Jim:
I just want to add a correction to my post in reply to your thesis about truth as an average. Upon reflection I have to say that I don't know what I was thinking of in saying that I didn't recognize the structure of the fourth method in your account. I should have stopped with saying that your thesis would only apply to some cases of settlement by the fourth method. I'm not sure exactly how to characterize that class of cases, but the differentium seems to involve them being cases where there is an initial disagreement, amounting to a formal contradiction, between diverse observation statements about the same object of observation, and this is handled not by taking due account of perspectival differences but simply by averaging and taking the projected average to be the truth of the matter. If perspectival considerations are taken duly into account initially in describing the observations there is no contradiction to be reconciled to begin with since one expects the object to appear differently from those differing perspectives and with just the differences found in the observation reports, which means that averaging is not pertinent to that sort of case. But where it is pertinent in arriving at the truth of the matter, what is happening is that a decision has been made that the original observation reports are to be construed as differing for reasons unknown and therefore to be best regarded as not being simply about the object but about the observer as well as the observed, though without specification of exactly what the difference is as regards the vantage point of the observer's observation.
I am saying that awkwardly, but you get my point: that if we take the perspectival difference into account to begin with we don't get pluralism but simply expected differences in appearance reports. If we don't take perspectival differences into account we do get pluralism, apparently, but with the implicit understanding that it is really only apparent disagreement which is best handled by not going to the trouble of trying to figure out what the systematic perspectival difference is and taking the average as the final conclusion to be drawn in lieu of that, on the assumption that it does not differ significantly from what we would get if we knew what the perspetival differences are. Bit then that is not pluralism either/
However, there is still another relevant possibility for the use of averaging, in your sense., which is suggested by Peirce's notion of the "composite photograph" as a sort of metaphor for the way in which generality is developed on the basis of vagueness plus difference. Here is a Pomeranian and there is a Great Dane and both are dogs. How can animals seemingly so different in appearance be regarded as of the same kind? One reason might of course be that they are classified according to very different sorts of properties, which are not all visual appearance propertties. But sticking with differences in visual appearance, one can perhaps explain their type identity by noticing that if you overlay photos of various instances of various species of dogs the resultant and in some sense the averaged result is an animal that looks about as much like the one as it does the other and definitely looks like a dog, especially if the photograhs are cinematic, showing the ways they move about. (A Pomerian looks more like a typical cat then like a typical dog if the overlay is only with motionless photographs, but it it is a cinematic overlay the difference in style of movement between cats and dogs differentiates them effectively enough. ) Chris Hookway's provocative paper on this topic has come up before and if we were to pursue this topic we would want to go to that. However, I am not myself interested in that right at the moment -- though I am much interested in it in respect to another thread of discussion which has emerged here and which I would like to return to another time -- and I mention it now only as a reminder in passisng, and as a sort of marker of relevance of your thesis to another topic to be returned to in another connection at another time. But for the moment I would myself prefer to stick with further leisurely musement about the four methods of the Fixation article, and I don't think your thesis works for that.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
I just want to add a correction to my post in reply to your thesis about truth as an average. Upon reflection I have to say that I don't know what I was thinking of in saying that I didn't recognize the structure of the fourth method in your account. I should have stopped with saying that your thesis would only apply to some cases of settlement by the fourth method. I'm not sure exactly how to characterize that class of cases, but the differentium seems to involve them being cases where there is an initial disagreement, amounting to a formal contradiction, between diverse observation statements about the same object of observation, and this is handled not by taking due account of perspectival differences but simply by averaging and taking the projected average to be the truth of the matter. If perspectival considerations are taken duly into account initially in describing the observations there is no contradiction to be reconciled to begin with since one expects the object to appear differently from those differing perspectives and with just the differences found in the observation reports, which means that averaging is not pertinent to that sort of case. But where it is pertinent in arriving at the truth of the matter, what is happening is that a decision has been made that the original observation reports are to be construed as differing for reasons unknown and therefore to be best regarded as not being simply about the object but about the observer as well as the observed, though without specification of exactly what the difference is as regards the vantage point of the observer's observation.
