Dear Patrick, Thank you for your response. The line you quote of mine below is, in fact, inconsistent with Carnap's view - and that would suggest from what you say that the ontologies of Carnap and Peirce - both of which are weak in any case - are indeed consistent with respect to this matter. By "ontologies" I have assumed that you mean the ontological basis of their epistemology. Let me restate the case more clearly. There are two ways to view epistemological primacy. Either signs (i.e., individuated experiences) are primary, or there is a basis of signs that is primary. This will depend upon your model. If your model is that signs are the function of an integrative process of distinct experiences you will tend to argue the first case. If your model is that signs are the differentiation of experience within the context of the whole, you will tend to prefer the second case. Snatching a paragraph from my book, my position is as follows: "The entire experience of an organism has epistemological primacy; that is, our particular conceptions are the product of differentiation within the total content of experience. Physiologically, the embodiment of knowledge therefore does not require the integration of distinct embodiments but rather requires the differentiation of experience within the embodiment as a whole." In others words - your model of semeiosis can either require an integrative function or a differentiating function. I certainly argue the case for the latter, as does Carnap, I thought that Peirce did and I am still unsure, and perhaps Kant did - I need to check, and while I am at it I will check Locke and Hume too. Differentiation is compatible with Carnap's position in LSotW and I had taken it to also be compatible with Peirce - except that when rereading the source material while checking references today I saw that both interpretations were possible in what he had said there. His use of the term "unity" confuses me. The "induction problem" is a completely unrelated issue since it has more to do with the prediction model. My respect for both Carnap and Popper, however, precludes me from believing that they missed much at all in their considerations - even of Peirce. So I think it is a question of emphasis only. Peirce was right in my view to empathize abduction. With respect, Steven On Sep 6, 2006, at 7:34 PM, Patrick Sullivan wrote: Been awhile since I’ve worked with this stuff, but there is a fundamental difference between ontologies in Carnap and Peirce that will inform how each discusses the relationship between experience and knowledge. The statement below would be far more in line with the nominalism behind Carnap, and inconsistent with Peirce’s realism. The reduction of “the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity” would be a function of continuity, of real generality in experience, driven by an inferential theory of cognition at the level of knowledge. The “gradiations” among concepts reflects the iterative, transitive nature of the categories via thirdness (in later essays for example, why there is no “problem of induction” for Peirce— Carnap missed that one, too, along with Popper, regarding Peirce). The “theory already established” would be Kant. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com |
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