Insights to the Daf: Yoma 66-70

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Yoma 66

1) "AND UPON HEARING THE NAME OF HASHEM THE PEOPLE BOWED"
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that when the Kohen Gadol mentioned the
Name of Hashem during the recitation of the Viduy on the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach (the third Viduy of the day), all of the people who were
gathered in the Mikdash bowed down. By bowing upon hearing the Name of
Hashem, the people gave honor to Hashem. (The Yerushalmi says that when
they heard the Name of Hashem, the people near the Kohen Gadol bowed
down, and the people who were far away proclaimed, "Baruch Shem Kevod
Malchuso....")

The Kohen Gadol uttered the Name of Hashem at other times during the Yom
Kippur service. The Mishnah earlier (35b) states that he uttered the
Name of Hashem during the first Viduy on the Par. Similarly, the Mishnah
(39a) states that he uttered the Name of Hashem during the second Viduy
on the Par. Another Mishnah (41b) states that he uttered the Name of
Hashem when he performed the Goral to choose the Sa'ir la'Shem. The
Beraisa (39b) summarizes and says that the Name of Hashem was uttered
ten times on Yom Kippur -- three times during each of the three Viduyim
and once during the Goral.

Why does the Mishnah in all of those places omit mention of the people's
prostration at the time of the Kohen Gadol's utterance of the Name of
Hashem?

ANSWERS:
(a) The VILNA GA'ON emends the text of the Mishnah here so that it makes
no mention of the people's prostration. (The DIKDUKEI SOFRIM #100 points
out that a number of early manuscripts do not include these words in the
Mishnah.) Even though it is true that the people bowed down (as the
Beraisa and Gemara mention), the Mishnah does not mention it because it
is not a detail in the laws of Yom Kippur, but rather in the laws of
Hazkaras Hashem, mentioning the Name of Hashem, and thus it does not
belong in the Mishnayos which discuss the Avodos of Yom Kippur.

The Mishnah in Sotah (37b-38a) mentions the differences between the
recitation of Birkas Kohanim in the Beis ha'Mikdash and the recitation
of Birkas Kohanim everywhere else. The Mishnah there says that in the
Beis ha'Mikdash, the Birkas Kohanim included the actual pronouncement of
the Name of Hashem. The GEVURAS ARI here (see also Insights to Yoma
37:1) asks that the Mishnah in Sotah should also mention as a difference
the prostration that was performed when the Name of Hashem was uttered,
since it was performed in the Beis ha'Mikdash (because the Name of
Hashem was pronounced) and nowhere else. According to the Vilna Ga'on's
understanding, the answer to this question is that there is no need for
the Mishnah in Sotah to mention the prostration as a difference, because
that is not a Halachah which relates specifically to Birkas Kohanim.

(b) In the RAMBAM's text of the Mishnah, the people's prostration is
mentioned *only* in the earlier Mishnah (35b) with regard to the first
Viduy, which is the first time that the Mishnah mentions that the Kohen
Gadol uttered the Name of Hashem. Thereafter the Mishnah does not need
to mention that the people bowed, because the first Mishnah already
mentioned it.

(c) RAV YOSEF DOV SOLOVEITCHIK (Avodas Yom ha'Kipurim, 37a) writes that
perhaps the reason why the people bowed at the mention of Hashem's name
was not in order to honor the Name of Hashem. Rather, it was an act
related specifically to the Viduy recited over the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach. Accordingly, it is fitting that only the Mishnah here
mentions it and not the earlier Mishnayos.

RASHI (21a, DH Mishtachavim) writes that the people used to bow when
they recited Viduy in the Beis ha'Mikdash. If bowing indeed is related
specifically to Viduy, then it makes sense that the *people* bowed only
when the Name of Hashem was said during "the *people's* Viduy" (the
Viduy recited over the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach on behalf of atonement for
the sins of the entire nation). Even though the Name of Hashem was
mentioned during the Goral, the Goral was not a Viduy and thus the
people did not bow at that time. When the Name of Hashem was uttered
during the first and second Viduyim, the people did not bow because
those two Viduyim were for the Kohen Gadol himself (although all of the
Kohanim gained atonement through the second Viduy, their atonement was
only "b'Kufya" -- secondary to the Kohen Gadol's atonement -- as the
Gemara (50b) explains). In contrast, the Viduy of the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach was for all of the Jewish people, and therefore the
people bowed when they heard the Name of Hashem.

(See TOSFOS YOM TOV (DH veha'Kohanim), who alludes to such an approach
but eventually rejects it, asserting that the people bowed to honor the
Name of Hashem and not because of the Viduy. The premise of the Tosfos
Yom Tov is borne out by the Avodah prayer recited on the Yom Kippur,
which mentions three (Nusach Ashkenaz) or four (Nusach Sefard) bowings.)

As an aside, Rav Soloveitchik points out that during the Avodah prayer
of Yom Kippur, it is customary to bow down four times -- three times
during the description of the three Viduyim, and one time during the
description of the Goral (the latter according to the Nusach Sefard text
of the Avodah). Why do we bow down four times? If we do not accept Rav
Soloveitchik's understanding of the Mishnah, we should bow down ten
times, just as the people bowed down in the Beis ha'Mikdash ten times on
Yom Kippur when the Kohen Gadol uttered the Name of Hashem (three times
during each Viduy, and once at the time of the Goral). According to Rav
Soloveitchik's understanding, we should bow down only once, during the
Viduy of the Sa'ir.

He answers that the prostrations during Musaf on Yom Kippur are not for
the sake of giving honor to the Name of Hashem, but rather they
commemorate what was done during the Avodah of Yom Kippur in the Beis
ha'Mikdash. It suffices to bow once during each Viduy to demonstrate
what was done in the Beis ha'Mikdash. (See also PERISHAH OC 621.) He
suggests further, based on the Rambam in Hilchos Tefilah (9:1), that
when a prayer involves a series of responses (such as a series of
prostrations or "Amen"s), it suffices to respond once at the end of the
prayer rather than to respond at various points in the prayer. Thus, it
was sufficient to bow once at the end of each Viduy, even though the
Name of Hashem was mentioned three times in each Viduy. 



