I know that EternalBlue was fixed in the March round of patches, and my quick googling indidates that DoublePulsar was covered in MS17-010
Kurt On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Ed Ziots <eziot...@gmail.com> wrote: > U need to patch.. I believe the 0 days are fixed in last round of m$ patches > > On Jun 23, 2017 7:19 AM, "Kent, Larry J CTR USARMY 93 SIG BDE (US)" > <larry.j.kent2....@mail.mil> wrote: >> >> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED >> >> Interesting article, but is there a fix for this? >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: listsad...@lists.myitforum.com >> [mailto:listsad...@lists.myitforum.com] On Behalf Of Kurt Buff >> Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 11:02 PM >> To: ntsysadm <NTSysADM@lists.myitforum.com> >> Subject: [Non-DoD Source] [NTSysADM] Thank you, NSA... >> >> All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the >> identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained >> within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web >> browser. >> >> >> >> >> ---- >> >> >> Caution-https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/technology/ransomware-attack-nsa-cyberweapons.html >> >> A Cyberattack ‘the World Isn’t Ready For’ >> >> NEWARK — There have been times over the last two months when Golan Ben-Oni >> has felt like a voice in the wilderness. >> >> On April 29, someone hit his employer, IDT Corporation, with two >> cyberweapons that had been stolen from the National Security Agency. >> Mr. Ben-Oni, the global chief information officer at IDT, was able to fend >> them off, but the attack left him distraught. >> >> In 22 years of dealing with hackers of every sort, he had never seen >> anything like it. Who was behind it? How did they evade all of his defenses? >> How many others had been attacked but did not know it? >> >> Since then, Mr. Ben-Oni has been sounding alarm bells, calling anyone who >> will listen at the White House, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the New >> Jersey attorney general’s office and the top cybersecurity companies in the >> country to warn them about an attack that may still be invisibly striking >> victims undetected around the world. >> >> And he is determined to track down whoever did it. >> >> “I don’t pursue every attacker, just the ones that piss me off,” Mr. >> Ben-Oni told me recently over lentils in his office, which was strewn with >> empty Red Bull cans. “This pissed me off and, more importantly, it pissed my >> wife off, which is the real litmus test.” >> >> Two weeks after IDT was hit, the cyberattack known as WannaCry ravaged >> computers at hospitals in England, universities in China, rail systems in >> Germany, even auto plants in Japan. No doubt it was destructive. >> But what Mr. Ben-Oni had witnessed was much worse, and with all eyes on >> the WannaCry destruction, few seemed to be paying attention to the attack on >> IDT’s systems — and most likely others around the world. >> >> The strike on IDT, a conglomerate with headquarters in a nondescript gray >> building here with views of the Manhattan skyline 15 miles away, was similar >> to WannaCry in one way: Hackers locked up IDT data and demanded a ransom to >> unlock it. >> >> But the ransom demand was just a smoke screen for a far more invasive >> attack that stole employee credentials. With those credentials in hand, >> hackers could have run free through the company’s computer network, taking >> confidential information or destroying machines. >> >> Worse, the assault, which has never been reported before, was not spotted >> by some of the nation’s leading cybersecurity products, the top security >> engineers at its biggest tech companies, government intelligence analysts or >> the F.B.I., which remains consumed with the WannaCry attack. >> >> Were it not for a digital black box that recorded everything on IDT’s >> network, along with Mr. Ben-Oni’s tenacity, the attack might have gone >> unnoticed. >> >> Scans for the two hacking tools used against IDT indicate that the company >> is not alone. In fact, tens of thousands of computer systems all over the >> world have been “backdoored” by the same N.S.A. weapons. >> Mr. Ben-Oni and other security researchers worry that many of those other >> infected computers are connected to transportation networks, hospitals, >> water treatment plants and other utilities. >> >> An attack on those systems, they warn, could put lives at risk. And Mr. >> Ben-Oni, fortified with adrenaline, Red Bull and the house beats of >> Deadmau5, the Canadian record producer, said he would not stop until the >> attacks had been shut down and those responsible were behind bars. >> >> “The world is burning about WannaCry, but this is a nuclear bomb compared >> to WannaCry,” Mr. Ben-Oni said. “This is different. It’s a lot worse. It >> steals credentials. You can’t catch it, and it’s happening right under our >> noses.” >> >> And, he added, “The world isn’t ready for this.” >> >> Targeting the Nerve Center >> >> Mr. Ben-Oni, 43, a Hasidic Jew, is a slight man with smiling eyes, a thick >> beard and a hacker’s penchant for mischief. He grew up in the hills of >> Berkeley, Calif., the son of Israeli immigrants. >> >> Even as a toddler, Mr. Ben-Oni’s mother said, he was not interested in >> toys. She had to take him to the local junkyard to scour for typewriters >> that he would eventually dismantle on the living room floor. As a teenager, >> he aspired to become a rabbi but spent