On 04/11/2016 09:26, Marcus Meissner wrote:
On Fri, Nov 04, 2016 at 10:03:21AM +0530, Akshar Kanak wrote:Dear team as per the documnet http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf page 150 , Its mentioned The implementation of the nonce_explicit management logic inside the module shall ensure that when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key (e.g., a 64-bit counter starting from 0 and increasing, when it reaches the maximum value of 2 64 -1), *either party (the client or the server) that encounters this condition triggers a handshake to establish a new encryption key – see Sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 in RFC 5246*.is this being handled by openssl ? in the source code of openssl i am not able find out the exact location where this renegotiation is initiated when the counter over flows ?(my understanding might be limited) I think we currently do an error if the calling frontend does not initiate renegotiation. Code is here: crypto/modes/gcm128.c CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32 These kind of checks avoid the 32bit counter overflow: if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) return -1; The calling instance needs to re-iv with CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv. For TLS, if I understand correctly, the stack does intiailize the GCM cipher with a new IV on every TLS record and these cannot be that large. Ciao, Marcus
As I understand the GCM mode, the limitation is that the same IV must not be used twice, and only a limited number of all the possible IVs may be used before changing the *key*. Setting a "new" IV for each TLS record is always needed, regardless if it comes from a simple record counter or is transmitted for each record (the TLS RFCs presumable have a fixed choice for this). But to get a new *key* before too much data has been encrypted with it (such limits exist for *all* algorithms and modes), I believe that an actual TLS renegotiation is needed, involving at least a partial handshake without closing the connection. Enjoy Jakob -- Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded -- openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