2) "TITHARU" -- THE COMMON PRACTICE TODAY
QUESTION: The Mishnah describes the procedure of the Viduy with the
Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach. The Kohen Gadol approached the Sa'ir, laid his
hands upon it, and uttered the confession on behalf of the Jewish
people. The description of the procedure is incorporated into the
Chazan's repetition of Musaf on Yom Kippur recited today. However, there
is a difference between the way the Chazan recites the text of the Viduy
of the Kohen Gadol, and the way the Kohen Gadol actually said it. The
common practice is that when the Chazan reaches the words "Lifnei
Hashem" in the verse, "Ki ba'Yom ha'Zeh Yechaper Aleichem... Lifnei
Hashem Titharu," he pauses while the congregation recites the next words
in the Mishnah, "veha'Kohanim veha'Am... Hayu Mishtachavim," and
everyone bows down (in some communities, only the Chazan recites those
words and bows down). After everyone has bowed down, the Chazan
continues and says "Titharu," the last word of the verse he started
before the pause. (This is also the order printed in most editions of
the Yom Kippur Machzor.)

Why does the Chazan pause before he recites the word "Titharu"? The
Mishnah makes no mention of such an interruption. Rather, it says that
the Kohen Gadol recited the verse in its entirety, and afterwards it
describes how the people and the other Kohanim bowed down when they
heard the Name of Hashem.

ANSWER: RAV SHALOM SHVADRON zt'l, the Magid of Yerushalayim (who served
as the Ba'al Tefilah on Yom Kippur for many years in the Chevron Yeshiva
in Givat Mordechai, Yerushalayim) said that although the people in the
Beis ha'Mikdash bowed down immediately when they heard the Name of
Hashem, there indeed is no reason for the Chazan to split up the verse
and mention the last word of the verse ("Titharu") *after* he says the
other words of the Mishnah that describe the people's prostration. Rav
Shalom asserted that there is absolutely no source for interrupting the
verse. Therefore, when he would serve as Chazan he would complete the
verse and say, "Lifnei Hashem Titharu" before he continued with the
words, "veha'Kohanim veha'Am...." This is also the practice in a number
of congregations.

Perhaps the source of the common practice to divide the verse is as
follows. The TUR (OC 621) quotes RAV SA'ADYAH GA'ON who says that when
the Chazan recounts the Viduy that the Kohen Gadol said ("Ana
ha'Shem..."), he should not say the actual Name of Hashem when he quotes
the verse, "Lifnei Hashem Titharu." Rather, he should the say the word
"ha'Shem" ("the Name"). When the custom of Rav Sa'adyah Ga'on was
introduced, the Chazan no longer recited the Name of Hashem in the
verse, but rather the word "ha'Shem." Since the Name of Hashem was not
recited, there was nothing wrong with interrupting in the middle of the
verse. Later, as the Tur relates in the name of RABEINU YITZCHAK IBN
GE'AS, the practice was changed again and the Name of Hashem was recited
by the Chazan when he said the verse. However, the printers of the Yom
Kippur Machzor neglected to correct the corresponding change in the
Machzor and did not remove the interruption between the first part of
the verse and the word "Titharu." (M. Kornfeld)



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Yoma 67

67b----------------------------------67b

1) THE PROOF THAT ONE MAY DERIVE BENEFIT FROM THE REMAINS OF THE "SA'IR
HA'MISHTALE'ACH"
QUESTIONS: The Gemara records a dispute between Rav and Shmuel with
regard to whether one may derive benefit from the limbs of the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach. Rava asserts that it is logical to say that one may
derive benefit from them, because had the Torah prohibited them it would
not have commanded that the Sa'ir be sent away in a manner that would
cause a person to sin. (As Rashi explains, one might find the limbs and
derive benefit from them without realizing that they came from the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach.)

A similar discussion appears in the Gemara in Kidushin (57b). The Gemara
there asks whether one may derive benefit from the live bird of the
Metzora (which he dips into blood and sends away as part of his
purification process). The Gemara answers that it is not possible that
the bird is Asur b'Hana'ah, because the Torah would not have commanded
that it be sent away in a manner that would cause a person to sin (one
might find it and eat it without realizing that it is Asur b'Hana'ah).
The fact that the Torah commands the Metzora to send away the bird
proves that it is Mutar b'Hana'ah.

The proof that the limbs of the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach, and bird of a
Metzora, are Mutar b'Hana'ah is difficult to understand.

(a) The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Me'ilah 7:6) points out that even if
the limbs of a Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach and bird of a Metzora are Asur
b'Hana'ah, one who finds them and unknowingly derives benefit from them
has *not* transgressed. In such a situation, the person is *permitted*
to derive benefit from them because of the principle of "Kol d'Parish,
m'Ruba Parish." This principle teaches that when there is a doubt about
the source of a certain item (such as from where it came or to which
group it belongs), the item is assumed to have come from the majority
group. One who finds the limbs of a goat or catches a bird may assume
that his find comes from the majority of goats and birds in the world,
from which one is permitted to derive benefit.

Accordingly, even if the limbs of the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach are Asur
b'Hana'ah, one who finds them is permitted to derive benefit from them.
How does the Gemara prove that they are Mutar b'Hana'ah from the fact
that one might find the limbs and benefit from them?

(b) The GEVURAS ARI and SI'ACH YITZCHAK ask that the sending away of the
Sa'ir, even if it is Asur b'Hana'ah, should not be considered a
potential cause for transgression ("Takalah"). If the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach is Asur b'Hana'ah, then it should be treated like any
other Isur Hana'ah and *buried* after Yom Kippur in order to prevent any
Takalah from occurring. The argument of Takalah is appropriate only when
an object is sent out to roam freely in the wild (such as the bird of
the Metzora). In such a case, it is not possible to treat the animal
like other Isurei Hana'ah and bury it, and thus the concern for Takalah
is relevant. In contrast, the Sa'ir is pushed off a cliff to its death,
and its limbs can easily be buried.

