Harsh Kapoor
Wed, 07 Feb 2007 17:14:39 -0800
South Asia Citizens Wire | February 8, 2007 | Dispatch No. 2359 - Year 8 [Interruption Notice: Please note there will be no SACW dispatches between 9 - 13 February 2007] [1] Assessing Sri Lanka's presidential commission of inquiry (Kishali Pinto Jayawardena) [2] Pakistan: Why Musharraf Succeeds (S Akbar Zaidi) [3] North American Network for Democratic Republic of Nepal - A Press Release [4] India - Higher education in a multicultural society (K.N. Panikkar) [5] India: My right not to be censored (Neera Chandhoke) [6] India - Gujarat: The non screening of "Parzania" - A Press Release by Prashant [7] Clemency for Mohd. Afzal Guru - A petition submitted to the President of India - on 7 February 2007 [8] Call for Entries : The International Festival & Forum on Gender and Sexuality 2007 (New Delhi, March 2007) ____ [1] [Reproduced below is full text of a three part article by Kishali Pinto Jayawardena] o o o The Sunday Times Online 14 January 2007 ASSESSING SRI LANKA'S PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY [Part 1] by Kishali Pinto Jayawardena In a three part series commencing this week, this column will examine in detail the mandate and nature of the eight member Presidential Commission of Inquiry, (the Commission), established by the Government of Sri Lanka in 2006 in order to probe into fifteen selected incidents of assassinations, extra judicial killings and disappearances. These cases include the assassinations of Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, MP Joseph Pararajasingham, Kethesh Loganathan, the execution style shooting of 17 aid workers in Mutur and killings in Mutur, Trincomalee, Sancholai, Pesalai Beach, Kayts Police area, Pottuvil, Kebithagollawa, Welikanda, Digapathana and the disappearance of Rev Jim Brown, all of which occurred at varying points of time during 2005 and 2006. The Commission (due to commence its formal sittings early next month) will be 'observed' by eleven 'eminent persons' whose functioning is also governed by a mandate issued by the Presidential Secretariat. While some nominations have invoked controversy, there is no doubt that Sri Lanka is fortunate to have had the inclusion of the highly respected former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and current member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Nigel Rodley. Former Chief Justice of India, P.N. Bhagwati functions as the Chairman of this panel of observers. The Government has been strident in its assertions that this Commission will constitute an effective mechanism in re-establishing accountability for rights violations in Sri Lanka. Consequently, the mandates of both the Commission and the international observers will be analysed in detail to see whether this is indeed, the case. In so doing, I will underline the fact that we have had enough of Commission Reports and Sessional Papers that have merely languished in the desks of bureaucrats. On the contrary and insofar as killings allegedly by government forces are concerned, given the pervasive climate of impunity that has prevailed for decades, (aided by extraordinary emergency laws allowing abuses), an effective pattern of prosecutions will be the only actual deterrent. Yet, is the Commission satisfactorily structured to realise this objective? Where petitions involve issues of service responsibility as factually and immensely complicated as those relating to prosecutions for extra judicial killings, can they be satisfactorily resolved by fact finding Commissions of Inquiry as well as the law and procedures applicable to command responsibility and burden of proof as are currently in force? These are the questions that will be investigated. Act No 17 of 1948 (the law under which the Commission is established), was enacted primarily to provide for small local inquiries concerning the administration of any department of Government or the conduct of any member of the public service among other things. It is very clear that while this law may have been suitable for that purpose, it was not meant to be used for complex inquiries such as investigations into extra judicial killings. Page 2 of the mandate of the Commission affirms its fact finding nature in that its investigations are stated to facilitate and enable the President "to present the relevant material to the appropriate competent authorities of the Government of Sri Lanka including the Attorney General" towards efficacious prosecutions. Thus, it does not automatically follow that immediate prosecutions will ensue from the recommendations of the Commission. Rather, in a context where the Commission has itself, no separate investigative powers or investigative staff, it will function purely as a body before which aggrieved persons may present their versions (often differing) of the violations in issue. This will obviously accomplish little. Past practice of the work of similar Commissions has indicated this very well. One immediate comparative instance concerns the four 1994 Presidential Commissions of Inquiry to investigate the Involuntary Removal or Disappearances of Persons which was appointed under the very same law in terms of which the current Commission has been constituted. Out of these four Commissions, the Commission investigating the Disappearances of Persons in the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces (hereafter the Western Province Disappearances Commission) remain the best example of the futility of processes of this nature, even if the Commission itself functions satisfactorily. Some 10,000 witnesses gave evidence before the Western Province Disappearances Commission, which found the security forces responsible for a large part of the disappearances. However, the prosecutions that followed from these findings were negligible. Despite the fact that tens of thousands of such cases are thought to have occurred in the past, we have had only nine cases of convictions since 1998. A major reason as to why findings of Commissions of Inquiry are not used in the actual prosecutions relevant to those cases is primarily because the standards of proof used in both contexts differ in substantial respects. The commission inquiry will hear evidence of those affected, which may at