Cory asked: > When you say “the linked article”, do you mean the PCWorld one?
My apologies I meant the one Ted referred to soon after. Pauli -- Oracle Dr Paul Dale | Cryptographer | Network Security & Encryption Phone +61 7 3031 7217 Oracle Australia -----Original Message----- From: Cory Benfield [mailto:c...@lukasa.co.uk] Sent: Wednesday, 28 June 2017 5:15 PM To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] Work on a new RNG for OpenSSL > On 28 Jun 2017, at 04:00, Paul Dale <paul.d...@oracle.com> wrote: > > > Peter Waltenberg wrote: >> The next question you should be asking is: does our proposed design mitigate >> known issues ?. >> For example this: >> http://www.pcworld.com/article/2886432/tens-of-thousands-of-home-routers-at-risk-with-duplicate-ssh-keys.html > > Using the OS RNG won't fix the lack of boot time randomness unless there is a > HRNG present. > > For VMs, John's suggestion that /dev/hwrng should be installed is reasonable. > > For embedded devices, a HRNG is often not possible. Here getrandom() (or > /dev/random since old kernels are common) should be used. Often /dev/urandom > is used instead and the linked article is the result. There are possible > mitigations that some manufacturers include (usually with downsides). When you say “the linked article”, do you mean the PCWorld one? Because that article doesn’t provide any suggestion that /dev/urandom has anything to do with it. It is at least as likely that the SSH key is hard-coded into the machine image. The flaw here is not “using /dev/urandom”, it’s “exposing your router’s SSH access on the external side of the router”, plus the standard level of poor configuration done by shovelware router manufacturers. Cory -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev