On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:43:19PM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:05:41PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Seth Forshee (seth.fors...@canonical.com):
> > > Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
> > > allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
> > > for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
> > > cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns
> > > to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user
> > > the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable
> > > to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same
> > > userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.fors...@canonical.com>
> > > ---
> > > fs/fuse/dir.c | 10 ++++++++--
> > > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> > > index f67f4dd86b36..5b8edb1203b8 100644
> > > --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
> > > +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> > > @@ -1018,8 +1018,14 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn
> > > *fc)
> > > {
> > > const struct cred *cred;
> > >
> > > - if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
> > > - return 1;
> > > + if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER) {
> > > + struct user_namespace *ns;
> > > + for (ns = current_user_ns(); ns; ns = ns->parent) {
> > > + if (ns == fc->user_ns)
> > > + return 1;
> > > + }
> >
> > use current_in_userns() ?
>
> Yes, it should. I wrote this before I wrote the patch which adds that
> function and never thought to go back to change it here.
Ok -
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hal...@canonical.com>
thanks.
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