times be ex parte. In addition, the provisions of Act No 17 of 1948 stipulate that hearsay evidence (statements by third parties) may also be heard, which evidence would however be inadmissible in an actual prosecution. However, the High Court before which prosecutions may be brought will consider the specific question as to whether particular service officers specified in the indictment were responsible beyond all reasonable doubt for their complicity in that particular crime. Hearsay evidence will obviously not be admissible for that purpose. Next week's column will examine past examples where despite Commission findings in respect of the culpability of senior army officers, these officers were acquitted in prosecutions precisely as a result of what has been highlighted above. It will stress the necessity for rigorous changes in the law incorporating internationally accepted norms of command responsibility among other factors, in order that an effective prosecutorial strategy may be enabled. Undeniably, rather than the continued enthusiastic endorsing of fact finding procedures, this is what is currently imperative. The Sunday Times Online 28 January 2007 ASSESSING SRI LANKA'S PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY [Part 2] by Kishali Pinto Jayawardena In the last column, the constitution of the eight member Presidential Commission of Inquiry, (the Commission), established by the Government of Sri Lanka last year in order to probe into fifteen selected incidents of extra judicial killings and other grave human rights violations, was examined. The Commission will begin sittings in early February. The point made was very simple; precious little can be achieved by fact finding Commissions of this nature. Instead, what is required are substantive legal changes that relate to the determination of questions of service responsibility as factually and immensely complicated as those relating to prosecutions for extra judicial killings. This week's column takes this discussion somewhat further. However, rather than limiting the debate to the fifteen cases mandated for inquiry by this Commission, let me put these matters in their historical context. During the past three decades, we have undergone civil and ethnic conflict as a result of which, more than sixty thousand people have died. These killings have occurred both in the North due to the conflict between the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as well as during the late eighties when there were attempts by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) to capture the government through armed force. The abuses that occurred during these periods of conflict were manifold. While the LTTE and the JVP were responsible for countless acts of terror, the counter response on the part of the various Governments was equally ruthless. Many people were simply 'disappeared' by state agents using emergency laws that gave them extraordinary powers or by paramilitaries acting with the knowledge and concurrence of sections of government. There is no question that these deprivations of life were due to a system that allowed and even encouraged such abuses. A familiar argument of successive governments has limited responsibility to rogue elements within its ranks. One primary factor however gives the lie to this spurious defense. This is that despite the many thousands of disappearances and extra judicial killings, the Sri Lankan State has been demonstrably unwilling to put into place, specific mechanisms of legal accountability that counter impunity for these perpetrators. Most particularly, we have seen only two successful prosecutions in recent times. Ironically, one case concerned brutal acts of rape and murder of a Tamil schoolgirl and members of her family by soldiers in the North (the Krishanthi Kumaraswamy Case) while the other concerned the no less brutal enforced disappearance of fifty three Sinhalese schoolboys in a remote village in the South (the Embilipitiya Case). The reason why prosecutions in respect of disappearances and extra judicial killings fall by the wayside is very clear. Present Sri Lankan legal structures, based on old notions of British criminal justice, are wholly unable to deal with questions of service responsibility as factually and immensely complicated as they are in these cases. Let me now illustrate this point in one simple but nevertheless extremely powerful example. Prior to the Embilipitiya prosecutions, the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Disappearances Commission of Inquiry (the Western Province Disappearances Commission) submitted a Special Report on the Embilipitiya incidents to President Chandrika Kumaratunga on 29.11.'95 which found not only a group of junior officers but the district coordinating military secretary (who was in effective charge of the military for that area) responsible for the enforced disappearances. However, when the case went to the Ratnapura High Court for prosecution, even though that senior army officer, Brigadier 'Parry' Liyanage was indicted along with the other junior officers, he was acquitted due to the Court holding that no evidence could be found directly linking him to the charges of abduction with intent to kill. (See Application No; 121/94, Judgement of the Ratnapura High Court on 23/02/1999. Some of the junior officers were convicted). What is striking is that the findings of the Western Province Disappearances Commission were not relevant for this prosecution and, in fact, did not appear to have even been cited before the High Court. As remarked previously in this column, the precise reason for this non-relevance is not difficult to discover; commissions of this nature are purely fact finding and function very differently from courts of law. Standards of proof used in findings of the Commission and in judicial prosecutions differ. Hearsay evidence (unlike in the case of Commission proceedings) will not be admissible for that purpose in judicial proceedings. There is a very strong possibility that this same pattern will repeat itself in the fifteen cases that would be inquired into by the current Commission of Inquiry. In other words, (and confounding current cynicism) even if the inquiry/investigative process of the Commission