Günther Greindl
Tue, 06 May 2008 12:20:44 -0700
Dear Bruno, - CRH implies COMP - COMP implies the negation of CRH > Universality, Sigma_1 completeness, m-completness, creativity >(in Post sense), all those equivalent notion makes sense only through >complementary notion which are strictly sepaking more complex (non RE, productive, ...). >The self-introspecting universal machine can hardly miss the inference of such "realities", > and once she distinguishes the 1, 1-plural, 3-person points of view, she has to bet on >the role of the non computable realities (even too much getting not just randomness, >like QM, but an hard to compute set of anomalous stories > (white rabbits, coherent but inconsistent dreams). Why does the machine have to bet on these complementary non-RE histories? I do not quite see how this arises from 1 and 1-plural POV; after all, it could be just rec. enumerable continuations? Schmidhuber's/Tegmarks Computable Universe Hypothesis seems very attractive: it gives rise to structure, _evolves_ self-aware sub-structures, and gives reasonable (?) measure, for instance Schmidhuber's speed prior. This also takes care of the white rabbit. > It's a bit like "understanding" (putting in a RE set) the (code of) the total > computable > functions, forces us to accept the existence of only partially computable functions, >which sometimes (most of the time, see the thesis by Terwijn) have a non recursive domain. > OK, the ontic part of a comp TOE can be no *more* than Sigma_1 complete, >but a non self-computable part of Arithmetical truth and analytical truth, >is needed to get the *internal* measure, we can't even give a name >to our first person plenitude and things like that. I think this answers part of my question above. The ontic part is only the Sigma_1 complete stuff; we assume the others for our measure - but my claim is that they do not give rise to first person experience. I think the central question is this: _what_ does the Arithemetic Truth of whatever simulate? Reality at a granular level (like in the CA approach, Zuse's Rechnender Raum) - that is what I would assume - that reality at the lowest level is a number-relation; but that awareness only arises in these domains as a higher oder abstraction. I think you assume that the Sigma_1 sentences give the OMs directly, is that correct? So in your view there is no underlying reality; QM and stuff like that is only an "illusion". Am I correct in how I interpret your theory? > Perhaps this is why the Intelligible has been discovered (Plato) before the > "ONE" >(Plotin). It is far bigger. With comp you can restrict the ontic to the Universal Machine > (the baby ONE), Ok, I'm with you this far. > but its intelligible realm is well beyond its grasp. For me, the intelligible can be only a (proper?) subset of the ontic. How could something that does not exist (ontic) be intelligible? Or would you say that this is mathematical imagination? > All this is related to the fact, already understood by Judson Webb, >that comp is truly a vaccine against reductionist theories of the mind. I have the Webb book on my desk and have glanced occasionally inside, it looks like a wonderful book, but I have not yet had the time to study it in detail. But I wonder - why do you say that comp is not reductionist? For me comp is reductionist - mind as the working of computation (I am pro reductionist, that is not a negative word in my view). So, two questions: 1) At what level do your Sigma_1 sentence operate? OM's directly (I would interpret your paper in this way) or low level (more like a classical physical/digital physics view)? 2) You say that the ontic part is computable (in this sense, I would say COMP does _not_ refute CRH?) Because what "is" that is not ontic? That would be contradiction in terms? Cheers, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---