http://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/payback-time-as-kosovo-chickens-
come-home-to-roost-1466346.html
Irish Independent
August 31, 2008
Payback time as Kosovo chickens come home to roost
Engaging with, not isolating, Russia is the path to
avoiding further confrontation over South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, writes Sir Ivor Roberts
Sir Ivor Roberts is President of Trinity College
Oxford and a former British Ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Ireland and Italy
-The Russians' dislike of encirclement is profound and
historical. More recently, it has been fuelled by
enlargement of NATO to take in the Eastern European
countries formerly members of the Warsaw Pact.
Georgian and Ukrainian ambitions for NATO membership
-- discussed but not agreed at the NATO summit in
April this year, despite enormous US pressure - only
added to the Russian anger.
-Saakashvili visited Bush in the White House only a
few months ago and - despite Bush officials'
protestations to the contrary - appears to have taken
away the impression that supportive rhetoric
translated into active military support.
-Perhaps Saakashvili, as a political chancer, believed
he could drag the US and NATO into the conflict in the
same way that the Kosovo Liberation Army successfully
brought in NATO as their air force against the Serbs
in 1999.
-How can the West talk of the need to maintain an
independent state's territorial integrity and to
refuse to countenance forcible changes of borders when
that is exactly what the US and most of the EU
countries condoned in recognising Kosovo - against
Serbia's will, and in the absence of any Security
Council Resolution allowing it? To argue that Kosovo
is unique is facile.
Behind the war of words over the conflict in South
Ossetia and the threat of a new Cold War lies a key
strategic issue which should not have caught Western
policymakers napping in their August somnolence.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are among those frozen
conflicts which Russia warned of if the West persisted
in redrawing boundaries in the Balkans by recognising
Kosovo's declaration of independence. The cases are
two sides of the same coin in Russian minds.
If the West was prepared to support Kosovo's secession
from Serbia and disregard internationally recognised
borders, then Russia could do the same in respect of
Georgia by recognising the borders of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia as those of independent states.
Russia's strategy is brutally simple. Keep South
Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent buffers, and
discourage its neighbours who aspire to Nato
membership.
The Russians' dislike of encirclement is profound and
historical. More recently, it has been fuelled by
enlargement of NATO to take in the Eastern European
countries formerly members of the Warsaw Pact.
Georgian and Ukrainian ambitions for NATO membership
-- discussed but not agreed at the NATO summit in
April this year, despite enormous US pressure - only
added to the Russian anger.
Putin, who had been invited to the summit, made his
position clear. Russia viewed "the appearance of a
powerful military bloc" on its borders as a direct
threat.
Despite Bush's famous claim after his first meeting
with Putin that he could look into his eyes and see
his soul, he failed to read Russian red lines.
The US-educated Georgian President, Mikheil
Saakashvili, has, since he came to power in 2004 by
toppling former Soviet foreign minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, played a clever game in Washington:
endearing himself to the foreign policy hawks around
Vice-President Cheney, who saw in the Georgian leader
a model for the kind of pro-democracy movement which
the hawks believe is waiting to spring up worldwide.
Naturally, Saakashvili's supporters in the US included
the Republican candidate for the US presidency, John
McCain....
Saakashvili visited Bush in the White House only a few
months ago and - despite Bush officials' protestations
to the contrary - appears to have taken away the
impression that supportive rhetoric translated into
active military support.
Why else did Saakashvili feel strong enough to provoke
the Russians by attempting forcibly to integrate South
Ossetia into Georgia when Russian armed forces are
more than 30 times the size of Georgia's?
Part of the answer may lie in Saakashvili's own
personality, which has been described as part neo-con,
part-Georgian nationalist and part post-Communist
party politician.
But the other part lies surely in Saakashvili's belief
that, by providing reinforced troop contributions for
Iraq, he was building up military credit which could
be drawn down to deal with his separatists.
Many anonymous US administration officials are now
claiming that they consistently warned Georgia off a
fight it could not win, and for which it would not
receive US military backing beyond the training they
already provide.
Perhaps Saakashvili, as a political chancer, believed
he could drag the US and NATO into the conflict in the
same way that the Kosovo Liberation Army successfully
brought in NATO as their air force against the Serbs
in 1999.
Indeed, Russia's aggressive response to Saakashvili
was partly a reaction to its sense of impotence over
NATO action in Yugoslavia, and partly an assertion of
Russian power. As if to say that the years of
humiliation after the break-up of the Soviet Union are
over.
It is now the West which looks humiliated and
disoriented. Georgians are asking where the US and
NATO were when they were needed. The sense of let-down
is palpable. It seems distant days when George W Bush
was greeted by 150,000 people as he visited Tbilisi in
2005 (the road to the airport is named after him).
Yet the Republicans, in the shape of McCain, may
paradoxically gain from the crisis. He has emerged
with a stronger line in rhetoric ("We are all
Georgians now") in denouncing Russia than Obama.
McCain will proclaim his virtues as the candidate with
the weight and experience to deal with such
international crises.
It may well, however, have been McCain and the
neo-cons around Cheney with their uncritical support
for Georgia which encouraged Saakashvili to embark on
his rash adventure.
McCain, though, hit the nail on the head when he
called the Russians' devastating over-reaction an
attempt in part "to intimidate other neighbours such
as Ukraine for choosing to associate with the West".
The West's reaction has been rhetorically robust -
much talk of the severe consequences Russia will face
as a result of its action, though whether Russia will
be too fazed by its exclusion from the G8 or the WTO
is debatable - but, militarily, Nato looks as impotent
as Russia did over Kosovo's declaration of
independence.
The shock which greeted Russia's recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia's independence can only be
cosmetic. This was payback time for Kosovo in
identical coinage.
Western politicians maintain that Russia's recognition
of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Georgia and is contrary to UN Security Council
Resolutions. Quite.
Now substitute the West for Russia and Kosovo for
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the inconsistency and
double standards of the West's position are clear.
How can the West talk of the need to maintain an
independent state's territorial integrity and to
refuse to countenance forcible changes of borders when
that is exactly what the US and most of the EU
countries condoned in recognising Kosovo - against
Serbia's will, and in the absence of any Security
Council Resolution allowing it? To argue that Kosovo
is unique is facile. Each potential secession is
special, with its own often violent history.
Europe's increasing dependence on Russia as an energy
supplier weakens its position further. Most of the
economic measures which the West might take against
the Russians will only hurt the Western Europeans
more.
What is needed at this time is cool heads. A
ratcheting down of the temperature; fewer mercy dashes
to Tbilisi and Kiev, and a toning down of the
megaphone diplomacy (however tempting it is to deploy
with a domestic audience); more direct engagement with
the Russians to bolster the message that a new Cold
War harms East and West....
Isolating Russia may make Western politicians feel
better, but the sensible course is to engage the
Russians in security discussions and to get them to
understand that, as spheres of influence are last
century's diplomatic vocabulary, what Russia needs is
stable, prosperous neighbours who have no hostile
intentions.
Unfortunately, Georgia under its current president has
not proved an ideal exemplar.
Is Russia not playing a neo-imperialist game?
Perhaps, but we are clearly no longer in a uni-polar
world. The rush to NATO membership by its former
satellites and the foolhardy activity of Washington
pets like Saakashvili make...Russia distinctly
unsettled and unpredictable.
Talking of a new Cold War and building "coalitions
against Russian aggression", however, risks being self
fulfilling. Engaging with, not isolating, Russia is
the path to avoiding further confrontation. Be careful
what you wish for, says the old adage.
Serbian News Network - SNN
news@antic.org
http://www.antic.org/