proceeds successfully, its findings may well prove to be useless when the matter goes to actual prosecutions in terms of the existing criminal law. Within this rigid framework of the law, it is no surprise that the most that can happen is the successful prosecution of junior officers. However, senior officers escape unscathed and the system itself (which condones and encourages such actions) remains in place. So we have the paradoxical result that while state appointed Commissions of Inquiry find culpability on the part of state officers, the laxity of the law allows them escape. Practically, in both the Embilipitiya Case and the Krishanthi Kumaraswamy Case, only the junior level officers were successfully prosecuted with their convictions being upheld on appeal. Even more disturbingly, the law has developed in such a manner that even though the doctrine of command responsibility has not been held applicable to state agents in times of war in the relevant prosecutions, such principles have nonetheless been affirmed in a different judicial context of fundamental rights violations in situations of ordinary law and order. The inconsistency in this differential application of judicial principles has been marked. The concluding part of this column next week will examine these cases and will urge a different approach to securing accountability in regard to human rights violations as contrasted to a fact finding Commission of Inquiry from which improbable miracles continue to be promised by this Government. The Sunday Times Online 4 February 2007 ASSESSING SRI LANKA'S PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY [Part 3] by Kishali Pinto Jayawardena This is the concluding segment of a three part series of articles critically examining the recently established eight member Presidential Commission of Inquiry, (the Commission), to probe into fifteen selected incidents of grave human rights violations that had occurred in the country during 2005 and 2006. A team of international "eminent persons" will observe the Commission's work and the functioning of both bodies will be in accordance with their particular Mandates. Some eminently commonsensical points may be disposed of first. The fifteen incidents selected for the scrutiny of this fact-finding body are only a minute fraction of similar abuses that continue to take place even as this column is being written. Is it not discriminatory, if not wholly irrational that some incidents have been selected for inquiry by this special process while others have been exempted? On what basis has this selection been done and the spatio-temporal limits of the Commission's mandate defined? In addition, problematic conditionalities govern the release of the findings of the Commission in regard to which, the President can withhold the publication of any material which is in his opinion, "prejudicial to or absolutely necessary for the protection of national security, public safety or wellbeing." Curiously, different grounds seem to govern the release of the reports of the Commission and the International Observers. It seems that though at an early stage, both mandates used the same vague term of 'public safety and well being', the Mandate of the Observers (see the supposedly final version of the Mandate of the International Observers dated November 24, 2006 and signed by the Secretary to the President) was changed later to the more rigorous wording of 'national security' and 'public order' while the Mandate of the Commission remained the same. Meanwhile, ambiguities in the relevant last paragraph of the Mandate of the Commission leaves the publication of its Report dependant upon yet another contingent factor; namely that the publication should be immediately after the Attorney General decides to prosecute and files indictment for that purpose. The question then arises; what would be the situation if the Attorney General decides that there is not enough prima facie evidence to prosecute? Or, for that matter, in a country where the indictments take up to two years even in the case of ordinary crimes, what if there is interminable delay in the issuance of the indictments? Would the Report then not be made public till all these conditions are complied with? From the question of publication we should proceed to the issue of prosecution. The Mandate of the International Observers contains a clause that permits objections to be made public when the Attorney General unlawfully or unreasonably refrains from instituting prosecutions on the findings of the Commission. It is however relevant that the Commissioners are directed to come to a finding on the 'identities, descriptions and backgrounds of persons and groups of persons who are responsible under the applicable laws and legal principles of Sri Lanka' for the commission of deaths, injury or physical harm in respect of the fifteen selected incidents. By itself, this stipulation seems innocuous. After all, the relevant standard should indeed, be "the applicable laws and legal principles of Sri Lanka." But then, what would be the case if such laws and standards are manifestly inadequate to deal with the complexity of war crimes that the Commission will undoubtedly be called upon to deal with? For example, if the question of culpability involves indirect rather than direct responsibility, could the Commission recommend prosecution and would the Attorney General be justified in issuing indictment? If not, would the Observers be justified in regarding this as an unreasonable or unlawful decision of the Attorney General to refrain from prosecution? Last week's column looked at a singular instance of the Embilipitiya Case concerning the abduction of twenty four Sinhalese schoolchildren with intent to kill by officers of the army during the height of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna insurrection in the late eighties. In this instance, the Attorney General did, in fact, prosecute Brigadier 'Parry' Liyanage, the district coordinating military secretary and hence in effective charge of the military for that area. Notwithstanding the fact that a fact-finding Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances had found a measure of responsibility on the part of this senior army officer, he was