • Re: SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce) Richard Powell
  • Re: SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce) Richard Powell
  • Re: SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce) Richard Powell
• How to leak a secret and not get caught PeterThermos
  • RE: How to leak a secret and not get caught Jeremy Hansen
• Why AACS will fail Frank A Stevenson
• Banking Follies Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Banking Follies John Ioannidis
  • Re: Banking Follies Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Banking Follies John Ioannidis
  • Re: Banking Follies Adam Shostack
  • Re: Banking Follies Matt Crawford
• [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500 Richard Brisson
  • Re: [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500 Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500 Roy M. Silvernail
  • Re: [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500 Rui Paulo
  • Re: [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500 Taral
• Fwd: [FDE] Inside interview with Seagate on it's new FDE Drive Saqib Ali
• A web site that believes in crypto Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: A web site that believes in crypto Erik Tews
  • Re: A web site that believes in crypto Victor Duchovni
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases Matthias Bruestle
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases Matthias Bruestle
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases Matthias Bruestle
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases Allen
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases Allen
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases John Denker
  • Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases James A. Donald
  • Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases David Wagner

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