I am saying that awkwardly, but you get my point: that if we take the perspectival difference into account to begin with we don't get pluralism but simply expected differences in appearance reports. If we don't take perspectival differences into account we do get pluralism, apparently, but with the implicit understanding that it is really only apparent disagreement which is best handled by not going to the trouble of trying to figure out what the systematic perspectival difference is and taking the average as the final conclusion to be drawn in lieu of that, on the assumption that it does not differ significantly from what we would get if we knew what the perspetival differences are. Bit then that is not pluralism either/
However, there is still another relevant possibility for the use of averaging, in your sense., which is suggested by Peirce's notion of the "composite photograph" as a sort of metaphor for the way in which generality is developed on the basis of vagueness plus difference. Here is a Pomeranian and there is a Great Dane and both are dogs. How can animals seemingly so different in appearance be regarded as of the same kind? One reason might of course be that they are classified according to very different sorts of properties, which are not all visual appearance propertties. But sticking with differences in visual appearance, one can perhaps explain their type identity by noticing that if you overlay photos of various instances of various species of dogs the resultant and in some sense the averaged result is an animal that looks about as much like the one as it does the other and definitely looks like a dog, especially if the photograhs are cinematic, showing the ways they move about. (A Pomerian looks more like a typical cat then like a typical dog if the overlay is only with motionless photographs, but it it is a cinematic overlay the difference in style of movement between cats and dogs differentiates them effectively enough. ) Chris Hookway's provocative paper on this topic has come up before and if we were to pursue this topic we would want to go to that. However, I am not myself interested in that right at the moment -- though I am much interested in it in respect to another thread of discussion which has emerged here and which I would like to return to another time -- and I mention it now only as a reminder in passisng, and as a sort of marker of relevance of your thesis to another topic to be returned to in another connection at another time. But for the moment I would myself prefer to stick with further leisurely musement about the four methods of the Fixation article, and I don't think your thesis works for that.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Original Message ----
From: Joseph Ransdell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Thursday, October 5, 2006 10:10:02 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Joseph Ransdell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Thursday, October 5, 2006 10:10:02 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What
Jim:
I think your thesis about the truth being the average, in the sense you describe, is an instance of a partial truth in that it probably does work for some class of truths, but it really only applies to those in which the diversity of opinion is opinion based upon observation. The first three methods, though, are not about opinions arrived at by observation. Indeed, the third is conspicuously not composed of any opinions arrived at by observation, .The second could at mos be construed as being about observation in the case where the authority arrived at the opinion that way; but the person who adopts the method of authority is, insofar, NOT basing his or her opinion on observation. And as regards the first, the only observation the tenacious thinker is making is about his or her own feelings, but the opinion adopted is not about his or her own feelings of conviction. So you are at best right only about some cases of settlement by the fourth method. But even there I do not recognize in it the formal structure of the fourth method itself.
I think you start to go wrong when you say that "Each of the three methods for fixing belief is valid in so far as it goes". "Valid" must mean "valid as a way of getting truth", but there is simply no basis for saying that, so far as I can see. One CAN say that any of the four methods can yield a truth, and one can perhaps make a case for saying that there may be describable classes of cases where the conviction yielded by this or that non-fourth method is a better way of getting truth than the attempt to use the fourth method would be. When I taught using this paper, usually in intro classes, I regularly assigned the students the task of considering various kinds of cases where we form opinions about something and then making a case for the method they thought most reliable, by and large, for getting at the truth about the matter in this case and that.. I uuually just cited such sorts of cases as those where we are arriving at ethical opinions, at esthetic opinions, religious ones, poliical, scientific (when we are oot ourselves scientists), opinions about wha other people are like, opinions about ourselves, and so on. And I often got very interesting and plausible claims made about the value of this and that non-fourth method.. But none of that srrengthens your view.
On the other hand, I think that, as regards cases where indeed observation is involved, there may be a generalization to be drawn along the lines you suggest/ Since it does not appear to require all of the elements of the foruth method, thouoh, it looks to me like it might actually be a fifth method. So it was a thesis well worth trying out, at the very least.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
I think your thesis about the truth being the average, in the sense you describe, is an instance of a partial truth in that it probably does work for some class of truths, but it really only applies to those in which the diversity of opinion is opinion based upon observation. The first three methods, though, are not about opinions arrived at by observation. Indeed, the third is conspicuously not composed of any opinions arrived at by observation, .The second could at mos be construed as being about observation in the case where the authority arrived at the opinion that way; but the person who adopts the method of authority is, insofar, NOT basing his or her opinion on observation. And as regards the first, the only observation the tenacious thinker is making is about his or her own feelings, but the opinion adopted is not about his or her own feelings of conviction. So you are at best right only about some cases of settlement by the fourth method. But even there I do not recognize in it the formal structure of the fourth method itself.
I think you start to go wrong when you say that "Each of the three methods for fixing belief is valid in so far as it goes". "Valid" must mean "valid as a way of getting truth", but there is simply no basis for saying that, so far as I can see. One CAN say that any of the four methods can yield a truth, and one can perhaps make a case for saying that there may be describable classes of cases where the conviction yielded by this or that non-fourth method is a better way of getting truth than the attempt to use the fourth method would be. When I taught using this paper, usually in intro classes, I regularly assigned the students the task of considering various kinds of cases where we form opinions about something and then making a case for the method they thought most reliable, by and large, for getting at the truth about the matter in this case and that.. I uuually just cited such sorts of cases as those where we are arriving at ethical opinions, at esthetic opinions, religious ones, poliical, scientific (when we are oot ourselves scientists), opinions about wha other people are like, opinions about ourselves, and so on. And I often got very interesting and plausible claims made about the value of this and that non-fourth method.. But none of that srrengthens your view.