most of his free time hacking >> computers at the University of California, Berkeley, where his exploits once >> accidentally took down Belgium’s entire phone system for 15 minutes. >> >> To his parents’ horror, he dropped out of college to pursue his love of >> hacking full time, starting a security company to help the city of Berkeley >> and two nearby communities, Alameda and Novato, set up secure computer >> networks. >> >> He had a knack for the technical work, but not the marketing, and found it >> difficult to get new clients. So at age 19, he crossed the country and took >> a job at IDT, back when the company was a low-profile long-distance service >> provider. >> >> As IDT started acquiring and spinning off an eclectic list of ventures, >> Mr. Ben-Oni found himself responsible for securing shale oil projects in >> Mongolia and the Golan Heights, a “Star Trek” comic books company, a project >> to cure cancer, a yeshiva university that trains underprivileged students in >> cybersecurity, and a small mobile company that Verizon recently acquired for >> $3.1 billion. >> >> Which is to say he has encountered hundreds of thousands of hackers of >> every stripe, motivation and skill level. He eventually started a security >> business, IOSecurity, under IDT, to share some of the technical tools he had >> developed to keep IDT’s many businesses secure. >> By Mr. Ben-Oni’s estimate, IDT experiences hundreds of attacks a day on >> its businesses, but perhaps only four each year that give him pause. >> >> Nothing compared to the attack that struck in April. Like the WannaCry >> attack in May, the assault on IDT relied on cyberweapons developed by the >> N.S.A. that were leaked online in April by a mysterious group of hackers >> calling themselves the Shadow Brokers — alternately believed to be >> Russia-backed cybercriminals, an N.S.A. mole, or both. >> >> The WannaCry attack — which the N.S.A. and security researchers have tied >> to North Korea — employed one N.S.A. cyberweapon; the IDT assault used two. >> >> Both WannaCry and the IDT attack used a hacking tool the agency had >> code-named EternalBlue. The tool took advantage of unpatched Microsoft >> servers to automatically spread malware from one server to another, so that >> within 24 hours North Korea’s hackers had spread their ransomware to more >> than 200,000 servers around the globe. >> >> The attack on IDT went a step further with another stolen N.S.A. >> cyberweapon, called DoublePulsar. The N.S.A. used DoublePulsar to >> penetrate computer systems without tripping security alarms. It allowed >> N.S.A. spies to inject their tools into the nerve center of a target’s >> computer system, called the kernel, which manages communications between a >> computer’s hardware and its software. >> >> In the pecking order of a computer system, the kernel is at the very top, >> allowing anyone with secret access to it to take full control of a machine. >> It is also a dangerous blind spot for most security software, allowing >> attackers to do what they want and go unnoticed. In IDT’s case, attackers >> used DoublePulsar to steal an IDT contractor’s credentials. Then they >> deployed ransomware in what appears to be a cover for their real motive: >> broader access to IDT’s businesses. >> >> The N.S.A. campus in Fort Meade, Md. Tens of thousands of computer >> systems, some of which could be connected to public utilities, have been >> “backdoored” using the agency’s stolen cyberweapons. Patrick >> Semansky/Associated Press >> >> Mr. Ben-Oni learned of the attack only when a contractor, working from >> home, switched on her computer to find that all her data had been encrypted >> and that attackers were demanding a ransom to unlock it. He might have >> assumed that this was a simple case of ransomware. >> >> But the attack struck Mr. Ben-Oni as unique. For one thing, it was timed >> perfectly to the Sabbath. Attackers entered IDT’s network at 6 p.m. on >> Saturday on the dot, two and a half hours before the Sabbath would end and >> when most of IDT’s employees — 40 percent of whom identify as Orthodox Jews >> — would be off the clock. For another, the attackers compromised the >> contractor’s computer through her home modem — strange. >> >> The black box of sorts, a network recording device made by the Israeli >> security company Secdo, shows that the ransomware was installed after the >> attackers had made off with the contractor’s credentials. And they managed >> to bypass every major security detection mechanism along the way. Finally, >> before they left, they encrypted her computer with ransomware, demanding >> $130 to unlock it, to cover up the more invasive attack on her computer. >> >> Mr. Ben-Oni estimates that he has spoken to 107 security experts and >> researchers about the attack, including the chief executives of nearly every >> major security company and the heads of threat intelligence at Google, >> Microsoft and Amazon. >> >> With the exception of Amazon, which found that some of its customers’ >> computers had been scanned by the same computer that hit IDT, no one had >> seen any trace of the attack before Mr. Ben-Oni notified them. The New York >> Times confirmed Mr. Ben-Oni’s account via written summaries provided by Palo >> Alto Networks, Intel’s McAfee and other security firms he used and asked to >> investigate the attack. >> >> “I started to get the sense that we were the canary,” he said. “But we >> recorded it.” >> >> Since IDT was hit, Mr. Ben-Oni has contacted everyone in