Michael Rosefield
Thu, 21 Aug 2008 08:16:53 -0700
The trouble with this whole area is that it's so incredibly easy to not-quite understand each other without quite realising it. It's like that Wilde quote: "England and America are two countries separated by a common language." I think I understand you, though.... As regards the crystal, I think the best way to put it is that I'm thinking in terms of 'possible contexts'; for every selected object, it could belong in a number of supporting universes. My mind, for example, could be in a physical body, a brain in a jar, or an abstract software emulation, etc... and each of these possibilities has an infinite variety of instances. As far as I'm concerned, I always exist in all the possible universes that can generate my consiousness. And each universe can have its own set of metaphysical contexts, etc. I think I'm departing from my point rapidly, so I'll try another way. It's like an inverted form of Kaufmann's 'adjacent possible', which is all the possible ways a system may evolve next, and what features they may have. Rather, this takes a feature of a system and asks what its immediate possible surroudings/precursors are. Oh, and the holy trinity thing was a term I just thought of -- but what I mean to convey is that I think of reality as a bit like a fractal; you can take a little bit of it and it will generate the complete form. In this way the whole is equivalent to any bit plus the generational principle (growth algorithm). Actually, I suppose the generational principle by itself should be able to form the whole from scratch. Perhaps there are a number of different principles you could have; they will 'grow out' in different ways, but ultimately lead to the same whole. Excuse me if I make absolutely no sense. I find language to be a real problem when it comes to communicating this sort of thing.... 2008/8/21 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Redface - ME! > Michael, you picked my careless statement and I want to correct it: > "...You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts..." > should refer to THOSE parts we know of, observe, include, select, handle, - > not ALL of the (unlimited, incl. potential) parts (simple or not). From > such ALL parts together (a topical oxymoron) you can(?) build anything, > although it does not make sense. > > What I had in mind was a cut, a structural, functional, ideational select > model (system organization) FROM which you have no way to expand into the > application of originally not included items. > I agree with your 'whole caboodle' as a deterministic product (complexity), > as far as its entailment is concerned. I don't understand "holy trinities" - > yours included. > > "Growing out" your -it*- requires IMO the substrates it* grows by, - by > addition - I dislike miraculous creations. A crystal grows by absorbing the > ingredients already present. Cf (my) entail-determinism (- no goal or aim). > > John > > > On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 8:32 AM, Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > >> "You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts" >> >> That would be the case if we were trying to reconstruct an arbitrary >> universe, but you were talking about 'the totality'. My take is that the >> whole caboodle is not arbitrary - it's totally specified by its requirement >> to be complete. You could take a little bit of it* and 'grow' it out like a >> crystal in some kind of fractal kaleidoscopic space; eventually its >> exploration would completely fill it. This makes a kind of holy trinity of >> equivalence of (Whole | Parts | Process) which I like. >> >> >> >> * That little bit could even be unitary or empty in nature, solving for me >> the issue as to why something rather than nothing, and why anything in >> particular. >> >> 2008/8/20 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> >>> Brent wrote: >>> >>> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler >>> domains, so much the better that they are simple...." >>> >>> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with >>> mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality' >>> and *select the animals as your model* (disregarding the rest) even you >>> continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even) simpler. >>> ((All you have is some beasts in a frame)) >>> Now try to *"reconstruct"* the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those >>> remnant 'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc. >>> *from nowhere*, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as >>> you say: from the *Occam-simple*, i.e. as you say: from those few >>> 4-legged animals, - to make it even simpler. >>> Good luck. >>> You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the *total >>> *to do so. You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple >>> parts - you are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a >>> synthesis, (while in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of >>> it. ) >>> >>> John >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 3:19 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> John Mikes wrote: >>>> > Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the >>>> > state of being "sane".) >>>> >>>> As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you are >>>> either >>>> 100% right or 100% wrong. Human fallibility being what it is, don't bet >>>> on >>>> being 100% right. :-) >>>> >>>> In classical logic, an inconsistency allows you to prove every >>>> propositon. In a >>>> para-consistent logic the rules of inference are changed (e.g. by >>>> restoring the >>>> excluded middle) so that an inconsistency doesn't allow you to prove >>>> everything. >>>> >>>> Graham Priest has written a couple of interesting books arguing that all >>>> logic >>>> beyond the narrow mathematical domain leads to inconsistencies and so we >>>> need to >>>> have ways to deal with them. >>>> >>>> > Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to >>>> "cut" >>>> > our model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and >>>> > more from the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate things) >>>> > from our chosen topic of the actual interest in our observational >>>> field >>>> > (our topical model). >>>> > Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification. >>>> >>>> And so is mathematical logic and arithmetic. But if one can reconstruct >>>> "the >>>> rest of the world" from these simpler domains, so much the better that >>>> they are >>>> simple. >>>> >>>> Brent Meeker >>>> >>>> > John M >>>> > >>>> > On 8/18/08, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] >>>> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote: >>>> > >>>> > > Sorry. I quite agree with you. I regard logic and mathematics >>>> > as our >>>> > > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we >>>> > > place on how we >>>> > > think and talk about the world. We can change them as in para- >>>> > > consistent logics. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application. >>>> > Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in >>>> natural >>>> > language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer >>>> science or >>>> > number theory. >>>> > >>>> > Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of >>>> > remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually at >>>> least >>>> > 8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them >>>> > being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of >>>> inconsistency) >>>> > making the most sane machine always very near insanity. >>>> > And so easily falling down. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > Bruno >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > > >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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