On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I get your point with decoherence.
Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What does mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling with
the environment prevents the current observer state to become
compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such
certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot
disprove, but find problematic).

It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP.

But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T- rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the T- rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid.

I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and returned to the original interaction.

In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have agreed to disagree on this if I remember well).



Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible.

OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM)


Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is possible in special circumstances, but not in general.

From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved.

In QM + SR. OK.



Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs, simply means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the decoherent history remains unique.


OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle, or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c).

That makes sense.






FWIW, you
are expressing my own understanding of the situation: there can be no superposition of red and green screens or dinosaurs, or dead and live cats, because there can be no quantum superposition of macroscopic objects. Superpositions of wave functions are only possible for systems isolated from interaction with their environment, which is why quantum computers are so fricking hard to make: keeping aggregates of particles isolated from
interactions with the surrounding environment is exponentially more
difficult as the system grows in size.

The main question for me is this: can two branches hold different
observer states, if they differ only by things that are not
observable?

I would say no, intuitively. I would even say "no" just for the things not observed, even when observable.

I previously answered Telmo's question in the affirmative, viz., two fully decohered branches will hold different observer states, even if the differences are not observed or observable. So if some trivial physical event happens to your body, such as the decay of a K 40 nucleus in your foot, this would not be noticeable, or even particularly observable even if you were looking for it. But such an event causes at least two branches to form every instant -- one in which the decay has occurred, and one in which it has not. And since this is a beta decay, a neutrino is lost along the light cone in every case of decay. Perfect recombination of the branches is, then, according to the above argument, not possible. You might object that this decay in my toe did not alter my conscious state -- that is correct, but there are now two copies of the Moscow man as in step 3,

But those state difference are accessible to the observers, and indeed, only this makes the analogy with step 3 working. With computationalism, the two identical states at the correct susbt-level, if never distinguishable, will not add ways to the probabilities (that would entail that a computer with double cable would have a higher probability). The measure remains on the first person view, which eventually needs the self-referential definition. usually I just say that if in step 3 you add a reconsitution box in Moscow, exactly identical, the P(W) remains equal to 1/2, but a slight difference in the future histories of the two guy in Moscow, will changes the probability into 1/3 (but that is a typical open problem).




and these can evolve in different directions while each remains unaware of the existence of the other. They can never recombine and compare diaries!


OK.





But this has to be tempered by the fact that any interaction will count as an observation, making super-exponentially hard to indeed recover a macroscopic superposition in the past, even the very close past. Of course, that might change the day we succeed in building a fault tolerant (topological perhaps) quantum computer.

That will not help in the general case. Our future quantum computer might be able to delay decoherence for some useful finite time, but that still only retaines the superposition in the said computer, it does not help with recombination of decohered branches in general.

In general no. But I was in a thought experiment in classical QM, with some T-rex having isolated a quantum qubit.




Unfortunately, the T-rex missed them. yet, if a T-rex made a solid topological quantum qubit, in the state 0+1, we would have a past with 0, and a past with 1, as long as we don't look at it. I read, already a long time ago, some experimental evidence of temporal Bell's inequality going in this direction, and I think we don't even need to test them, as we get them with the usual Bell's inequality violation, if we accept special relativity (and some amount of physical realism (not the full materialism, to be sure).


The temporal version of Bell's inequality simply shows that the ubiquitous non-locality of quantum entanglement occurs even over time. And despite your protestations to the contrary, it is now generally accepted that MWI does not remove the essential non- locality associated with entangled states.

Of course, it assures them in all branches, where indeed Aspect like experiences can be made. It seems to me that we did agree on this: that non-locality does not entail any physical influence in the past. That does happen in the unique universe view though; even if there is no possible communication of information is done.


This non-locality is even more evident in the more recent delayed choice experiments that use entangled photons to manipulate photon polarization states non-locally.

I have no problem with one-branch observable, apparent, non-locality.
I have a problem only with the action at a distance that you need in case you assume one contextually well defined physical reality.

For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition.

Bruno





Bruce

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