Re: smartcards, electronic ballots

[R. Hirschfeld]

To pick nits, this is not completely accurate.  What is at odds with
non-coercibility is the ability to demonstrate to a third party how
one voted.  But there are techniques that allow a voter to verify that
his/her vote was counted correctly without being able to prove this to
others.  (Not that these are necessarily practical for a real-world
voting system.)

> Date: Sun, 04 Feb 2001 17:49:02 -0500
> From: Dan Geer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> 
> 
> 
> As seems universally the case in security design, there must
> be ugly tradeoffs.  In particular (and without quoting acres
> of prior material), the proposed requirements for verifiability
> and non-coercibility are at odds and one must yield to the
> other.  Paper systems make this tradeoff by, on the one hand,
> the polling booth (non-coercibility once within) and, on the
> other hand, the supervision of the counting process by opponents
> (verifiability by proxy), at a cost of zero technology.  Bettering
> this in the real world is challenging.
> 
> --dan
> 
> ======================================================================
> as used here
> 
> verfiability
>   -- voter may verify that his vote counted as he intended it to count
> non-coercibility
>   -- voter cannot be compelled to show how he voted, during or after
> 
> proposition:
>  If the voter can verify, then he can be coerced to do so.
> contrapositive:
>  If voter cannot be coerced, then he cannot verify.
> 
> ======================================================================
> 
> 
>