On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. < lem.niko...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of > duties in this security instance. > > Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also > mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code > execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. > Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... > > If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a > bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. > You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. > > Nicholas. > > > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. < > lem.niko...@googlemail.com> wrote: > >> We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those >> points. >> I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid >> vulnerability.. >> >> >> Best Regards, >> Nicholas Lemonias. >> >> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas <mvi...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from >>> the Institute for >>> Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. < >>> lem.niko...@googlemail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks Michal, >>>> >>>> We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the >>>> research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout >>>> some time. >>>> >>>> We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including >>>> Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We >>>> are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Nicholas Lemonias. >>>> AISec >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. < >>>> lem.niko...@googlemail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Jerome, >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. >>>>> >>>>> However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file >>>>> of choice. >>>>> >>>>> I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits >>>>> multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels >>>>> that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen >>>>> on >>>>> that job. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias <athiasjer...@gmail.com >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi >>>>>> >>>>>> I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. >>>>>> Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. >>>>>> >>>>>> As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a >>>>>> Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or >>>>>> Requirements[1]) >>>>>> * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + >>>>>> Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business >>>>>> Impact and Risk Analysis >>>>>> >>>>>> So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not >>>>>> Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not >>>>>> Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if >>>>>> mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book), security >>>>>> controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also >>>>>> ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a proper >>>>>> SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth security principles >>>>>> and 2) used and implemented correctly. >>>>>> NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be a solid >>>>>> support to your report >>>>>> This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g. CVSS). >>>>>> Helping the decision/actions around this risk >>>>>> >>>>>> PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that the Separation of >>>>>> Duties security principle was applied correctly by Google in term of >>>>>> Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding) >>>>>> >>>>>> So in few words, be careful with the terminology. (don't always say >>>>>> vulnerability like the media say hacker, see RFC1392) Use a CWE ID >>>>>> (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616) >>>>>> >>>>>> My 2 bitcents >>>>>> Sorry if it is not edible :) >>>>>> Happy Hacking! >>>>>> >>>>>> /JA >>>>>> https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM >>>>>> >>>>>> 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski <lcam...@coredump.cx>: >>>>>> > Nicholas, >>>>>> > >>>>>> > I remember my early years in the infosec community - and sadly, so >>>>>> do >>>>>> > some of the more seasoned readers of this list :-) Back then, I >>>>>> > thought that the only thing that mattered is the ability to find >>>>>> bugs. >>>>>> > But after some 18 years in the industry, I now know that there's an >>>>>> > even more important and elusive skill. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > That skill boils down to having a robust mental model of what >>>>>> > constitutes a security flaw - and being able to explain your >>>>>> thinking >>>>>> > to others in a precise and internally consistent manner that >>>>>> convinces >>>>>> > others to act. We need this because the security of a system can't >>>>>> be >>>>>> > usefully described using abstract terms: even the academic >>>>>> definitions >>>>>> > ultimately boil down to saying "the system is secure if it doesn't >>>>>> do >>>>>> > the things we *really* don't want it to do". >>>>>> > >>>>>> > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability" is generally reserved for >>>>>> > behaviors that meet all of the following criteria: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > 1) The behavior must have negative consequences for at least one of >>>>>> > the legitimate stakeholders (users, service owners, etc), >>>>>> > >>>>>> > 2) The consequences must be widely seen as unexpected and >>>>>> unacceptable, >>>>>> > >>>>>> > 3) There must be a realistic chance of such a negative outcome, >>>>>> > >>>>>> > 4) The behavior must introduce substantial new risks that go beyond >>>>>> > the previously accepted trade-offs. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > If we don't have that, we usually don't have a case, no matter how >>>>>> > clever the bug is. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Cheers (and happy hunting!), >>>>>> > /mz >>>>>> > >>>>>> > _______________________________________________ >>>>>> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. >>>>>> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html >>>>>> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. >>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html >>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights >>> the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When >>> the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the >>> people.” >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. >>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html >>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ >>> >> >> > -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.”
_______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
