On closer review of Peirce's explanation of Kant's "unity" and his subsequent use of the term, I am now convinced that Carnap and Peirce do not concur and that they have opposing views of what is epistemologically primary. For Peirce it is, unsurprisingly I'd guess, signs. For Carnap signs are epistemologically second, and the total embodied experience is primary. 

With respect,
Steven



On Sep 7, 2006, at 10:14 AM, Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Steven:

I append to this message some quotes from Peirce that might be helpful as regards cognitive synthesis, for what it's worth.  (I picked them up from a string search of the CP on "synthesis" and they looked like they might be pertinent.)
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