(The Si'ach Yitzchak adds that it is because of this question that the
Amora who maintains that the Sa'ir remains Asur b'Hana'ah does *not*
compare the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach to the bird of the Metzora. The proof
that the bird of the Metzora is Mutar b'Hana'ah because of the concern
for Takalah does not apply to the limbs of the Sa'ir.)

ANSWERS:
(a) The MISHNEH L'MELECH answers the first question as follows. The
potential Takalah is not that a person who finds the limbs will benefit
from them and transgress a prohibition (because, as mentioned above, the
principle of "Kol d'Parish" permits him to benefit from the limbs).
Rather, the Takalah in the case of the Sa'ir is that the person who
sends away the Sa'ir transgresses if the Sa'ir is Asur b'Hana'ah: When
he sends it away, he deliberately causes a prohibited object to become
annulled, and the principle of "Ein Mevatlin Isur l'Chatchilah" teaches
that one may not deliberately cause a prohibited object to become
annulled. The Torah would not have commanded that he send away the Sa'ir
and thereby annul a prohibited object. It must be that the Sa'ir is
Mutar b'Hana'ah.

The SHA'AR HA'MELECH (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 15:25) challenges the
answer of the Mishneh l'Melech. Almost all of the Rishonim rule that the
prohibition of "Ein Mevatlin Isur l'Chatchilah" is only mid'Rabanan. The
Torah does not prohibit one from annulling a prohibited object (see
SHULCHAN ARUCH YD 99:5, and SHACH 99:7). Consequently, the person who
sends away the Sa'ir does *not* transgress any Torah prohibition against
annulling a prohibited object, and his act cannot be the Takalah to
which the Gemara here refers.

The MAHARATZ CHAYOS answers the Sha'ar ha'Melech's question. He explains
that the Isur d'Rabanan of "Ein Mevatlin Isur l'Chatchilah" applies when
the mixture of forbidden and permitted items is comprised of items which
blend with each other and render each other unrecognizable (such as a
forbidden liquid which fell into a permitted liquid). In such a case,
the Torah permits one to annul the Isur, and the Rabanan prohibit it.
However, when solid items become mixed up in such a way that each piece
remains separate but one does not recognize which piece is the piece of
Isur, even mid'Oraisa one is prohibited from annulling the Isur (because
the piece of Isur in the mixture remains physically unchanged and is
independent of the other pieces; the only doubt is its location in the
mixture).

(b) The GEVURAS ARI and SI'ACH YITZCHAK answer the second question as
follows. The reason why the Gemara considers sending away the Sa'ir to
be a Takalah if it is Asur b'Hana'ah, even though the limbs can be
buried and kept away from inadvertent use, is because it is possible
that the Sa'ir will not die during its descent, and when it reaches the
bottom it will run away. (Although the Gemara (66b) teaches that in the
event that the Sa'ir does not die from the fall the Torah requires that
one go down and kill it, nevertheless it is possible that the animal
will run away before the person reaches it.) Indeed, the Yerushalmi
(Yoma 6:3) relates that this was a common occurrence after the death of
Shimon ha'Tzadik.

However, RASHI (DH l'Takalah) apparently does not accept this answer.
Rashi implies that the Gemara is concerned only that one will find and
use the dismembered *limbs* of the Sa'ir, and not that one will find and
use a live Sa'ir.

Perhaps the reason why the Gemara does not consider the burial of the
Sa'ir as a way to prevent Takalah is because the Sa'ir is crushed into
many pieces as it falls down the steep incline, as the Mishnah here
says. So many small pieces become scattered that it is not possible to
bury every little piece of the Sa'ir. Consequently, the concern for
Takalah remains even after the limbs of the Sa'ir are buried. (M.
Kornfeld)



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Yoma 68

68b----------------------------------68b

1) WAITING FOR THE "SA'IR HA'MISHTALE'ACH" TO REACH THE WILDERNESS
QUESTION: The Mishnah relates that when the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach
reached the wilderness, "they said to the Kohen Gadol, 'The Sa'ir has
reached the wilderness.'" RASHI (DH Amru Lo) explains that after the
Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach was sent away, the Kohen Gadol was not allowed to
begin another Avodah until the Sa'ir reached the wilderness. Once it
reached the wilderness, the Mitzvah to send away the Sa'ir was fulfilled
(according to Rebbi Yehudah) and the Kohen Gadol was permitted to
proceed to the next Avodah.

The previous Mishnah (67b) states that after the Kohen Gadol sent away
the Sa'ir, he immediately proceeded to the next stage of the Avodah and
removed the innards ("Emurin") from the Par and Sa'ir ha'Nisrafin. Why
was the Kohen Gadol permitted to perform that Avodah before he was
informed that the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach reached the wilderness?

It must be that the removal of the Emurin from the Par and Sa'ir
ha'Nisrafin is not a real Avodah. Since it is merely a preparatory act
for another Avodah (the burning of the Emurin on the Mizbe'ach), the
Kohen Gadol was permitted to perform this act before the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach reached the wilderness.

However, if the Kohen Gadol was permitted to perform an act which does
not constitute an Avodah, why was he not permitted to begin reading from
the Torah immediately after he sent away the Sa'ir? The Gemara later
clearly states that the reading of the Torah is not considered an
Avodah, and yet the Mishnah implies that the Kohen Gadol needed to wait
until he was informed that the Sa'ir had reached the wilderness before
he began to read from the Torah (as Rashi says later, DH Na'asis
Mitzvaso).

ANSWERS:
(a) RABEINU YEHONASAN MI'LUNIL suggests that the Kohen Gadol indeed read
from the Torah immediately after he sent away the Sa'ir. Moreover, he
suggests that the reason why the Torah was read at this time was to
engage the people in a productive endeavor while they waited for the
Sa'ir to reach the wilderness, at which time the Kohen Gadol would
become permitted to begin the next Avodah.