On the other hand, I think that, as regards cases where indeed observation is involved, there may be a generalization to be drawn along the lines you suggest/ Since it does not appear to require all of the elements of the foruth method, thouoh, it looks to me like it might actually be a fifth method. So it was a thesis well worth trying out, at the very least.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Original Message ----
From: Jim Piat <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Thursday, October 5, 2006 6:14:05 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Jim Piat <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Thursday, October 5, 2006 6:14:05 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What
Dear Jim Willgoose,
Opps, I
goofed. I think you are right. In an earlier
version of my post I had included the possibility that in an open
system new energy, information and possibilities were being added (or
taken away) that would change the mean of the system and thus account
for evolution of the mean (and why variation about the mean is so
important and included in nature's plan).
Otherwise,
yes, the average represents the "least total error" of a
distribution and moreover is in some ways an abstract "fiction" as for
example the average family size of 2.3 people. Still,
as long as we are dealing with generalization about multiple
observations that in reality vary about a mean (and I can't think
of any actual observations that don't) then the mean remains the
characterization of the group of observations that produces the
least total difference from all the other observation comprising
the data set. And what is our notion of truth if not the example
with the least error?
Along
with Peirce, and statistical measurement theory, I think of
every observation as containing a combination some universal truth and
individual error. The average of a distribution of observations
contains the least percentage of individual error because that is what
the math of achieving the average produces. The "truth" of a
whole distribution is the distribution itself. The least
erroneous generalization about the distribution is its
average. I don't think truth lies outside the data. I take
the view that every method, observation or imaginable thing contains
some truth but only a part of the truth along with individual
error. Each of the three methods for fixing belief is valid
in so far as it goes (and of course as examples of themselves perfectly
true). So I would describe them as producing partial
truths. All observation are individual matters.
But idividual observations are wrong in so far as they lack
the validity that only multiple individual POVs can
provide. The whole truth requires simultaneous
observations from multiple POVs which can only be achieved through the
existence of others. And the multiple observations must be
combined rationally (as for example the simple average) in order to
cancel rather than multiply or add error. All of this multiple
POV business being required because the universe extends in both
space and time and there is no way any individual can achieve a POV
from which to grasp its totality.
As
to the flat earth example -- I'd say "the world is flat"
was not so much a wrong conclusion as it was an only partially
true conclusion. For the purpose of most local everyday walking
distances (the main mode of transportation at the time the view was
popular, though never universally accepted) the idea that the earth was
a bumpy (hills and valleys) flat surface was effectively true.
Granted, as we expand our horizons and the distribution of
observation to include previously excepted outliers the mean
shifts accordingly. An error you have correctly noted in my
account. I incorrectly spoke as if my world were the whole
world and we all lived in a locally closed and fixed
system. A common false assumption of the
tenaciously narrow minded such as myself.
BTW
some empirical studies of cultural ideals of human facial beauty point
to the conclusion that the population average (based upon actual
measurements of facial features) is the most favored. This seems
to tie in with Peirce's suggestion (as it survives my personal
filter) that aesthetics is the basis for ethics and ethics for
truth.
And
yes -- in the final analysis all of what I've proposed is not only old
hat but so limited in its generality as to be little more than a crank
opinion. I realize this. Yet for me individually
pluralism has been a big part of
my small personal conception of how truth is
approached. So I appreciate your taking the time to comment,
Jim. Your helpful suggestions have, I believe, already
brought me a bit closer to courtroom ideal of "the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth". I've been learning a
little about the history of common law recently . In a way
the common law system with its constant honing and development based
upon reason and evidence has produced a quasi scientific body of
knowledge about human behavior that is in my view every bit the equal
or superior of that produced by other social
science approaches. A psychologist who wants to
understand interpersonal relations and our society at
large could do worse than to study contract and property
law.
Best wishes and thanks,
Jim Piat
Jim Wilgoose wrote:
Interesting.
But if all the scientist did was "average" three defective modes of
inquiry, wouldn't we be stuck with the "least total error," yet an
error nevertheless? We would have all agreed that the earth is flat,
Euclidean geometry is the true physical geometry, a part can never be
greater than the whole and so forth. The other methods are
experimentally defective. Even if the average was taken just from
within the scientific community, are there not numerous examples of
"leaps" in knowledge occurring by virtue of the beliefs held out along
the fringes of the distribution?
Jim W
---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
