Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be very 
lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding. IIRC, you 
weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you on this 
list. I wonder if you'd care to comment on my original argument on this 
thread - which has of course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not 
a single history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a current 
moment mean that there is also only a single possible future? And if the 
future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a serious issue for single 
universe models of QM? How can the outcome of quantum events be both 
inevitable and random?

On Wednesday, May 31, 2017 at 12:01:23 PM UTC+10, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> > 
> >> I get your point with decoherence. 
> >> Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What does 
> >> mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling with 
> >> the environment prevents the current observer state to become 
> >> compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such 
> >> certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot 
> >> disprove, but find problematic). 
> > 
> > It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP. 
> > 
> > But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T-rex, 
> > we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the T-rex in 
> > its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the particles 
> > "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely impossible, 
> > but to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it seems to me 
> > (and you if I understood well) is invalid. 
>
> I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is more 
> than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in principle. One 
> major problem with recoherence in general is that information leaks from 
> the paths at the speed of light (as well as less slowly for other 
> interactions). Since this vital information goes out along the light 
> cone, it can never be recaptured and returned to the original 
> interaction. Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in 
> principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible. Of course, 
> with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of information along 
> the light cone is prevented, recoherence is possible in special 
> circumstances, but not in general. 
>
>  From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is 
> assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the word) 
> is by no means invalid -- it is proved. Even if one encounters one of 
> those rare situations in which recoherence is achieved, that still does 
> not invalidate the uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it 
> occurs, simply means that no new branches are formed at that point, so 
> the decoherent history remains unique. 
>
>
> >>> FWIW, you 
> >>> are expressing my own understanding of the situation: there can be no 
> >>> superposition of red and green screens or dinosaurs, or dead and 
> >>> live cats, 
> >>> because there can be no quantum superposition of macroscopic objects. 
> >>> Superpositions of wave functions are only possible for systems 
> >>> isolated from 
> >>> interaction with their environment, which is why quantum computers 
> >>> are so 
> >>> fricking hard to make: keeping aggregates of particles isolated from 
> >>> interactions with the surrounding environment is exponentially more 
> >>> difficult as the system grows in size. 
> >> 
> >> The main question for me is this: can two branches hold different 
> >> observer states, if they differ only by things that are not 
> >> observable? 
> > 
> > I would say no, intuitively. I would even say "no" just for the things 
> > not observed, even when observable. 
>
> I previously answered Telmo's question in the affirmative, viz., two 
> fully decohered branches will hold different observer states, even if 
> the differences are not observed or observable. So if some trivial 
> physical event happens to your body, such as the decay of a K 40 nucleus 
> in your foot, this would not be noticeable, or even particularly 
> observable even if you were looking for it. But such an event causes at 
> least two branches to form every instant -- one in which the decay has 
> occurred, and one in which it has not. And since this is a beta decay, a 
> neutrino is lost along the light cone in every case of decay.  Perfect 
> recombination of the branches is, then, according to the above argument, 
> not possible. You might object that this decay in my toe did not alter 
> my conscious state -- that is correct, but there are now two copies of 
> the Moscow man as in step 3, and these can evolve in different 
> directions while each remains unaware of the existence of the other. 
> They can never recombine and compare diaries! 
>
> > But this has to be tempered by the fact that any interaction will 
> > count as an observation, making super-exponentially hard to indeed 
> > recover a macroscopic superposition in the past, even the very close 
> > past. Of course, that might change the day we succeed in building a 
> > fault tolerant (topological perhaps) quantum computer. 
>
> That will not help in the general case. Our future quantum computer 
> might be able to delay decoherence for some useful finite time, but that 
> still only retaines the superposition in the said computer, it does not 
> help with recombination of decohered branches in general. 
>
> > Unfortunately, the T-rex missed them. yet, if a T-rex made a solid 
> > topological quantum qubit, in the state 0+1, we would have a past with 
> > 0, and a past with 1, as long as we don't look at it. I read, already 
> > a long time ago, some experimental evidence of temporal Bell's 
> > inequality going in this direction, and I think we don't even need to 
> > test them, as we get them with the usual Bell's inequality violation, 
> > if we accept special relativity (and some amount of physical realism 
> > (not the full materialism, to be sure). 
>
>
> The temporal version of Bell's inequality simply shows that the 
> ubiquitous non-locality of quantum entanglement occurs even over time. 
> And despite your protestations to the contrary, it is now generally 
> accepted that MWI does not remove the essential non-locality associated 
> with entangled states. This non-locality is even more evident in the 
> more recent delayed choice experiments that use entangled photons to 
> manipulate photon polarization states non-locally. 
>
> Bruce 
>

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