The YEFEH EINAYIM (67b) cites an opinion in the Yerushalmi that supports
the assertion of Rabeinu Yehonasan mi'Lunil. The Yerushalmi says that
the Kohen Gadol approached the Par and Sa'ir, and then he read from the
Torah *immediately* after he sent the Sa'ir to the wilderness. He did
not wait for the Sa'ir to arrive at the wilderness, because both the act
of preparing the Par and Sa'ir and the act of reading the Torah are not
Avodos.

(b) However, RASHI and the TOSFOS YESHANIM write that there are other
sources for the requirement to read the Torah at this point in the
service of Yom Kippur. Rashi (DH Ba Likros) writes that the Kohen
Gadol's obligation to read from the Torah on Yom Kippur is derived from
the Parshah of Milu'im, as the Gemara earlier (5b) teaches. The Tosfos
Yeshanim cites the Yerushalmi which states that the obligation to read
from the Torah on Yom Kippur is derived from a verse (Vayikra 16:34).

The Tosfos Yeshanim says that, alternatively, the obligation is derived
logically. The Kohen Gadol must pray at some point during the day. Since
he has completed the main Avodos of the day once he has sent away the
Sa'ir, that moment is an opportune time for him to pray for forgiveness
and to read from the Torah.

Rashi (DH Na'asis Mitzavso) clearly says that the Kohen Gadol did not
read from the Torah until after the Sa'ir reached the wilderness and the
Mitzvah was completed. Why was the Kohen Gadol required to wait to read
the Torah if he was permitted to remove the Emurin?

Perhaps the requirement that the Kohen Gadol wait until the Sa'ir
reaches the wilderness before he begins a new Avodah applies only to an
act which is part of a *new* series of Avodos unrelated to the Avodos
done until now. The removal of the Emurin from the Par and Sa'ir is
merely a continuation of the Avodos which were started earlier. Perhaps
this is why the Kohen Gadol was permitted to remove the Emurin at this
point, while he was not permitted to read the Torah (an entirely new
act) until the Mitzvah of sending the Sa'ir was completed.

(c) The BRISKER RAV cites his father, RAV CHAIM SOLOVEITCHIK, who
proposes that not only was the Kohen Gadol prohibited from starting a
new Avodah until the previous one was completed, but he was also
prohibited from *leaving the area* in which he stood until the previous
Avodah was completed. Since the Kohen Gadol sent away the Sa'ir from the
Azarah, he was not permitted to leave the Azarah in order to go to the
Ezras Nashim to read the Torah. He was required to remain in the Azarah
until he was informed that the Sa'ir reached the wilderness.

(d) The NETZIV (in MEROMEI SADEH) answers that although the reading of
the Torah was not an Avodah, it was an act which the Kohen Gadol was
required to perform *himself*. Since it required the Kohen Gadol, he was
not permitted to begin until he completed the previous Avodah. In
contrast, the removal of the Emurin could be performed by any Kohen;
there was no obligation for the Kohen Gadol himself to do it. Therefore,
the Kohen Gadol was permitted to remove the Emurin before the Sa'ir
reached the wilderness.



2) READING THE TORAH BY HEART
QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that after the Kohen Gadol read Parshas
Acharei Mos (Vayikra 16:1 to 18:30) and the verses in Parshas Emor that
discuss Yom Kippur (Vayikra 23:26-32), he rolled up the Torah scroll,
held it close to his chest, and read by heart the verses in Parshas
Pinchas (Bamidbar 29:7-11) that discuss Yom Kippur.

Why was the Kohen Gadol permitted to read verses by heart? The Halachah
prohibits one from reading verses in the Torah by heart (Gitin 60b).

ANSWERS:
(a) The RITVA (70a) explains, based on the Yerushalmi, that the
prohibition against reading verses of the Torah by heart applies only to
verses which must be read publicly ("Chovas Keri'as Tzibur"). The
prohibition does not apply to verses read for the sake of reviewing the
Torah, or for the sake of giving praise to Hashem. The Kohen Gadol was
permitted to read verses of the Torah by heart on Yom Kippur because
there was no obligation to read these verses publicly. Rather, they were
read merely for the sake of reviewing the topics relevant for the day.
(This is in contrast to the explanation of Rashi, who says that there
was an obligation to read the verses publicly.)

(b) The TOSFOS YESHANIM (70a) says that there is no *prohibition* to
read verses of the Torah by heart; rather, it is a *Mitzvah Min
ha'Muvchar* (the most preferable way to perform the Mitzvah) to read the
verses from the Sefer Torah. The Rabanan permitted the Kohen Gadol to
read part of the Torah by heart on Yom Kippur in order not to trouble
the people to wait as he rolled the Sefer Torah to the proper place. The
Rabanan permitted him not to do the Mitzvah in the most preferable way
for the sake of the honor of the Tzibur.

(c) The TALMIDEI RABEINU YONAH in Berachos (9b) explain as follows. The
Torah requires an individual to read certain verses, but it does not
require him to read them from a Sefer Torah. For example, the Torah
requires one to recite the Shema twice each day, but it permits him to
recite the verses of Shema by heart. The Torah does not expect every
person to read the Shema twice each day from a Sefer Torah. The same
applies to the verses of Birkas Kohanim which the Kohanim recite each
day when they bless the people. Similarly, the Gemara in Ta'anis (27b)
says that when the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing, one who recites the
Parshah of Korbanos in the Torah is considered as though he offered the
Korbanos. One certainly is not required to recite the Parshah of
Korbanos every day from a Sefer Torah.

Since the Torah permits one to recite these verses by heart, he may
recite them by heart even when he does *not* perform a specific Mitzvah
when he reads them. For this reason, the Kohen Gadol may read by heart
the verses which discuss the Korbanos of Yom Kippur.

It seems that these three answers of the Rishonim appear to be based on
three different reasons for the prohibition against reciting verses of
the Torah by heart.

