On closer review of Peirce's explanation of Kant's "unity" and his subsequent use of the term, I am now convinced that Carnap and Peirce do not concur and that they have opposing views of what is epistemologically primary. For Peirce it is, unsurprisingly I'd guess, signs. For Carnap signs are epistemologically second, and the total embodied experience is primary. With respect, Steven On Sep 7, 2006, at 10:14 AM, Joseph Ransdell wrote:
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