cryptography  

Messages by Date

• 2009/02/24 Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox silky
• 2009/02/24 Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Ed Gerck
• 2009/02/24 Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox silky
• 2009/02/24 Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Ed Gerck
• 2009/02/24 Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox James A. Donald
• 2009/02/24 Re: SHA-3 Round 1: Buffer Overflows Darren J Moffat
• 2009/02/24 Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Ed Gerck
• 2009/02/23 Re: SHA-3 Round 1: Buffer Overflows Steve Furlong
• 2009/02/23 Re: SHA-3 Round 1: Buffer Overflows Ian G
• 2009/02/23 Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jonathan Katz
• 2009/02/23 Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security "Hal Finney"
• 2009/02/23 Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox silky
• 2009/02/23 RE: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Dave Kleiman
• 2009/02/23 Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/23 Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security sbg
• 2009/02/23 Re: The password-reset paradox Matt Crawford
• 2009/02/23 Brazilian mandatory vehicle anti-theft and tracking regulation Santiago Aguiar
• 2009/02/23 SHA-3 Round 1: Buffer Overflows R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/02/23 Re: The password-reset paradox Debra L Cook
• 2009/02/23 "Sweden's air force 'can't send secret messages'" Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/23 Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/23 Call for Participation: Computers, Freedom & Privacy Conference Research Showcase R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/02/23 RE: The password-reset paradox Charlie Kaufman
• 2009/02/23 Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Ed Gerck
• 2009/02/23 Re: stripping https from pages Peter Gutmann
• 2009/02/23 Re: The password-reset paradox Ian G
• 2009/02/23 Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Peter Gutmann
• 2009/02/20 Re: The password-reset paradox James Chacon
• 2009/02/20 Re: The password-reset paradox Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/02/20 Re: The password-reset paradox Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/20 Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jonathan Katz
• 2009/02/20 stripping https from pages Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/02/20 The password-reset paradox Peter Gutmann
• 2009/02/20 fyi: Researchers Hack Biometric Faces ' =JeffH '
• 2009/02/20 Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Ivan Krstić
• 2009/02/20 Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Erwan Legrand
• 2009/02/20 Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/02/20 Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Lea Kissner
• 2009/02/20 Contradictory opinion on KMIP Arshad Noor
• 2009/02/20 Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge James Hughes
• 2009/02/20 Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Ben Laurie
• 2009/02/20 Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Alexander Klimov
• 2009/02/20 Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge David Molnar
• 2009/02/20 Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/02/20 Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Peter Gutmann
• 2009/02/20 Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Jeffrey I. Schiller
• 2009/02/16 how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Rene Veerman
• 2009/02/16 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Peter Gutmann
• 2009/02/16 Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge David Molnar
• 2009/02/14 Re: "Italy police warn of Skype threat" [USE THIS VERSION - left some stuff out] Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/14 "Italy police warn of Skype threat" Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/14 Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• 2009/02/14 Re: preparing a web 2.0 crypto talk Adam Shostack
• 2009/02/14 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/02/14 Crypto Craft Knowledge Ben Laurie
• 2009/02/14 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Nicholas Bohm
• 2009/02/14 preparing a web 2.0 crypto talk Travis
• 2009/02/14 ANNOUNCING allmydata.org "Tahoe", the Least-Authority Filesystem, v1.3 zooko
• 2009/02/14 Re: NSA offering 'billions' for Skype eavesdrop solution Adam Fields
• 2009/02/13 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Jon Callas
• 2009/02/13 The Magic of X.509 Certification (was Re: Property Rights in Keys) Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/02/13 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Florian Weimer
• 2009/02/13 NSA offering 'billions' for Skype eavesdrop solution Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/02/13 no warrant required James Muir
• 2009/02/13 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Ben Laurie
• 2009/02/13 Re: full-disk subversion standards released James A. Donald
• 2009/02/13 RE: Property RIghts in Keys Weger, B.M.M. de
• 2009/02/13 Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) Darren Lasko
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Jack Lloyd
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Darren J Moffat
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Donald Eastlake
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys sbg
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Nicholas Bohm
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys sbg
• 2009/02/12 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Alexander Klimov
• 2009/02/12 Re: Property RIghts in Keys Nicolas Williams
• 2009/02/12 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Ben Laurie
• 2009/02/12 UK must balance surveillance and data collection with privacy Ali, Saqib
• 2009/02/12 anyone know "Morris Code"? dan
• 2009/02/12 "Nato's cyber defence warriors " Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/12 Property RIghts in Keys Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/02/12 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Jerry Leichter
• 2009/02/12 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Brian Gladman
• 2009/02/02 XKCD shows the real world of cryptography to the masses Matt Crawford
• 2009/02/02 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Peter Gutmann
• 2009/02/02 Re: Obama's secure PDA Ivan Krstić
• 2009/02/02 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Jonathan Thornburg
• 2009/02/01 Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? John Levine
• 2009/02/01 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Ben Laurie
• 2009/02/01 Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Alistair Crooks
• 2009/02/01 RE: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Jennifer Bayuk
• 2009/02/01 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Alexander Klimov
• 2009/02/01 Re: full-disk subversion standards released David G. Koontz
• 2009/01/31 Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? John Levine
• 2009/01/31 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/01/31 Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Sascha Silbe
• 2009/01/31 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/31 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Russ Nelson