The first reason is that when one reads verses by heart, he might make a
mistake. This reason is consistent with the explanation of the Ritva
(a), who says that one must read from a Sefer Torah only when there is
an obligation to read the verses in public (see also Tosfos to Temurah
14b, DH Devarim). In order for the Tzibur to fulfill the obligation, the
reader must not make a mistake. In contrast, when one reads verses for
the sake of giving praise to Hashem the consequences of making a mistake
are not as severe, because he is not attempting to fulfill any
obligation.

(See also the TUR (OC 49) who quotes his uncle, HA'RAV REBBI CHAIM, who
says that one may recite verses by heart when he is fluent in those
verses, because there is no concern that he will err. This is also the
approach of RABEINU TAM cited by the MORDECHAI in Gitin (#407). This
reasoning also seems to be the basis of the answer of the SHILTEI
GIBORIM in Megilah (14a of the pages of the Rif), who rules that it is
permissible for the congregation as a whole to recite verses by heart.
When the entire congregation recites verses by heart, it is unlikely
that everyone will make the same mistake.)

The second reason given for the obligation to read verses from the Sefer
Torah and not by heart is cited by the BEIS YOSEF (OC 49) and by the
RITVA in Gitin (60b) in the name of the RAMBAN. The written word --
which one sees when he reads the verses from the Sefer Torah -- contains
various elements and meanings which one does not see when he recites the
verses by heart. The advantage of reading the verses with those deeper
meanings, however, is only a Mitzvah Min ha'Muvchar; one certainly
fulfills his obligation if he does not have in mind those deeper
meanings. This is consistent with the answer of the Tosfos Yeshanim (b).

The third reason is offered by the KOL BO. If one recites verses by
heart in front of an open Sefer Torah, the people present might think
that those verses are not part of the Torah. Therefore, one must always
read from the Sefer Torah. This reason is consistent with the answer of
the Talmidei Rabeinu Yonah (c). If verses are normally recited by heart
in the course of a Mitzvah, then everyone knows that they are in the
Torah and that they are recited by heart only out of necessity. No one
will think that they are not written in the Torah. (M. Kornfeld) (See
also Insights to Sotah 40:3 and Temurah 14:3.)
 


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Yoma 69

1) "KIL'AYIM" IN THE VESTMENTS OF THE KOHEN
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether a Kohen is permitted to derive
benefit from the Bigdei Kehunah while he is not performing an Avodah.
Does deriving benefit from the Bigdei Kehunah constitute Me'ilah or not?
The Gemara suggests various proofs to permit a Kohen to derive benefit
from the Bigdei Kehunah. The first proof is from the Mishnah (68b) which
states that the Kohen Gadol may wear the Bigdei Kehunah when he reads
from the Torah (which is not an Avodah) on Yom Kippur. The second proof
is from a Beraisa which says that the Kohanim are permitted to sleep in
the Bigdei Kehunah and to walk around while wearing the Bigdei Kehunah.
Finally, the Gemara cites a Beraisa which says that the Kohanim are
permitted to place the Bigdei Kehunah beneath their heads when they
sleep.

The Gemara rejects its final proof and says that the Beraisa does not
mean that the Kohanim are permitted to place the Bigdei Kehunah
*underneath* their heads, but rather *beside* their heads. The Gemara
supports this interpretation of the Beraisa by pointing out that the
Beraisa cannot mean that the Kohanim may place the Bigdei Kehunah
literally underneath their heads, because if they place the Bigdei
Kehunah there they will transgress the prohibition against deriving
benefit from Kil'ayim (the Avnet was made of wool and linen).

Why does the Gemara address the problem of Kil'ayim only at this point?
If wearing the Bigdei Kehunah (when not performing an Avodah) poses a
problem of Kil'ayim, why does the Gemara earlier suggest that the Kohen
may wear the Bigdei Kehunah even when he is not performing an Avodah?
Even if he transgresses no prohibition of Me'ilah, he still transgresses
the prohibition of Kil'ayim! Why does the Gemara address the problem of
Kil'ayim only now, when it discusses placing the Bigdei Kehunah
underneath one's head?

ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS in Menachos (40b-41a, DH Techeles) and the TOSFOS YESHANIM
here write that the Gemara here provides strong support for the opinion
of RABEINU TAM. Rabeinu Tam asserts that since one is permitted to wear
a garment which contains Kil'ayim in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of
Tzitzis, he may wear that garment even at a time when he fulfills no
Mitzvah (such as the nighttime). (Rabeinu Tam maintains that the reason
why one may wear a garment with Kil'ayim in order to fulfill the Mitzvah
of Tzitzis is not merely because of the principle, "Aseh Docheh Lo
Ta'aseh," but because the Torah completely permits the prohibition of
Kil'ayim on a garment with Tzitzis.) Similarly, with regard to Kil'ayim
in the Bigdei Kehunah, since the Kohen is permitted to wear the Bigdei
Kehunah with Kil'ayim when he performs the Avodah he may also wear the
Bigdei Kehunah with Kil'ayim when he does not perform the Avodah. The
prohibition against benefiting from Kil'ayim applies only when the Kohen
does not *wear* the Bigdei Kehunah but merely *warms* himself with them
in some other way. The Torah permits Kil'ayim only when the Kohen
*wears* the Bigdei Kehunah, but not when he sits on top of them or rests
his head on them.

(See also RA'AVAD, Hilchos Kil'ayim 10:32 and Hilchos Klei ha'Mikdash
8:10, who rules like Rabeinu Tam and argues with the Rambam on this
point.)

(b) The MEFARESH in Tamid (27a) says that the Gemara's question here
with regard to Kil'ayim refers back to the beginning of the Sugya. The
Gemara indeed could have asked this question earlier, but it knew that
the answer to the question would apply to the entire Sugya (to all of
the cases of Kohanim who wear the Bigdei Kehunah with Kil'ayim). The
Gemara answers that the garment with Kil'ayim is made of a very hard
material, to which the prohibition of Kil'ayim does not apply. 