acquitted in the High Court due to the finding that no evidence could be found directly linking him to the abductions. This was a good illustration of the absence of the doctrine of command responsibility in our criminal law. Principles of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court imposing responsibility where a commander either knew or should have known that such crimes were being committed by forces effectively under his or her command, and failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of the crimes or to have them investigated, (Article 28), are important in that regard. But apart from the criminal law, it is disturbing is that even in a different judicial context of exercising its jurisdiction pertaining to fundamental rights violations, Sri Lankan judges have been wary of emphasizing the doctrine of command responsibility in situations of conflict. For example, following Brigadier Liyanage's acquittal referred to above, he subsequently won a fundamental rights case against his non-promotion to the rank of Major General. The Supreme Court took the contested position that in the absence of direct involvement in the disappearances, Brigadier Liyanage merely occupied 'a place of authority in the chain of command.' (see SC Application No;506/99, SCM dated 25.11.99). To give the proverbial devil her just due, it must be said however that despite the direction of the Court, then President Chandrika Kumaratunge refused to make the promotion. In puzzling contradistinction, the Supreme Court has been far more receptive to applying the doctrine of command responsbility in situations of ordinary law and order. For example, in Silva vs Iddamalgoda, ( 2003 [2] SriLR, 63) and in the Wewelage Rani Fernando Case SC(FR) No 700/2002, SCM 26/07/2004,) the officer-in-charge of a police station and senior prison officials were respectively held liable, not on direct involvements in the acts of torture but rather, on their non-action. These paradoxes are understandably bewildering to human rights activists who tend to shy away from rarefied battles over obscure points of legal theory in the courtrooms. Yet there is no doubt that the reform of the legal/justice system and the law itself is key to ensuring rule of law norms in times of conflict. Ideally, the Commission process and the involvement of an independent objective element through the international observers could be used to urge such a process, including the establishing of an effective witness protection programme. In the alternative, we will be reluctant observers of yet another dilatory, obfuscatory 'fact-finding' process with no perceptible impact on a prevalent culture of impunity and a manifest lack of prosecutorial/judicial will. ______ [2] Economic and Political Weekly January 27, 2007 Letter from South Asia WHY MUSHARRAF SUCCEEDS Military rule in Pakistan has had long spells because the army has learnt how to be repressive and yet accommodative, target only the marginalised and minority groups, buy off support from political groups and, in Musharraf's case, make use of the US fear of "Islamic" power. by S Akbar Zaidi Why does military rule persist in Pakistan for as long as it does, at times up to a decade, often without much resistance? Why is military rule acceptable to a large number of people, perhaps even the majority at certain times, and even preferred to Pakistan's own form of electoral politics or democracy? Two possible, partial, explanations have been suggested by commentators in these columns. One relates to the nature of Pakistan's civil society and questions whether it has a democratic gene in it, or whether its agenda is more of "enlightened moderation" rather than of participatory politics, and is hence willing to support anyone who fulfils that agenda through any means. Similarly, as a corollary, the second strand of this argument assertsthat the political class, which should be involved in the democratic process of politicking, is more interested in coming to power at any cost, even if that means coming to some 'samjhota' with military rule than having to take the military head-on. Clearly, what both these strands suggest is that Pakistanis are opportun- ists andare concerned, like most rational beings, in specific outcomes and results, and not in the process through which they are achieved. It also suggests that these groups in society are more willing to compromise than oppose or contradict the state institutions. While this is perhaps a partial and tenuous argument, it ignores the role - at times brutal, at others accommodative - that the military plays in this equation. In order to under- stand the longevity of military rule in Pakistan, let us first examine how general Zia stayed in power for 11 years and how general Musharraf can easily do likewise. Zia and Bhutto General Zia came in to power in July 1977 through a coup, which was backed by a large number of politicians who were against Z A Bhutto. Clearly the supporters of the Pakistan People's Party, Bhutto's party, were against the coup and against Zia, especially when he hanged Bhutto in 1979. Zia's regime was oppressive and brutal by any definition of the term. He had hundreds of Bhutto supporters ar- rested, jailed and flogged. Some were even hanged. The greatest opposition Zia faced was from the People's Party, and not from the collective constituency of political actors - women's groups were a notice- able and commendable exception. Many of those who had suffered Bhutto's wrath, if they did not openly support Zia, sat on the sidelines hoping that they too would get their turn in power. Using Islamic laws and symbols as props for legitimacy, Zia managed to put the fear of god in all Pakistanis and became an active social engineer "Islamising" Pakistani institutions and society. He claimed to derive his legitimacy from fulfilling Pakistan's destiny to become an Islamic country and thereby drew support from a large section of Pakistan's urban middle classes, many of whom endorsed his Islamisation programme. Essentially, he was able to get social support from key sections in Pakistan's society as well as political support from Islamic parties by bringing them into the political arena as members of his parliament, the Majlis-e Shoora. However, a