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Best regards, Andrew Stewart Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.msu.edu> > Date: March 11, 2017 at 12:54:24 PM EST > To: h-rev...@h-net.msu.edu > Subject: H-Net Review [H-Diplo]: English on Sell, 'From Washington to > Moscow: US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of the USSR' > Reply-To: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.msu.edu> > > Louis Sell. From Washington to Moscow: US-Soviet Relations and the > Collapse of the USSR. Durham Duke University Press Books, 2016. > 416 pp. $99.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8223-6179-4; $27.95 (paper), ISBN > 978-0-8223-6195-4. > > Reviewed by Robert D. English (University of Southern California) > Published on H-Diplo (March, 2017) > Commissioned by Seth Offenbach > > Louis Sell is a retired foreign service officer with twenty-seven > years' diplomatic experience in Soviet-Russian and Balkan affairs. > Some will recall his fine earlier book, _Slobodan Milosevic and the > Destruction of Yugoslavia_ (2002). His senior postings--in addition > to years in the US embassies in both Belgrade and Moscow--range from > member of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) delegation to > deputy high representative for Bosnia to Kosovo director for the > International Crisis Group. But it is Sell's earlier experience as a > junior diplomat in Moscow, dating back to the 1970s, that provided > the insights and perspective that make this new book on the Cold > War's end so interesting. > > It should be admitted first that the book also suffers from the main > but hardly crippling defect of most histories of great > transformations that an author lived firsthand--namely, a diary-like > organization, often a chronicle of events that Sell himself > participated in, that leaves readers wondering in early chapters just > what it is he will be arguing, what he thinks were the main causes of > the USSR's collapse or Yeltsin's failures or Putin's hostility. That > is, until the event have passed and Sell pauses in reflection. But > the good side to this is a story that is extremely vivid, lively in > its detail and persuasive in its assessments, that engagingly > recreates what is now a bygone era for many readers and so a world > they have difficulty imagining through dry, academic analysis. > > Nearly half of the book is devoted to the pre-_perestroika_ years, > that is, more or less the mid-to-late Cold War, the years of Leonid > Brezhnev and his two brief successors. These corresponded to the > Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies, a useful periodization > because as a US diplomat Sell's experience was strongly shaped by the > different policies--and often assignments--that came under each > president. After a useful summary of the essentials of Brezhnev's > rule--the economy, society, the Communist Party, foreign > relations--Sell focuses on the Soviet dissident and human-rights > movements. Because he spent a great deal of time in these circles, > whether passing _samizdat _literature for publication abroad or > mingling with Moscow's _refusenik_ community on Saturday afternoons, > Sell knows the saga of these individuals (Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly > Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov et al.) very well. He vividly recounts the > bravery, integrity, drama, and anguish of their struggles, and it is > no surprise that he later assesses the moral-ethical failings of the > Soviet Union as key to the country's eventual collapse. > > The same is true for other aspects of Russian domestic life in the > 1970s and early 1980s, though less so when it comes to some political > and especially military affairs. Sell is good on the detail of the > Nixon-Kissinger approach to the USSR, but then with respect to Gerald > Ford mentions "revelations about real and imagined intelligence > abuses [that] called into question the US ability to use covert > operations which had been a fixture on both sides of the Cold War > struggle" (p. 83). The student reading Sell's account as a general > history of this period in US-Soviet relations will have no idea that > he is referring to the Church Committee hearings, the US > congressional investigation into the CIA's history of coups, > assassinations, and other clandestine operations. But Sell's lament > for the supposed hobbling of such operations is belied just a few > chapters later when he recounts the saga of the disastrous Soviet > invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. Sell nicely captures the > confusion that attended Moscow's decision--essentially taken by just > three Politburo members, none of them General Secretary Brezhnev--but > mocks the Soviets' fear of US incursions into their putatively > socialist neighbor as "otherworldly" (p. 101). This seems odd when, > just a few pages later, Sell acknowledges that nearly six months > _before_ the Soviets invaded, President Carter authorized covert US > aid to the mujahideen rebels fighting the socialist Afghan government > (p. 103). This came when ties with Moscow had already worsened over > Angola and Ethiopia, three years after the new Carter > administration--with its contradictory goals and feuding > personalities--had already "wrestled itself to the ground over > US-Soviet relations" (p. 87). > > The first years of the Ronald Reagan administration--and its > counterpart Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko general > secretaryships--are vividly and accurately described in setting the > stage for the epoch of Mikhail Gorbachev's sweeping reforms. One > might wish for better and clearer sourcing--sometimes two or more > detail-filled pages pass with no citations, though Sell's > bibliography is full of valuable memoirs and documents--but the story > of the corruption scandals and political intrigue that churned under > Andropov is nevertheless excellent. The rise of Gorbachev is nicely > summarized too, but by this point in the chronicle it becomes evident > that Sell was no longer "on the scene." Gorbachev's accession and > first years in power are told mainly through secondary sources. The > story becomes dry and somewhat distant, the judgments conventional, > and the only personal observations are from afar--Washington, DC, or > Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Thus the critical Chernobyl tragedy of 1986 is > recounted with the standard condemnation of the