The Mefaresh understands that not only is one permitted to lie on
Kil'ayim when the garment is made of a hard material, but the
prohibition does not apply even when one *wears* a garment made of a
hard material. Since such a garment does not warm the person while he
wears it, it does not constitute forbidden benefit from Kil'ayim. (See
following Insights.)



2) THE PROHIBITION OF LYING ON "KIL'AYIM"
QUESTION: The Gemara cites a Beraisa which states that although the
Torah forbids one only from wearing Kil'ayim upon his body, the Rabanan
prohibited even lying or sitting on Kil'ayim out of concern that perhaps
a thread of Kil'ayim will become wrapped upon the person in such a way
that he will benefit from wearing it. The Gemara asks that perhaps the
Isur d'Rabanan applies only when the Kil'ayim is directly underneath the
person, but if another object separates between him and the Kil'ayim he
may lie or sit on it. The Gemara responds with a statement of the
Tana'im that even when ten sheets are spread over the Kil'ayim, one
sheet on top of the other, one may not lie on the uppermost sheet.

Why does the Beraisa say that the reason for the Isur d'Rabanan against
lying on Kil'ayim is because of the concern that a thread of Kil'ayim
will wrap up onto the person's body? If one is forbidden to lie even on
top of sheets which cover the Kil'ayim, the prohibition obviously is
*not* due to the concern that a thread might wrap up onto one's body,
because many sheets separate his body from the Kil'ayim! Rather, the
Isur is merely a Gezeirah to prevent one from taking the Kil'ayim from
underneath him and wearing it. Why, then, does the Beraisa say that the
reason is because a thread of Kil'ayim might become wrapped around part
of his body?

ANSWERS:
(a) The RITVA in Beitzah (14b) says that the Gezeirah which prohibits
lying on top of ten sheets which are on top of Kil'ayim is actually a
"Gezeirah l'Gezeirah," a rabbinical decree made to safeguard another
decree. The original Gezeirah of the Rabanan prohibited lying directly
on a garment of Kil'ayim lest a thread of Kil'ayim wrap up onto his
skin. The Gezeirah which prohibits lying on the uppermost of ten sheets
which are on top of Kil'ayim was enacted in order to prevent one from
lying or sitting directly on Kil'ayim, which in turn is prohibited lest
a thread wrap onto his skin. (The two Gezeiros are considered to be one
Gezeirah -- "Kula Chada Gezeirah" -- since they were enacted at one
time.)

(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Kil'ayim 10:12) appears to understand that even
if a garment of Kil'ayim is underneath ten sheets, there still is a
concern that a thread from the Kil'ayim might reach the top of the
sheets and wrap around one's skin. Accordingly, only one Gezeirah was
enacted. This also appears to be the opinion of TOSFOS (DH Kashim).

The Rambam and Tosfos are consistent with their own opinion as expressed
elsewhere. They maintain that one is prohibited from lying directly on
top of a garment of Kil'ayim even if it is very hard. One is permitted
to sit on top of it only when another object separates between his skin
and the hard garment of Kil'ayim. They consider sitting on Kil'ayim a
form of "Ha'ala'ah," placing the garment on one's body, because there is
no logical reason to differentiate between a garment on top of one's
body and one's body on top of a garment. As long as one's flesh touches
the garment, it is considered "Ha'ala'ah." According to this opinion, no
Gezeirah is necessary to prohibit one from sitting on Kil'ayim because
of the reason that a thread might wrap up onto one's body, since the
prohibition of Kil'ayim itself prohibits one from sitting on Kil'ayim.
Why, then, was such a Gezeirah enacted? It must be that the Gezeirah
that a thread might wrap up onto one's body was enacted in order to
prohibit one from lying on a garment of Kil'ayim when it is underneath
several sheets.

(c) The RAN in Beitzah (14b) infers from the words of RASHI there (DH
Shema Tikarev) that the prohibition against lying on Kil'ayim lest a
thread wrap up onto one's body is d'Oraisa and not merely d'Rabanan.
When the Beraisa teaches that "the Chachamim said that it is forbidden
[to lie on Kil'ayim]," it means that it is forbidden because it is a
doubt in a case of an Isur d'Oraisa. In the case of Kil'ayim underneath
ten sheets, there is no Isur d'Oraisa but only a Gezeirah that one not
come to sit on the garment of Kil'ayim itself.

(d) The RAN himself, however, suggests that the Gezeirah against lying
on top of sheets which are on top of a garment of Kil'ayim is a Gezeirah
to prevent "Ha'ala'ah" -- to ensure that one does not pick up the
garment and wear it. It is unrelated to the concern that a thread will
wrap onto one's body. There is no concern for a thread in this case
because the Kil'ayim is separated from his body by other sheets.

The concern that one might pick up and wear the Kil'ayim, however,
applies only to a type of garment that is normally worn, but not to
sheets. If the Kil'ayim underneath the sheets is itself a sheet, one is
prohibited only to sit directly on top of it. There is no concern that
one might pick it up and wear it, but rather there is a concern that
since he is sitting directly on the Kil'ayim a thread might wrap up onto
him. In contrast, one may not sit on an item of clothing of Kil'ayim
even when it is underneath ten sheets, because in such a case the
Gezeirah that he might wear it applies. 

This explanation is supported by the text of the Beraisa which says,
"Even ten sheets, one on top of the other, and Kil'ayim *beneath them*
[is prohibited]." This implies that the prohibited item itself is not a
sheet but a different type of garment (a wearable one) made of Kil'ayim.



3) "KIL'AYIM" MADE FROM A HARD MATERIAL
OPINIONS: The Gemara explains that a Kohen does not transgress the
prohibition of Kil'ayim when he lies on the Avnet, because the Avnet is
made from a hard material.

When is one permitted to benefit from Kil'ayim made from a hard
material?