section of Pakistan's enlightened and moderate women played a key role in opposing his government. And of course, and most importantly, there was Afghanistan, and the country became the US' front line state receiving large amounts of military and economic aid. The Musharraf story has many par- allels with Zia. Just as Zia had alienated Bhutto's supporters but was able to draw support from other political groups and build his own mainstream political constituency, Musharraf too has been able to work with most political groups and parties who feel that by keeping their options open, they will be allowed to share the power the military chooses to dispense. The military's game when in power is to quickly identify individuals and groups - there are many, too many of them - who are willing to work with it and allow them some sem- blance of authority and autonomy in a political structure which it dominates. This form of praetorian democracy has worked well for both Zia and Musharraf. Identical to Zia's Islamisation pro- gramme and his desire to fulfil Pakistan's Islamic destiny (even if it is inverse in content) is Musharraf's messianic mission of "enlightened moderation", intended to realise the general's vision of Pakistan's destiny. In both cases, not surprisingly, there are numerous actors, groups and factions who are willing - even genuinely eager - to fulfil Pakistan's destiny in either of these two opposing directions. Hence, allies have never been a problem for any military regime in Pakistan. Ends and Means In Musharraf's case, just as the general has himself genuinely expressed the view that he (at least personally) wants to see a liberal and moderate Pakistan, there are numerous Pakistanis, too who want the country to be a modern, liberal, enlightened and peaceful society. Just as there were those who supported Zia's Islamic agenda out of their strong belief in such a political project for Pakistan, there are those who feel the same way about Musharraf's vision. When the ends justify the means, why should either vision be spoiled by agitational politics or democracy? It is this accommodative and inclusive, rather than exclusionary, political strategy which ensures that military rule in Pakistan continues unabated. Moreover, it is the refinement of this strategy from military regime to military regime, which allows the Musharraf dispensation to be less repressive than either Ayub Khan or Zia. Military rule in Pakistan is increasingly relying on the carrot rather than the stick. Also, in all the three episodes, the US government and Washington's financial institutions have played a key role in supporting the generals' rule in Pakistan. Without this financial, military and dip- lomatic support, none of the military governments would have survived as long as they did. This also explains why the decades of military rule show higher growth rates in the economy than the democratic interregnums. In each of the three cases the generals used the financial support from the US and other western governments to not only provide patronage and buy-off political opposition, but to also invest in economic resources. They could not have done this on their own. Military rule does also make enemies and excludes some groups. However, interestingly, in Pakistan, in each of three military regimes the exclusion and repression - often brutal and military - has been of ethnic/regional groups and not of mainstream political parties. But what is critical is that the military regimes are able to get away with this brutality precisely because they do not face enough opposi- tion. Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan were able to rape East Pakistan because there was no protest in west Pakistan against the military's actions; the democratic movement against Zia came mainly from Sindh and Zia was able to suppress the province because most of the political parties there were accommodated in his settlement. And now Balochistan under Musharraf: the little resistance that his oppressive policies receive is isolated and takes place far away in this region, on the sidelines of "main- stream" political Pakistan. Musharraf has also succeeded by reading the times astutely. Zia ul Haq, despite all his accommodative skills, would have found it difficult to survive in a post 9-11 anti-Islam world. In a world of US domination and "western" values, Musharraf has pandered to the fear- syndrome lobbies of the west, a factor that has resulted in his longevity. He has also benefited from the "there is no alternative" factor: he has projected himself as a liberal, moderate, enlightened, Muslim general who rules a country with nuclear weapons. If the US withdraws its support without finding a strong and reliable alternative to Musharraf, the nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of Islamic fundamentals, so goes the improbable theory. Better to work with the devil you know than the one you do not. With Musharraf making plans to be re- elected as general-president for another five years, there does not seem to be any way to dislodge him from power. He will not go voluntarily and the opposition, hoping to "share" power with him in the next assembly, is unlikely to make much noise. Having made a number of enemies in Waziristan and Balochistan, probably the only way he would end up going is the Zia way. Until then, general Musharraf is assured a political career perhaps far longer than any of his predecessors. ______ [3] NORTH AMERICAN NETWORK FOR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NEPAL (NANDRON) PRESS RELEASE February 5, 2007 North American Network for Democratic Republic of Nepal (NANDRON) is deeply concerned over the violent situation in Terai and expresses its solidarity with the common people of Terai, and renounces the violence and infiltration of the regressive forces in peaceful agitation launched by Madhesi people demanding their rightful place in Nepal's political system. It is obvious that regressive monarchical forces are trying to reestablish themselves through infiltration in the movement by jeopardizing the upcoming Constituent Assembly Elections. We demand immediate isolation of the infiltrators and opening up of dialogue with genuine leaders leading the Madhesi