[peirce-l] Re: Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC

[Jim Piat]

Dear Steven,   Your questions are very interesting to me as well.    I view the conceptions Peirce speaks of as signs and was just about to write something to that effect to Ben and might yet.    I read Peirce as saying their are various sensations that impinge upon us which we organize in such a way as to constitute signs of objects  -- these signs being conceptions.  And that we ourselves are signs standing for a point of view or object we call ourselves.  I don't mean by this to imply that this is all just a matter of neurology  -- I think coordination with other signs is fundamental to the process by which signs are established and do their work.   So I take it that the most complete organization of being is as signs and that this triadic being (of which we partake as signs) can at least conceptually be understood as comprised of a nesting of signs within which are signs, reactions and qualities.  So I would say primacy belongs to the sign of which quality, reaction (distinction)  and continuity are inherent parts.  Sensations I take to be reactions.  Of course I'm not sure any of what I'm saying here is correct.  I am joining you in calling for a discussion of the New List and the questions it raises.  So, I'm not really clear on the question you are asking (the difference between the two interpretations you are putting forth),  but I think the theory Peirce is referring to is the work of Kant in his critique of Pure Reason but I'm not at all sure.      In any case if you are taking on The New List paragraph by paragraph and are interested in discussing each paragraph as you go I'd like to join you and hope others will as well   --- I've been hoping for a systematic review of this work on the list for some time.  It would be very helpful to me.   Best wishes, Jim Piat  From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 8:34 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC Dear List, I want to make sure that I have interpreted Peirce correctly from his statements in On A New List of Categories (NLC). I am comparing this argument with the notion of epistemological primacy put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his The Logical Structure of the World. In the first paragraphs of NLC Peirce says: (CP1.545) Sec. 1. This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it.  (CP1.546) Sec. 2. This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on. Here are my questions: Carnap argues that the entire experience of an individual holds epistemological primacy. This could be taken to concur with Peirce's argument in CP1.545 but there appear to be two interpretations possible. The source of my doubt is Peirce's use of the term "unity" in the above paragraph and his comments in the following paragraph. I want to be sure that I understand how he is using the term "unity."  He may mean that concepts are differentiated in the landscape of experience and that the "manifold of sensuous impressions" is a whole and not constituted of distinctions, that distinctions in that "manifold" are what he calls "the function of conceptions."  These distinctions fit my definition of "signs" and so an interpretation of CP1.545 could read that the "function of conceptions" are signs (i.e., differentiated experiences). An alternative point of view would argue that Peirce is saying the opposite of what I have said before and that he means that distinct "sensuous impressions" are brought to together as a function of conceptions.   In this last case he would need an integrative mechanism for semeiosis and give epistemological primacy to "conceptions." This provides significant problems. Finally, where is the theory "already established" to which Peirce refers - in his own work or is he referring to someone else? Sincerely, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith INSTITUTE for ADVANCED SCIENCE & ENGINEERING Sunnyvale, California http://iase.info --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com