(a) The RA'AVAD (on the Rif, Beitzah 15a) explains that, mid'Oraisa,
there is no prohibition of Kil'ayim made from a hard material.
Mid'Oraisa, one is permitted even to *wear* such Kil'ayim. The Rabanan,
however, prohibited one from wearing it, but they did not prohibit one
from lying or sitting on it. Mid'Oraisa, one is prohibited from wearing
a soft material of Kil'ayim, and the Rabanan prohibited one from lying
or sitting on it. If the material is a bit soft and a bit hard, one is
prohibited to *wear* such a garment mid'Oraisa, but one is permitted to
*sit* on it even mid'Rabanan. The Rabanan did not prohibit sitting on
such material because it is uncommon ("Lo Shachi'ach").

(b) RASHI (DH Shari) here writes that one is permitted to place Kil'ayim
of a hard material on one's body ("Ha'ala'ah") even though one normally
is prohibited mid'Oraisa from placing Kil'ayim on one's body.
"Ha'ala'ah" is forbidden only when it is done in a manner similar to the
way a garment is *worn*, for only in such a way does it give a person
some form of pleasure (it provides warmth).

Rashi implies that *wearing* Kil'ayim ("Levishah") is *always*
forbidden, even when the material is hard, because (as the TOSFOS RID in
Beitzah writes) when one wears an item he derives benefit not only from
the warmth that it provides but from the protection that it affords or
from the honor that it brings him. In the case of "Ha'ala'ah," however,
the only benefit one derives from the cloth is the warmth.

(c) TOSFOS in Beitzah (15a) and the TOSFOS YESHANIM here explain in the
name of RABEINU TAM that whenever an Isur *d'Rabanan* of Kil'ayim
applies (such as in the case of lying down on a normal garment of
Kil'ayim), the Rabanan permitted one to use the Kil'ayim if it is made
of a hard material. In contrast, any form of Kil'ayim which is Asur
mid'Oraisa remains Asur mid'Oraisa even when it is a hard material.
Therefore, the Rabanan permitted one to sit on Kil'ayim (an act which
normally is prohibited mid'Rabanan) or to wear a garment made from
threads of wool and linen which were pressed but not woven (which is
prohibited mid'Rabanan), if it is a hard material.

(d) The RA'AVAD in Tamid (27b) permits one only to lie on or sit on
Kil'ayim of a hard material. He maintains that only "Hatza'ah" is
permitted when the material is hard. Any other form of the prohibition
of Kil'ayim d'Rabanan remains prohibited even when the material is hard
(such as wearing a garment of pressed threads which were not woven). He
says in the name of Rabeinu Efraim that the threads of a hard cloth do
not have a tendency to wrap up around the person's body, and therefore
the Gezeirah against lying on Kil'ayim does not apply to hard material.

(e) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Kil'ayim 10:13) rules that *wearing* Kil'ayim of
a hard material is forbidden mid'Oraisa. One is permitted only to lie on
or sit on hard Kil'ayim ("Hatza'ah") but not to wear it ("Levishah") or
place it on top of his body ("Ha'ala'ah"), as the Ra'avad in Tamid
rules.

Moreover, the allowance to lie on or sit on hard Kil'ayim applies only
when the material does not touch the person's skin. According to the
Rambam, one may not sit directly on top of the Kil'ayim (with no
intervening material). (The Ra'avad in Tamid suggests that the reason
why the Rambam prohibits sitting directly on hard Kil'ayim is because he
maintains that "Ha'ala'ah" applies whenever the Kil'ayim is in direct
contact with the person's skin, whether the garment is on the person or
the person is on the garment. "Ha'ala'ah" is forbidden mid'Oraisa, and
therefore it remains forbidden even when the Kil'ayim is a hard
material.)



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Yoma 70

1) THE AFTERNOON TAMID ON YOM KIPPUR
OPINIONS: The Mishnah discusses the specific times during the day at
which various parts of the Avodah on Yom Kippur are performed, such as
the different Musaf offerings, the removal of the Kaf u'Machtah from the
Kodesh ha'Kodashim, the afternoon Ketores and the afternoon lighting of
the Neros.

The Mishnah, however, does not mention when during the day the afternoon
Korban Tamid is offered. When is the afternoon Korban Tamid offered on
Yom Kippur?

(a) RASHI (DH u'Par, and 70b, DH v'Achar Kach) explains that the
afternoon Tamid is offered after the *fifth* Tevilah, which follows the
Avodah of the removal of the Kaf u'Machtah (which is performed after the
fourth Tevilah). The Tamid is offered immediately before the Avodah of
the Ketores and the Neros.

The Beraisa later (Tana d'Vei Shmuel) provides support for Rashi's
opinion. The Beraisa says that the Kohen Gadol offers his Ayil and the
nation's Ayil, as well as the Emurei Chatas, after his third Tevilah,
"but the Par ha'Olah, Shiv'as Kevasim, and Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz
(i.e., all of the remaining Musaf offerings) [are offered] *together
with the afternoon Tamid*." The fact that the Beraisa differentiates
between the time at which the Kohen Gadol offers his Ayil and the
nation's Ayil, and the time at which he offers the afternoon Tamid,
implies that he performs those Avodos at separate times (and one is
performed after the fifth Tevilah). (See Chart #15, footnote 12, and
Chart #16, footnote 6.)

(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Avodas Yom ha'Kipurim 4:2), however, rules that
the Korban Tamid is offered after the *third* Tevilah, together with
(i.e., right after) the Musaf offerings. The RAMBAN (Vayikra 16:32)
adduces proof to this opinion from the wording of the Mishnah which
mentions only the Ketores and the lighting of the Neros when it
discusses what is done after the fifth Tevilah. If the Tamid is also
offered after the fifth Tevilah, then the Mishnah should mention it
together with the other routine, daily Avodos done at that point. On the
other hand, if the Tamid is offered after the third Tevilah, the Mishnah
does not need to mention it, as it leaves out a number of other Avodos
done after the third Tevilah.