movement. NANDRON urges Nepal government to fulfill the genuine demands of Terai communities and immediately declare Nepal as Democratic Republic with Federal Governance System, paving way to the Constituent Assembly's election. We also demand the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement and announcement of the CA election date immediately. NANDRON supports inclusive and participatory governance through proportional representation with equal participation of all ethnicities in the affairs of state. At this historic juncture, when it appears possible to build Nepal as a promised land for all, unity, understanding and trust among all ethnicity, and linguistic groups, are paramount. Let us vouch for the national integrity. NANDRON demands the Rayamajhi Commission Report be made public and fully implemented immediately as recommended by the Commission. We would like to draw the attention of all the lawmakers in the interim legislature that the Non-resident Nepalese be not deprived of voting rights in this historic event of the Constituent Assembly's election for the establishment of a New Nepal. The North American Network for Democratic Republic of Nepal (NANDRON) is an advocacy and watchdog organization acting as a common forum for all Nepali expatriates and friends of Nepal living in North America with one of its primary objectives being advocacy and awareness campaigns to help the political parties, civil society, and people of Nepal pursuing for the establishment of a popular, inclusive and representative democratic republican system in the country. Dr. Chitra Tiwari Coordinator United State of America Washington DC [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] ______ [4] The Hindu February 08, 2007 HIGHER EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY by K.N. Panikkar Value education should be primarily secular without, however, discarding the humanist elements in religious traditions. THE UNESCO International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century headed by Jacques Delors has identified "learning to be" and "learning to live together" as two among the four pillars of education. They connote some of the fundamental values education tries to impart in any society. "Learning to be" addresses the question of development of the inner capacity of the individual, which will prepare him or her to meet social and political responsibilities. "Learning to live together" would involve the creation of a harmonious life, transcending sectarian loyalties and differences. There is no education without values, but in all societies values are a mixed bag. They are so because of differing ideological needs. Yet there are certain universal values all societies cherish and disseminate. Education is an effective agency of value dissemination, particularly in the context of a globalised world. As such, the values in education are a combination of the universal and the particular, both subject to changes according to the differing patterns of human experience. The values of higher education in India as obtained at the time of its liberation from colonial rule in 1947 and developed thereafter were shaped by the influences of these two dimensions. The search for the creation of new values in education has a fairly long history, reaching back to the period of early colonial rule. The Indian intelligentsia during the colonial period had sought to evolve a system of education qualitatively different from the colonial and the traditional. The alternative did not entirely reject them. It was an effort to reconcile tradition with modernity in which tradition was identified as the dominant literate culture and its religion and modernity as the culture of the capitalist West filtered through colonialism. The beginning of the quest for such reconciliation can be traced to the intellectual engagements in the early part of the 19th century. The genesis of modern ideas of education in India is generally attributed to the colonial system but in reality they emerged in opposition to it. The Indian intelligentsia tried to evolve an alternative that was neither colonial nor traditional, although it borrowed ideas from both. Given the colonial hegemony, however, the alternative was stillborn, remaining mainly at the level of ideas without much of an impact on practice. As a result, the modern educated intelligentsia was nurtured on the social and political values the colonial system tried to disseminate, which continued to be an influential factor even after Independence. The thinking on education as reflected in the recommendations of various commissions and policy statements from 1948 to 1992 underlined an increasing tendency to adopt secular values. Unfortunately, this tendency to orient value education on secular-democratic lines received a setback thereafter when Hindu communal forces controlled the governments at the Centre and in some States. During this period, two tendencies acquired prominence. First, to promote religion-centred education by defining value education mainly in religious terms. Secondly, to discard the critical approach to the tradition-modernity relationship and to privilege traditional values over all others. The implication of this historical experience - the incorporation of secular values and their attempted reversal - is a useful guide in the formulation of value education. These two tendencies represented two different conceptions of Indian society. The former implied a plural society struggling to become multi-cultural whereas the latter implied an attempt to turn a plural society into a mono-cultural one. India being a multi-religious society with a variety of cultural practices, one of the aims of value education should be to promote the former and discourage the latter. If so, value education has to be primarily secular without, however, discarding the humanist elements in religious traditions. Such an approach would lead to two sets of values. The first, universal moral values such as truth, honesty, and compassion; and, the second, values such as secularism, democracy, and equality. These two sets of values are generally considered mutually exclusive, but are not really so, as secularism essentially creates a moral universe. Pillars of secularism