USSR's (and > Gorbachev's own) secrecy, with little sense of the actual drama of > the event and the fierce opposition that liberals faced. The rise of > _glasnost_ over 1986-87 is dealt with surprisingly briefly, with the > usual milestones noted and little sense of how it felt and unfolded > at the time--rather, a fairly standard and low-key hindsight > appraisal again reflecting mostly secondary sources. The difference > between this and Sell's telling of earlier years, when he was on the > scene, reminds one of the stark difference between Dusko Doder's two > books on the Soviet Union--_Shadows and Whispers_ (1986), based on > his own residence and reporting, and _Heretic in the Kremlin_ (1990), > researched and written mainly from afar. These weaknesses of the > latter are perhaps seen most starkly in Sell's brief treatment of > _perestroika_'s economic woes. Key reform initiatives and legal > changes are barely mentioned, problems in their implementation and > functioning are omitted, and there is certainly no up-close depiction > of the obstacles workers and managers faced in attempting their > implementation. In all, both _glasnost_ and economic reform over > 1985-87 take up just five pages (pp. 185-189). > > The drama and detail return when Sell turns to back foreign policy. > The insider's perspective, combined with digging into the latest > memoir and documentary sources, lends his discussion of the origins > of arms control proposals, the early summitry, and the negotiations > between (and within) the Soviet and American sides vividness and > insight. So too his wide-ranging research makes Sell's account of > accelerating domestic change--leading up to the climactic Congress of > People's Deputies in 1989--a thorough and lively chronicle. > Unfortunately, as before, the economy is a weak point and this vital > realm is dispatched superficially with the familiar--but basically > useless--references to "timidity" and "half measures" (p. 347). As > with Gorbachev's much-criticized failures to run for president of the > USSR as early as 1989 or 1990, or to break with the hardliners and > create two Communist Parties (p. 250), there is virtually no analysis > devoted to which "bolder" economic reforms might have worked and how > they would have been implemented. Yet this is vital, for even as > Sell, like so many other authors, finds that key underlying causes of > the USSR's collapse included political polarization and nationalist > separatism, he pays relatively little attention to the economic > discontent that underlay these movements. > > The unasked questions include: Exactly what bolder economic reforms > might have worked? How could they have been implemented against > fierce party-bureaucratic resistance? And had they worked, how might > a stronger economy have weakened radical currents of all sorts and > strengthened Gorbachev's hand in preserving the USSR? Sell does not > really ask the latter question at all, but implies instead that it > was the legacy of decades of Soviet repression of national > aspirations--frustrations that burst forth when publicized by > _glasnost_ and then given voice by democratization--that seemingly > made secession of various non-Russian peoples from the USSR > inevitable. That is certainly how it looked from the aspirations and > appeals of many nationalist politicians. But this may be "the > inevitably of hindsight" at work, and in fact successful economic > reforms might have undercut many separatist movements and also > reduced the appeal of populist politicians such as Boris Yeltsin. > > Sell's telling of the "annus mirabilis" of 1989, the chain of events > in Eastern Europe that saw rapid dissolution of the Soviet bloc and > stoked conservatives' anger back in Moscow, is strong. The > contentious issue of German reunification--and the place of NATO in a > new Europe--is dealt with largely conventionally. Sell argues the > mainstream position, that there was no real agreement to limit > subsequent NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. So it is dismissed as > a direct or justifiable cause of subsequent Russian resentment, with > Sell offering a different explanation for the souring of relations > with the United States and the West in general: "the inability of > Moscow after the Soviet collapse to come to grips with its > necessarily reduced role in the world; the failure of Russia's > post-Communist leadership to create a vibrant and prosperous new > domestic system, which had the effect of undermining support for > every aspect of the post-Soviet settlement; and the failure of > theWest to find a way to include Russia as an equal partner in the > creation of the new, post-Cold War European order" (p. 278). > > Readers will immediately note the tensions, particularly Russia's > "inability ... to come to grips with its necessarily reduced role in > the world" side by side with "the failure of the West to ... include > Russia as an equal partner." This same dualism is woven through > Sell's vivid, heartfelt postscript on post-Soviet Russia. Russian > leaders failed to manage economic transition well, but the West is > guilty of giving little aid and lots of questionable advice. The > United States was correct to back the courageous Yeltsin, even in his > violent suppression of hardline opposition, but maybe winking at his > falsification of elections and passage of a new constitution was not > such a good idea after all. NATO expansion was key to integrating > former Soviet-bloc states into a "united and democratic" Europe, but > also caused an understandable "sense of humiliation" that fueled the > anti-Western turn of Vladimir, Putin who now threatens those same > former Soviet-bloc states. This final section of his book is written > with renewed detail and passion, and the reader is not surprised to > learn that Sell returned for another posting in Russia from 1991 to > 1994. And this experience gave him fascinating insight--but still no > easy answers--into the questions of what has gone wrong in Russia's > transition and where Russia is headed in the future. > > Citation: Robert D. English. Review of Sell, Louis, _From Washington > to Moscow: US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of the USSR_. > H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. March, 2017. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=48315 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -- _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