Further support for this opinion may be adduced from the next Beraisa
which the Gemara cites. The Beraisa says that the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh
ba'Chutz is offered before the Kohen Gadol's Ayil and the nation's Ayil,
after the *third* Tevilah. The Beraisa continues and says that after the
Kohen Gadol offers his Ayil and the nation's Ayil, he burns the Emurei
Chatas and, afterwards, he offers the afternoon Tamid. This implies that
all of these Korbanos are offered after the third Tevilah. (This is in
contrast to Rashi's understanding of the Beraisa. Rashi explains that
when the Beraisa says, "afterwards, the afternoon Tamid is offered," it
does not mean that it is offered at the same time as the
previously-mentioned Korbanos, but rather it means much later, after the
*fifth* Tevilah.)

In addition, the Mishnah says that the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz is
offered with the afternoon Tamid. According to Rashi, the Mishnah must
be arguing with the Beraisa, because the Mishnah maintains that the
Sa'ir is offered after the fifth Tevilah and the Beraisa maintains that
it is offered after the third Tevilah. (See Tosfos DH v'Achar Kach, and
Chart #16, footnote 2.)

How does the Rambam understand the first Beraisa (Tana d'Vei Shmuel)
which clearly supports Rashi's opinion when it says that the Korban
Tamid is *not* offered after the same Tevilah as the Ayil of the Kohen
Gadol?

RABEINU CHANANEL (cited by TOSFOS DH d'Tana) has a different Girsa in
the first Beraisa. In our text of the Gemara, the Beraisa reads, "He
offered his Ayil and the nation's Ayil and the Emurei Chatas [after the
third Tevilah], *but* the Par ha'Olah, Shiv'as Kevasim, and Sa'ir
ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz together with the afternoon Tamid." According to the
text of Rabeinu Chananel's Gemara, the Beraisa reads, "He offered his
Ayil and the nation's Ayil and the Emurei Chatas *and* the Par ha'Olah,
Shiv'as Kevasim, and Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz together with the
afternoon Tamid." That is, he offers all of these Korbanos, including
the afternoon Tamid, after the third Tevilah. This apparently is the
Girsa of the Rambam as well.



2) THE EIGHT BLESSINGS RECITED BY THE KOHEN GADOL
QUESTION: The Mishnah (68b) relates that the Kohen Gadol recited eight
blessings in the afternoon of Yom Kippur when he read from the Torah.
Those eight blessings included the familiar blessings of Birkas
ha'Torah, Avodah ("Retzeh"), Hoda'ah ("Modim"), and Mechilas Avon (the
central blessing of the Shemoneh Esreh of Yom Kippur), as well as four
blessings which were unique to the Avodah of Yom Kippur: a blessing for
the Mikdash, a blessing for Yisrael, a blessing for the Kohanim, and a
blessing for Yerushalayim. The Mishnah adds that the Kohen Gadol then
recited "the rest of the Tefilah."

The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which explains that "the rest of the
Tefilah" refers to a prayer in which the Kohen Gadol beseeched Hashem to
protect the Jewish people. This prayer concluded with the blessing,
"Shome'a Tefilah."

If the Kohen Gadol also recited the blessing of "Shome'a Tefilah," then
he recited *nine* blessings and not eight. Why does the Mishnah say that
he recited only eight blessings?

ANSWERS:
(a) In the text of the printed Mishnayos, the words "v'Al Yerushalayim"
do not appear, nor do they appear in the Yerushalmi (Sotah 7:6 and Yoma
7:1). When the Beraisa lists the eight blessings, it does not include
these words. The BACH and VILNA GA'ON delete these words from the
Mishnah (68b) as well. Most of the Rishonim, including Rashi and the
Rambam (Hilchos Avodas Yom ha'Kipurim 3:11), quote the Mishnah without
these words.

Although Rashi in Sotah (40b) writes that "the Yerushalmi explains the
blessing for Yerushalayim," the Yerushalmi makes no mention of such a
blessing. Apparently, Rashi refers to the blessing for the *Kohanim*,
because he does not explain that blessing anywhere else. (It is probable
that the word "Yerushalayim" in the text of Rashi is a mistake, and it
should read "Kohanim" instead.) Rashi means that the blessing for
*Kohanim* is described in the Yerushalmi (which indeed it is).
Accordingly, there are eight blessings (the blessing of "Shome'a
Tefilah" is the eighth).

According to the Girsa that includes the words "Al Yerushalayim,"
perhaps the Mishnah merely uses these words to give another description
for the blessing for the Mikdash, which, according to the Yerushalmi
cited by the Rambam (Hilchos Avodas Yom ha'Kipurim 3:11), ends with the
words "Shochen b'Tziyon" -- "Who dwells in Zion," a reference to
Yerushalayim.

(b) The RAMBAM in Perush ha'Mishnayos (here and in Sotah) also omits the
blessing "Al Yerushalayim," but he presents a slightly different way of
counting the eight blessings. He counts Birkas ha'Torah, the blessing
for the Torah, as *two* blessings. The Kohen Gadol recited one blessing
before he read the Torah and a second blessing after he read the Torah.
He counts the blessing for Yisrael and the blessing of "Shome'a Tefilah"
as *one* blessing: the Kohen Gadol prayed that Hashem protect the Jewish
people and he concluded his prayer with the words "Shome'a Tefilah," as
the Beraisa here mentions. This is the eighth of the eight blessings.

The Rambam's text of the Mishnah apparently lists the blessing for
Kohanim before "Al Yisrael" and "the rest of the Tefilah." Since those
two blessings are listed consecutively ("Al Yisrael and the rest of the
Tefilah"), the Rambam understands that they are counted as a single
blessing. (However, in Hilchos Avodas Yom ha'Kipurim (3:11), the Rambam
explains the Mishnah like the Rishonim cited above in (a), and he places
the blessing for the Kohanim *after* the blessing for Yisrael.)

(c) The ME'IRI cites Rishonim who have the text of "Al Yerushalayim" in
the Mishnah, and he writes that according to this Girsa the last
blessing ("Shome'a Tefilah") is a general prayer and is not included in
the count of eight blessings. (See also Insights to Sotah 40:4.)

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