The three pillars of secularism, to borrow the terminology used in the UNESCO report, are religious universalism, humanism, and rationality. In a multi-religious society universalism is one of the ideological bases of secularism. It would help to create harmony among religions by emphasising the commonly shared religious truth, which could lead to mutual respect of religions. Without respecting the religious rights of different denominations, a multi-religious society can hardly have a peaceful existence. One of the travails of Indian society since colonial times has been religious strife which, among other things, is a result of the absence of mutual respect. Faith in religious universalism, which is central to secularism, alone can bring about a harmonious relation between religions. Therefore, the core belief of universalism that all religions are essentially the same and differences are only in their external manifestations is a necessary value to cultivate in a multi-religious society. In all considerations of values in education, the multi-cultural and multi-religious character of Indian society figures prominently. The solution to the tensions arising out of this is sought through the dissemination of secularism as a value of education. This naturally brings into focus the place of religion in education. The overwhelming consensus has been in favour of education about religions distinct from religious education. The distinction is extremely important as the former would reinforce universalism and the latter would strengthen particularism. India is generally considered a multi-cultural society. If equality is central to multiculturalism, such an appellation is of doubtful validity. India is at best a plural society, which tolerates the existence of different cultures. Cultural equality in practice is yet a far cry. It is in this context that the inculcation of secular values becomes crucial as it would contribute to the transition from the plural to the multicultural. The cultural homogenisation the Hindu communal forces try to bring about would adversely affect this process. The tendency to privilege an invented monoculture of the past tends to undermine the possible realisation of multiculturalism. In this context, therefore, imbibing secularism as a value in education assumes great importance. In recent times, both cultural homogenisation as well as privileging the invented monoculture of the past gained ascendancy in the realm of higher education. In all discussions on educational values, there is a tendency to differentiate the secular values from the moral and the ethical. The assumption is that secular and moral values are distinct and unrelated. A strict division between the two is unreal, not only because they are interrelated in practice but also because most of the moral and ethical values are also embedded in the latter. One of the foundations of secularism, for instance, is humanism, which incorporates almost all moral and ethical values derived from religious teachings. This is not to argue that values derived from religious teachings need not be part of education, but to suggest that religion is not the only possible source for the incorporation of moral values such as compassion, love, mutual respect. It is possible to inculcate such values from secular sources also. The purpose of education could be variously interpreted, ranging from the mundane to the spiritual. That it helps to understand the meaning of life, to realise the creative potential of human beings, and to locate oneself in society is beyond dispute. Today when Indian society is entering a new phase of global participation, a variety of tensions are likely to emerge. One among them is related to the place of traditional values in a fast changing social, cultural, and intellectual climate. That they cannot be discarded is generally acknowledged. It is equally true that there is no place for revival. The solution is creative integration of the values of both for which the inculcation of secular values in higher education, which provides a sphere for critical interrogation, could pave the way. (The writer is a historian who is currently Chairman of the Higher Education Commission of Kerala. This article is based on a presentation at the Indo-China seminar on Higher Education in New Delhi on January 20-21, 2007.) ______ [5] Indian Express February 08, 2007 MY RIGHT NOT TO BE CENSORED As 'Parzania' is kept out of theatres in Gujarat, the question is: Can a ban on a book, play or painting ever serve a larger cause? by Neera Chandhoke The Indian state banned Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses in 1988 and 27 years later film exhibitors ruled out the screening of Parzania in Gujarat. In both cases it was feared that an otherwise creative work might enrage political passions, cause law and order problems, lead to the destruction of private and public property. What on earth, defenders of censorship can ask, is wrong with this? Individuals, howsoever creative, sometimes need to be curtailed in the interests of the public good. Reportedly activists of the Bajrang Dal warned owners of cinema houses in Gujarat that any decision on whether the film on the human consequences of post-Godhra riots should be screened, should keep in mind the interests of the state. That the theatre owners' decision is prompted by commerce more, and by considerations of ethics less, is not as important as the basic question: why is censorship of a book, a film, a play, or a painting wrong, if the ban serves a larger cause? We can only answer this question when we ask the reverse question: Why is censorship wrong? What does censorship do to the authors of a text? At an obvious level, censorship denies the author the basic right to freedom of expression. Human beings have the right to articulate their opinions, and give form to their creativity, their notions of how things are and how they should be. This is what being human means - to reflect on what it means to belong to society, to critique social practices, to dream of a desired society and to give expression to these yearnings. I may not agree with the precise way in which you frame your opinion or your creativity. But as the philosopher Voltaire put it, 