On 05 Jun 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Jun 04, 2017 at 11:48:23AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 9:48 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au >
wrote:


​> ​
That is not the same thing. The largest prime number doesn't exist, so
​ ​
there's no answer to find there, but the halting problem always has an
​ ​
answer - a program either halts, or it does not.


​But that's not ​the Halting Problem, it's is there a general way, in a finite number of steps, to separate all programs into these 3 categories?

1) Programs that will halt and there is a proof they will halt
2) Programs that will not halt and there is a proof they will not halt 3) Programs that will either halt or will not halt but have no proof they
will not halt.

Turing gave us the answer to that 80 years ago and it's no. Yes a program will either stop or it won't but the Halting Problem isn't about truth it's about proof. Mathematicians worry that some important problems, like the Goldbach Conjecture, may be in category #3, but if it is we will never know that it is. Goldbach could be true but a proof it is true does not exist, so a billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a
proof that it is true and still grinding away at numbers looking,
unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to show it is false.


​> ​
In fact, there are a variety of hypercomputers that can solve the
​ ​
halting problem in finite time.


​It sounds to me like you're talking about one of Bruno's very silly book computers that are just ink squiggles on dried wood pulp that are unable to
calculate 2+2 even if an infinite amount of time were available.


Not at all. Bruno's ontology implicitly assumes such hypercomputers
don't exist.

At the bare level, where only 0, s(0) ... exists. OK.

It is more than we don't need to assume them. We don't have to assume they do not exist. the assumption is that we can say yes to a doctor who propose computer for a body/brain. That does not entail we would die if he gives an hypercomputer, as usually they can emulate all computers.


The arithmetical truth contains, provably so, all hypercomputers, and even many "gods/oracles" (not necessary computable).

The computationalist hypothesis assumes only that our brain/body are computer emulable. That does not entail the non existence of hypercomputing machinery in the *physical* reality, which on the contrary should have a non computable first person plural component.

Bruno



It was David Deutsch who initially made the point, with a Hilbert
Hotel computer.


​> ​
Basically, any machine capable of
​ ​
executing an infinite number of computational steps will be able to
​ ​
solve the halting problem in finite time.


​Right,
​
executing an infinite number of computations in a finite number of seconds.
How hard can that be?​


There are a number of proposals for for doing so, probably the most
interesting is Malament-Hogarth spacetime, which is a solution to
general relativity that permits such a possibility. It is similar to a
Tipler cyclinder, which is a solution for a time machine that travels
back in time, in the sense that a seemingly impossible physical
situation is allowed by General Relativity.




​>​
​Anything that can be done a Turing Machine can do, if it can't be done
​ ​
then a Turing Machine can't do it, and neither can anything else.​


​>​
That is a thesis about the physical world
​


​Yes.​


​>​
​
It is quite a strong assumption about reality, and appears to be true


​Yes, but it's no stronger than the assumption perpetual motion machines can't be built, or that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is correct. It is
no stronger than​

​the assumption everything we know about physics isn't complete bullshit.​


I disagree. There is nothing in conventional physics that rules out
the possibility of a hypercomputer. David Deutsch has proposed a
principle that effectively says "hypercomputers are not possible", but
the fact that hypercomputing solutions of General Relativity exist,
such a principle would mean that something must be up the spout with
that.

But then, we know that QM is incompatible with GR, and I strongly
suspect it is GR that will need modification, so it doesn't bother me
if this is just something else that needs changing in Einstein's
theory. But it may well be that the physical CT thesis is itself only
some classical approximation. We just don't know at this stage.


--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Russell Standish                    Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow        hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University         http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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