Bill, [[ To deny what I said of the Bhagavad Gita, you have to deny what is written there. ]]
Well, if you choose (or are predisposed) to read it as an apology for a totalitarian ethic, then i'm sure there is no difficulty in doing so. I think this is evident in the principles shared by semiotics and hermeneutics. It is also evident that at least some of its deepest readers -- Gandhi, for one -- do not read it that way. [[ I've seen Ghandi's commentary, and whether he liked the Gita or not is irrelevant. He, in fact, treated the Mahabharata War as allegorical. ]] Naturally, he treated it as metaphorical (i would not say "allegorical"). It was, among other things, a metaphor for his own "war" against British imperialism. What's relevant is not whether Gandhi liked the Gita but his testimony that he based his *practice* on it. It's not possible, in my view, to base one's practice on an ancient scripture without reading it metaphorically -- not if you value *truth* as both Peirce and Gandhi did (i believe Gandhi is reported as saying "there is no god higher than truth"). In Peircean terms, the scripture must refer to what's real rather than what is (or was) actual. Or to put it another way, it refers to *types* (rather than tokens) of practice. In practice we are guided by ideals, and the (psychological) fact is that the guidance is not effective unless we believe in their reality. Your description of the bodhisattva presented him as a quasi-mythic figure. What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means it. Logically, this entails working toward the enlightenment of all sentient beings rather than for some personal attainment or "reward." It is the reality, and not the actuality (now or at any future time) of this ideal which functions to guide actual practice. The Peircean ideal of scientific method functions in exactly the same way, in my view. It's probably not necessary to append Peircean passages about this, which are many and well known; but i'll try to do that if requested. The upshot of it all is that the true scientist, like the bodhisattva, devotes his personal life to a *collective* enterprise (the quest for truth) in which he can only play a minute role. He must lose himself in that role, precisely because that's the only way to actualize his unique contribution to the quest. Peirce did not, to my knowledge, put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective, public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called "art" or "practice" -- obviously my sense of "practice" is different.) His emphasis was appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part, i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to communal habits does not contribute to its development. Peirce also emphasized that science and logic both demand and depend on "identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community." (For the source and context of the Peirce quotes i'm giving here, see http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Peirce.htm .) This is what lies behind his statement that "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle." This is where the Peircean ideal of science and the Buddhist ideal of the bodhisattva coincide. I hope this answers your question [[ How can there be personal responsibility in selfless action? ... Was Ghandi deficient in conscience? If he had one, yes. Arjuna had a conscience, and that was his problem. ]] Your usage of "conscience" -- an interesting word in its etymology and history -- strikes me as peculiar; i don't think you'd claim it is Peircean, would you? Anyway, Arjuna's problem is that he was only concerned about the fact that he was about to take the battlefield against his own relatives. He was not yet capable of identifying his interests with those of "an unlimited community." And i don't think that Peirce meant that phrase to be read as hyperbolic. He's talking about an ideal community, not any that have actually appeared in history or are likely to appear in the future. There's more to say, but this will do for now. As mentioned above, i've collected a few Peirce passages relevant to this thread at http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Peirce.htm . So i'll shut up now and let Peirce speak for himself, while i catch up on your exchange with the other Gary. gary F. }Our duty is to strive for self-realization and we should lose ourselves in that aim. [Gandhi]{ gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