'I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it'. Censorship denies basic rights to the creator of the text, and thereby the right to be human. Certainly, freedom of expression, like other rights, is not absolute; it can be limited by the principle of serious harm. If an inflammatory speech leads to communal or caste riots in which other persons are seriously harmed, the speech giver is culpable under law. What else counts for serious harm? Consider incidents in which either 'this' group or 'that' has demanded that a book be withdrawn, or a film not be screened. In India, increasingly groups who tend to belong to one particular ideology get agitated over representations of Saraswati by M.F. Husain on the grounds that this representation 'hurts' their sentiments. Deepa Mehta was not allowed by the same kind of group to film Water on the same pretext. Irate mutterings accompanied her earlier film Fire; the film, it was said, was against Indian culture. Historians cannot criticise Shivaji because he is an icon of Maharashtra. The film Fanaa could not be shown in Gujarat because the hero commented adversely on the Narmada issue. Now Parzania cannot be shown in the same state, because it might perchance harm the interests of the state. But what is the notion of harm that is being employed here? Husain's sketch of Saraswati followed a well-known and historical genre of representation in India. The film Water documents the plight of widows, not unknown to the newspaper-reading public. The film Fire deals with a phenomenon which is again not unknown - alternative sexualities. Fanaa was banned because the hero said something that had been documented in hundreds of government and non-government reports: That lakhs of people in the Narmada valley have been displaced without proper compensation. And hundreds of published and unpublished reports about what happened in Gujarat are in the public domain. In all these cases, the basic freedom of the author of the work has been violated, even though the exercise of his or her right has not resulted in serious harm. But our rights as readers, as watchers of films, as art lovers, and as citizens have also been violated. To watch a film is to engage in a dialogue with the filmmaker, to respond to the issues raised and the manner in which they have been raised, to criticise them and to mull over them. A good filmmaker shakes society out of its complacency, forces people to think. Censorship deprives us of this 'waking up'. It violates two rights - your right to tell me a story, howsoever wracking that story might be. It also violates my right to learn from that story. Either way, censorship prevents communication. This defeats the purpose of democracy; the rights of authors not to be prevented by the actions of other agents from communicating their ideas to others who might wish to hear them. -The writer is a professor of political science, University of Delhi ______ [6] Prashant . The Province Office for Integral Social Development of the Gujarat Jesuits . A Centre for Human Rights, Justice and Peace Post Box No. 4050, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad 380 009, Gujarat, India Tel. : +91 (079) 66522333, 2745 5913 . Fax : +91 (079) 2748 9018, 2630 1362 Mobile : 9824034536 . e-mail : [EMAIL PROTECTED] . www.humanrightsindia.in PRESS NOTE The news that "Parzania", a film by Rahul Dholakia will not be screened by the multiplex owners of Ahmedabad is simply shocking. The cold fact that an individual or a small group can terrorize ordinary citizens in this State, speaks volumes of the break-down of the law and order mechanism. It is also a clear indication that the ordinary citizens are denied their rights and freedoms. For them, the so called "Vibrancy" of this State, is a sheer sham...a total falsehood. Citizens of Gujarat should now boldly come out to protest the violation of their fundamental rights and make every possible effort to ensure that "Parzania" is screened everywhere and that as many as possible are able to see it. A new "Satyagraha" has to take place ! Fr. Cedric Prakash sj for and on behalf of several concerned citizens and human rights activists 7th February 2007 ______ [7] www.sacw.net | 8 February 2007 CLEMENCY FOR MOHD. AFZAL GURU - A PETITION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA - ON 7 FEBRUARY 2007 http://www.sacw.net/hrights/Afzalpet7feb07.pdf ______ [8] Call for Productions from African, Asian, Pacific, Latin American, European and Caribbean countries The Public Service Broadcasting Trust is pleased to invite audiovisual productions for THE INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL & FORUM ON GENDER AND SEXUALITY New Delhi, India, March 2007 The Festival will bring together a rich collection of films from India and across the world delving into the deep intricacies of our everyday experiences of gender and sexuality and those that raise some of the larger issues associated with these identities and constructions. If you have recently directed a documentary, a short fiction film, a feature or a television programme that is innovative (in form or content), creative, challenging and goes beyond conventional forms of television/ film language, we are interested in screening your work. For details on entering films visit www.psbt.org Public Service Broadcasting Trust is a not for profit trust that represents the confluence of energies in an attempt to foster a shared public culture of broadcasting that is as exciting and cutting edge, as it is socially responsive and representative of democratic values. In seeking to do this, PSBT seeks to situate a new vocabulary and activism at the very heart of broadcasting in India. _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/ Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on matters of peace and democratisation in South Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit citizens wire service run since 1998 by South Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/ SACW archive is available at: bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/ DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers. _______________________________________________ SACW mailing list SACW@insaf.net http://insaf.net/mailman/listinfo/sacw_insaf.net