his Rolodex to >> warn them of an attack that could still be worming its way, undetected, >> through victims’ systems. >> >> “Time is burning,” Mr. Ben-Oni said. “Understand, this is really a war — >> with offense on one side, and institutions, organizations and schools on the >> other, defending against an unknown adversary.” >> >> ‘No One Is Running Point’ >> >> Since the Shadow Brokers leaked dozens of coveted attack tools in April, >> hospitals, schools, cities, police departments and companies around the >> world have largely been left to fend for themselves against weapons >> developed by the world’s most sophisticated attacker: the N.S.A. >> >> A month earlier, Microsoft had issued a software patch to defend against >> the N.S.A. hacking tools — suggesting that the agency tipped the company off >> to what was coming. Microsoft regularly credits those who point out >> vulnerabilities in its products, but in this case the company made no >> mention of the tipster. Later, when the WannaCry attack hit hundreds of >> thousands of Microsoft customers, Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, slammed >> the government in a blog post for hoarding and stockpiling security >> vulnerabilities. >> >> For his part, Mr. Ben-Oni said he had rolled out Microsoft’s patches as >> soon as they became available, but attackers still managed to get in through >> the IDT contractor’s home modem. >> >> Six years ago, Mr. Ben-Oni had a chance meeting with an N.S.A. >> employee at a conference and asked him how to defend against modern-day >> cyberthreats. The N.S.A. employee advised him to “run three of everything”: >> three firewalls, three antivirus solutions, three intrusion detection >> systems. And so he did. >> >> But in this case, modern-day detection systems created by Cylance, McAfee >> and Microsoft and patching systems by Tanium did not catch the attack on >> IDT. Nor did any of the 128 publicly available threat intelligence feeds >> that IDT subscribes to. Even the 10 threat intelligence feeds that his >> organization spends a half-million dollars on annually for urgent >> information failed to report it. He has since threatened to return their >> products. >> >> “Our industry likes to work on known problems,” Mr. Ben-Oni said. >> “This is an unknown problem. We’re not ready for this.” >> >> No one he has spoken to knows whether they have been hit, but just this >> month, restaurants across the United States reported being hit with similar >> attacks that were undetected by antivirus systems. There are now YouTube >> videos showing criminals how to attack systems using the very same N.S.A. >> tools used against IDT, and Metasploit, an automated hacking tool, now >> allows anyone to carry out these attacks with the click of a button. >> >> Worse still, Mr. Ben-Oni said, “No one is running point on this.” >> >> Last month, he personally briefed the F.B.I. analyst in charge of >> investigating the WannaCry attack. He was told that the agency had been >> specifically tasked with WannaCry, and that even though the attack on his >> company was more invasive and sophisticated, it was still technically >> something else, and therefore the F.B.I. could not take on his case. >> >> The F.B.I. did not respond to requests for comment. >> >> So Mr. Ben-Oni has largely pursued the case himself. His team at IDT was >> able to trace part of the attack to a personal Android phone in Russia and >> has been feeding its findings to Europol, the European law enforcement >> agency based in The Hague. >> >> The chances that IDT was the only victim of this attack are slim. Sean >> Dillon, a senior analyst at RiskSense, a New Mexico security company, was >> among the first security researchers to scan the internet for the N.S.A.’s >> DoublePulsar tool. He found tens of thousands of host computers are infected >> with the tool, which attackers can use at will. >> >> “Once DoublePulsar is on the machine, there’s nothing stopping anyone else >> from coming along and using the back door,” Mr. Dillon said. >> >> More distressing, Mr. Dillon tested all the major antivirus products >> against the DoublePulsar infection and a demoralizing 99 percent failed to >> detect it. >> >> “We’ve seen the same computers infected with DoublePulsar for two months >> and there is no telling how much malware is on those systems,” >> Mr. Dillon said. “Right now we have no idea what’s gotten into these >> organizations.” >> >> In the worst case, Mr. Dillon said, attackers could use those back doors >> to unleash destructive malware into critical infrastructure, tying up rail >> systems, shutting down hospitals or even paralyzing electrical utilities. >> >> Could that attack be coming? The Shadow Brokers resurfaced last month, >> promising a fresh load of N.S.A. attack tools, even offering to supply them >> for monthly paying subscribers — like a wine-of-the-month club for >> cyberweapon enthusiasts. >> >> In a hint that the industry is taking the group’s threats seriously, >> Microsoft issued a new set of patches to defend against such attacks. >> The company noted in an ominously worded message that the patches were >> critical, citing an “elevated risk for destructive cyberattacks.” >> >> Mr. Ben-Oni is convinced that IDT is not the only victim, and that these >> tools can and will be used to do far worse. >> >> “I look at this as a life-or-death situation,” he said. “Today it’s us, >> but tomorrow it might be someone else.” >> >> >> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
