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• • Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox James A. Donald
  • Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Ed Gerck
  • Re: Security through kittens, was Solving password problems John Levine
  • Re: Security through kittens, was Solving password problems RL 'Bob' Morgan
  • Re: Security through kittens, was Solving password problems Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Security through kittens, was Solving password problems James A. Donald
  • Re: Security through kittens, was Solving password problems Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Ben Laurie
  • Re: Solving password problems one at a time, Re: The password-reset paradox Peter Gutmann
  • Re: The password-reset paradox Ian G
  • RE: The password-reset paradox Charlie Kaufman
  • Re: The password-reset paradox Matt Crawford
• fyi: Researchers Hack Biometric Faces ' =JeffH '
• Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security R.A. Hettinga
  • Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jonathan Katz
  • Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security sbg
  • Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security Jonathan Katz
  • Re: Shamir secret sharing and information theoretic security "Hal Finney"
• Contradictory opinion on KMIP Arshad Noor
• how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Rene Veerman
  • Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Jeffrey I. Schiller
  • Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Peter Gutmann
  • Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Alexander Klimov
  • Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Lea Kissner
  • Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Erwan Legrand
  • Re: how to properly secure non-ssl logins (php + ajax) Ivan Krstić
• "Italy police warn of Skype threat" Jerry Leichter
  • Re: "Italy police warn of Skype threat" [USE THIS VERSION - left some stuff out] Jerry Leichter
• Crypto Craft Knowledge Ben Laurie
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge David Molnar
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge David Molnar
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Ben Laurie
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Cat Okita
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Ben Laurie
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge James Hughes
  • Re: Crypto Craft Knowledge Cat Okita
• preparing a web 2.0 crypto talk Travis
  • Re: preparing a web 2.0 crypto talk Adam Shostack
• ANNOUNCING allmydata.org "Tahoe", the Least-Authority Filesystem, v1.3 zooko
• NSA offering 'billions' for Skype eavesdrop solution Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: NSA offering 'billions' for Skype eavesdrop solution Adam Fields
• no warrant required James Muir
• Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) Darren Lasko
• UK must balance surveillance and data collection with privacy Ali, Saqib
• anyone know "Morris Code"? dan
• "Nato's cyber defence warriors " Jerry Leichter
• Property RIghts in Keys Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Nicolas Williams
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys sbg
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys sbg
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Donald Eastlake
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Jon Callas
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Darren J Moffat
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Jack Lloyd
  • RE: Property RIghts in Keys Weger, B.M.M. de
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Florian Weimer
  • The Magic of X.509 Certification (was Re: Property Rights in Keys) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Nicholas Bohm
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Nicholas Bohm
  • Re: Property RIghts in Keys Steven M. Bellovin
• XKCD shows the real world of cryptography to the masses Matt Crawford
• "Attack of the Wireless Worms" Donald Eastlake
  • Re: "Attack of the Wireless Worms" Jerry Leichter
  • Re: "Attack of the Wireless Worms" Peter Gutmann
• hash trees to protect court evidence for genocide trials Perry E. Metzger
• full-disk encryption standards released Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: full-disk encryption standards released Arshad Noor
  • Re: full-disk encryption standards released Peter Gutmann
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released John Gilmore
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released John Gilmore
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Peter Gutmann
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released David G. Koontz
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Alexander Klimov
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Ben Laurie
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Peter Gutmann
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Jerry Leichter
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Ben Laurie
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Alexander Klimov
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Ben Laurie
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released James A. Donald
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Kent Yoder
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Kent Yoder
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Peter Gutmann
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Peter Gutmann
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Darren J Moffat
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Darren J Moffat
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Darren J Moffat
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Taral
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Nicolas Williams
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: full-disk subversion standards released Brian Gladman
  • Re: full-disk encryption standards released Paul Crowley
• Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Zooko O'Whielacronx
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon "Hal Finney"
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Bill Frantz
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Thomas Coppi
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Bill Stewart
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Nicolas Williams
• Obama's secure PDA Ivan Krstić
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Paul Hoffman
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Ivan Krstić
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Ivan Krstić
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Nicolas Williams
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA David G. Koontz
  • RE: Obama's secure PDA ian.farquhar
  • Re: Obama's secure PDA Steven M. Bellovin
• What EV certs are good for Jerry Leichter
  • Re: What EV certs are good for Ben Laurie
  • Re: What EV certs are good for Jerry Leichter
  • Re: What EV certs are good for William Soley
  • Re: What EV certs are good for Ben Laurie
  • Re: What EV certs are good for The Fungi
  • Re: What EV certs are good for John Levine
• [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it Stefan Kelm
  • Re: [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it Jason
  • RE: [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it Dave Kleiman
  • Re: [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it dan
• Re: [Opensim-dev] Technical assessment of Cable Beach asset server Eugen Leitl
• What risk is being defended against here? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: What risk is being defended against here? Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: What risk is being defended against here? Florian Weimer
• feds try to argue touch tone content needs no wiretap order Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: feds try to argue touch tone content needs no wiretap order Steven M. Bellovin
• OpenPGP:SDK v0.9 released Ben Laurie
• On the topic of "Asking the drunk"... Peter Gutmann
  • Re: On the topic of "Asking the drunk"... Jerry Leichter
  • Re: On the topic of "Asking the drunk"... Peter Gutmann
• Bitcoin v0.1 released Satoshi Nakamoto
  • Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released "Hal Finney"
  • Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Satoshi Nakamoto
  • Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released "Hal Finney"
  • Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Bill Frantz
  • Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released dan
  • Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released Satoshi Nakamoto
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Gilmore
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Russ Nelson
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon Ben Laurie
  • UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Ray Dillinger
  • Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? John Levine
  • Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Taral
  • Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Sascha Silbe
  • Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? John Levine
  • Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Alistair Crooks
  • Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? John Levine
  • RE: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing? Jennifer Bayuk
  • Re: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon John Levine
• [tmo...@seas.harvard.edu: [fc-announce] Financial Crypto February 23-26 in Barbados, Early Registration Deadline Approaching] R. Hirschfeld
• BIS looking for feedback on export controls Noah Salzman
• CodeCon 2009 Call for Presentations Len Sassaman
• enigma simulator in flash Perry E. Metzger
• Steve Bellovin on the MD5 Collision attacks, more on Wired David G. Koontz
• Researchers Use PlayStation Cluster to Forge a Web Skeleton Key David G. Koontz
• Researchers Show How to Forge Site Certificates | David G. Koontz
• MD5 considered harmful today Jacob Appelbaum
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today "Hal Finney"
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today Eric Rescorla
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today Len Sassaman
  • MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Dustin D. Trammell
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Victor Duchovni
  • RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Weger, B.M.M. de
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Victor Duchovni
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow James A. Donald
  • RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Peter Gutmann
  • RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Weger, B.M.M. de
  • RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Paul Hoffman
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Darren J Moffat
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Paul Hoffman
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Nicolas Williams
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Bodo Moeller
  • Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow Victor Duchovni

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