Steven,
The theory "already established" is Kant's. The modern improvement is that propositions are taken as more primary than judgements and unity is achieved through propositions rather than the "transcendental unity of apperception" or the ego. Thus, epistemological primacy lies with propositions rather than me. On another interpretation, the future community of inquirers has epistemological primacy. This imples that "we" is more important than "I."
Jim W
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Sent: Wed, 6 Sep 2006 7:34 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC
Dear List,
In the first paragraphs of NLC Peirce says:
(CP1.545) Sec. 1. This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it.
(CP1.546) Sec. 2. This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on.
Here are my questions:
Carnap argues that the entire experience of an individual holds epistemological primacy. This could be taken to concur with Peirce's argument in CP1.545 but there appear to be two interpretations possible.
The source of my doubt is Peirce's use of the term "unity" in the above paragraph and his comments in the following paragraph. I want to be sure that I understand how he is using the term "unity."
He may mean that concepts are differentiated in the landscape of experience and that the "manifold of sensuous impressions" is a whole and not constituted of distinctions, that distinctions in that "manifold" are what he calls "the function of conceptions."
These distinctions fit my definition of "signs" and so an interpretation of CP1.545 could read that the "function of conceptions" are signs (i.e., differentiated experiences).
An alternative point of view would argue that Peirce is saying the opposite of what I have said before and that he means that distinct "sensuous impressions" are brought to together as a function of conceptions.
In this last case he would need an integrative mechanism for semeiosis and give epistemological primacy to "conceptions." This provides significant problems.
Finally, where is the theory "already established" to which Peirce refers - in his own work or is he referring to someone else?
Sincerely,
Steven
--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
INSTITUTE for ADVANCED SCIENCE & ENGINEERING
Sunnyvale, California
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