Saibal Mitra wrote: >You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow >transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that >separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say >that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person >would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the >disease.
Perhaps. But if you do that move, everyone is resurrected in everyone, and there is only one person in the multiverse. I don't know. James Higgo was more radical on this, he defended the idea of zero person. With just comp this issue is probably undecidable. I guess comp (perhaps QM too) can lead to a vast variety of incompatible but consistent point of view on those matter. Comp is compatible whith a lot of personal possible interpretations of what is identity. What is possible to prove with comp is the non normative principle according to which personal identity is *in part* necessarily a matter of personal opinion. What remains to do is to compute the "real" probabilities to backtrack with amnesia compare to the probability to quantum/comp-survive big injuries. I doubt we have currently the tools to do those computations. Bruno