Brent Meeker
Sun, 20 Apr 2008 19:53:57 -0700
Alastair Malcolm wrote: > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Günther Greindl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Saturday, April 19, 2008 9:46 PM > Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law > >> Dear Nichomachus, >> >>> decision. If she measures the particle's spin as positive, she will >>> elect to switch cases, and if she measures it with a negative spin she >>> will keep the one she has. This is because she wants to be sure that, >>> having gotten to this point in the game, there will be at least some >>> branches of her existence where she experiences winning the grand >>> prize. She is not convinced that, were she to decide what to do using >>> only the processes available to her mind, she would guarantee that >>> same result since it is just possible that all of the mutiple versions >>> of herself confronted with the dilemma may make the same bad guess. >> >> I have also thought along these lines some time ago (to use a qubit to >> ensure that all outcomes are chosen, because one should not rely on >> one's mind decohering into all possible decisions). >> >> The essential question is this: what worlds exist? All possible worlds. >> But which worlds are possible? We have, on the one hand, physical >> possibility (this also includes other physical constants etc, but no >> totally unphysical scenarios). >> >> I have long adhered to this "everything physically possible", but this >> does break down under closer scrutiny: first of all, physical relations >> are, when things come down to it, mathematical relations. >> >> So we could conclude with Max Tegmark: all possible mathematical >> structures exist; this is ill defined (but then, why should the >> Everything be well defined?) >> >> Alastair argues in his paper that everything logically possible exists >> (with his non arbitrariness principle) but, while initially appealing, >> it leads to the question: what is logically possible? In what logic? >> Classical/Intuitionist/Deviant logics etc etc...then we are back at >> Max's all possible structures. >> > > The focus of my paper is on theories in principle fully describing universes > (or u-reality). The term 'logically possible' is intended to contrast with > 'physically possible' and refers to descriptions (theories) being internally > non-contradictory (more in note 4 in my paper). Classical logic is usually > intended in these kinds of cases, and I can't actually see from what I know > of other logics how they might relevantly extend the range of possible > inhabitable universes beyond those describable by formal systems operating > according to classical logic. Have you considered para-consistent logics, c.f. Graham Priest "In Contradiction". Brent Meeker >(There is also the issue of their additional > complexity, if some are somehow incorporatable.) I do mention in general > terms possible alternatives to standard formal systems at the start of > section 4. For my purposes all I need is a plausible way around the White > Rabbit problem. In my view its deep philosophical basis and potential > explanation of our relative simplicity and lawfulness are points in favour > of the 'All Possible States' hypothesis, and the idea of not being able to > fully characterize it is pretty much to be expected given its universal > scope. > > Alastair > > Paper at: http://www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---