• 2009/01/31 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Bill Stewart
• 2009/01/31 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2009/01/31 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Nicolas Williams
• 2009/01/31 Re: full-disk subversion standards released John Gilmore
• 2009/01/30 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Taral
• 2009/01/30 Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Taral
• 2009/01/30 Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? John Levine
• 2009/01/30 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
• 2009/01/30 Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/30 UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Ray Dillinger
• 2009/01/30 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Jonathan Thornburg
• 2009/01/30 Re: full-disk subversion standards released Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2009/01/30 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Thomas Coppi
• 2009/01/30 Re: "Attack of the Wireless Worms" Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/30 Re: Obama's secure PDA Ivan Krstić
• 2009/01/30 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Ben Laurie
• 2009/01/30 Re: full-disk subversion standards released John Gilmore
• 2009/01/30 Re: "Attack of the Wireless Worms" Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/30 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
• 2009/01/29 "Attack of the Wireless Worms" Donald Eastlake
• 2009/01/29 Re: full-disk encryption standards released Paul Crowley
• 2009/01/29 Re: full-disk encryption standards released Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/29 Re: Obama's secure PDA David G. Koontz
• 2009/01/29 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Nicolas Williams
• 2009/01/29 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Bill Frantz
• 2009/01/29 Re: full-disk encryption standards released Arshad Noor
• 2009/01/29 RE: Obama's secure PDA ian.farquhar
• 2009/01/29 hash trees to protect court evidence for genocide trials Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/01/28 Re: Obama's secure PDA Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/28 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/28 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
• 2009/01/28 full-disk encryption standards released Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/01/28 Re: Obama's secure PDA Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/01/28 Re: What EV certs are good for John Levine
• 2009/01/28 Re: Obama's secure PDA Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/28 Re: What EV certs are good for Ben Laurie
• 2009/01/28 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon "Hal Finney"
• 2009/01/27 Re: What EV certs are good for The Fungi
• 2009/01/27 Re: What EV certs are good for William Soley
• 2009/01/27 Re: What EV certs are good for Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/27 Re: What EV certs are good for Ben Laurie
• 2009/01/27 Re: Obama's secure PDA Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/01/27 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Zooko O'Whielacronx
• 2009/01/27 Re: Obama's secure PDA Nicolas Williams
• 2009/01/27 Re: Obama's secure PDA Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/26 Re: Obama's secure PDA Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/26 Re: Obama's secure PDA Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2009/01/26 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
• 2009/01/26 Re: Obama's secure PDA Paul Hoffman
• 2009/01/26 Obama's secure PDA Ivan Krstić
• 2009/01/26 Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Gilmore
• 2009/01/25 Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Satoshi Nakamoto
• 2009/01/25 Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released dan
• 2009/01/25 What EV certs are good for Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/24 Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Bill Frantz
• 2009/01/24 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Eric Rescorla
• 2009/01/24 Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released "Hal Finney"
• 2009/01/24 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Ben Laurie
• 2009/01/24 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/23 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Eric Rescorla
• 2009/01/23 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Victor Duchovni
• 2009/01/23 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Ben Laurie
• 2009/01/21 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/21 RE: [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it Dave Kleiman
• 2009/01/20 Re: [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it dan
• 2009/01/20 Re: [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it Jason
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Nicolas Williams
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Jon Callas
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Victor Duchovni
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Paul Hoffman
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Darren J Moffat
• 2009/01/20 [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it Stefan Kelm
• 2009/01/20 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Bodo Moeller
• 2009/01/18 RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Paul Hoffman
• 2009/01/17 Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Jonathan Thornburg
• 2009/01/17 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/01/17 Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Satoshi Nakamoto
• 2009/01/17 Re: [Opensim-dev] Technical assessment of Cable Beach asset server Eugen Leitl
• 2009/01/17 Re: What risk is being defended against here? Florian Weimer
• 2009/01/17 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Marcus Brinkmann
• 2009/01/17 RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Weger, B.M.M. de
• 2009/01/17 RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/17 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow James A. Donald
• 2009/01/11 Re: What risk is being defended against here? Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/01/11 What risk is being defended against here? Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/11 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Victor Duchovni
• 2009/01/11 Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released "Hal Finney"
• 2009/01/11 RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Weger, B.M.M. de
• 2009/01/11 Re: feds try to argue touch tone content needs no wiretap order Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/01/10 Re: On the topic of "Asking the drunk"... Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/10 Re: On the topic of "Asking the drunk"... Jerry Leichter
• 2009/01/10 Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Victor Duchovni
• 2009/01/10 feds try to argue touch tone content needs no wiretap order Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/01/09 OpenPGP:SDK v0.9 released Ben Laurie
• 2009/01/09 On the topic of "Asking the drunk"... Peter Gutmann
• 2009/01/09 MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Dustin D. Trammell
• 2009/01/09 Bitcoin v0.1 released Satoshi Nakamoto

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