Evening all,
The following BIP submission summarizes an idea that I've been tossing
around for the last year. I understand that there may be nuances to SegWit
and current consensus layer mechanisms that I may not fully understand, so
please do not hesitate to shred the following text to pieces
I'm not an expert to refute this classification, but would love to see those
points addressed by those in the know, without resorting to ad hominem, even
though I know it's really hard.
thx, gm
From: Johnson Lau via
On Tuesday, 4 April 2017 20:01:51 CEST Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> BIP 9 provides a mechanism for having
> miners coordinate softforks because they can make the upgrade process
> smoother this way. But the same is not true of hardforks: miners are
> essentially irrelevant to them, and
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 11:23:22PM -0400, David Vorick wrote:
> I urge everybody to realize how difficult something like this is going to
> be to pull off. We are literally talking about invalidating hardware (or at
> least the optimized bits). It's only going to succeed if everybody is
>
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 09:37:45PM +, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On that basis, I offer the following BIP draft for discussion.
> This proposal does not prevent the attack in general, but only
> inhibits covert forms of it which are incompatible with
> improvements to the Bitcoin
On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 12:39 AM, Joseph Poon wrote:
> #bitcoin@freenode:
> 00:04gmaxwell| lol poon pretending that he isn't complicit in all this
> stuff.
>
> Are you *fucking* serious? Is this how you resolve all problems? I'm
> taking you seriously and having
If the primary purpose of pow is to destroy value, then a masked proof of
burn to an expanded address that assigns the private key holder the right
to mine only in the next Nth block would be sufficient. Expanding the
address space so that addresses can only be proven invalid only with the
On Thu, Apr 06, 2017 at 01:32:03AM +, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 12:39 AM, Joseph Poon wrote:
> > #bitcoin@freenode:
> > 00:04gmaxwell| lol poon pretending that he isn't complicit in all this
> > stuff.
> >
> > Are you *fucking* serious? Is
Just checking to see if I understand this optimization correctly. In order to
find merkle roots in which the rightmost 32 bits are identical (i.e. partial
hash collisions), we want to compute as many merkle root hashes as quickly as
possible. The fastest way to do this is to take the top level
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 7:31 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> While I'm in favour of blocking covert usage of ASICBOOST, there's every
> reason
> to block non-covert usage of it as well. In a low margin business like
> mining,
> the advatange it
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 07:39:08PM -0700, Bram Cohen wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 7:31 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> > While I'm in favour of blocking covert usage of ASICBOOST, there's every
> > reason
> > to block non-covert usage of it as well. In a low margin business like
> > mining,
Is this the same as proof of burn?
On Apr 5, 2017 5:28 PM, "Mirelo via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> With the feedback on Proof-of-Loss (always privately to my email), I
> realized the article was hard to understand for lacking:
>
> * A more explicit definition
I have a practical concern related to the amount of activation energy
required to get something like this through. We are talking about
implementing something that would remove tens to hundreds of millions of
dollars of mining revenue for miners who have already gambled that this
income would be
#bitcoin@freenode:
00:04gmaxwell| lol poon pretending that he isn't complicit in all this
stuff.
Are you *fucking* serious? Is this how you resolve all problems? I'm
taking you seriously and having second thoughts and want to make public
commitments to do the right thing without any
Ahh, sorry all for this public message. :(
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 05:39:00PM -0700, Joseph Poon wrote:
> #bitcoin@freenode:
> 00:04gmaxwell| lol poon pretending that he isn't complicit in all this
> stuff.
>
> Are you *fucking* serious? Is this how you resolve all problems? I'm
> taking
I personally appreciate the minimal changes, and often encourage
development to be done this way - when it needs to be released quickly.
But does this need to be released quickly?
- maybe the proposal should be renamed segwit 8mb and be discussed solely
in terms of block weights.
- a high
> On 5 Apr 2017, at 22:05, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
>
>
> The concrete parameters chosen in the proposal are: each channel opening
> transaction reserves 700-bytes within _each_ block in the chain until the
> transaction has been closed.
>
>
Why so? It seems you are
I'd appreciate the authors chiming in, but I read the PASDA differently:
1) If a transaction is mined with a certain bit set, it reserves 700 bytes
for that particular block.
2) In that space, 2 transactions may happen:
a) First, a transaction penalizing the "parent" transaction for fraud by
Hi Luke,
Thank you for the review. Many of these points should definitely be
addressed in the spec. Although extension blocks has working code, the
spec is currently still in a draft state now and could really use all
the feedback it can get. A few rules are still up in the air before we
setup a
Hi Johnson,
Really appreciate the comments. I know this idea is your baby.
> so the authors don’t consider segwit as a consensus-layer solution to
> increase transaction throughput, or not think segwit is safe? But
> logically speaking if segwit is not safe, this BIP could only be
> worse. OTOH,
A schism is just that: miners can't ameliorate a HF transition in the way they
can censor transactions without permission. This is how miners became a
convenient way to activate soft-forks.
So while BIP9 can indicate the later censorship (a soft fork) in a way that
nodes can follow (or not) a
This seems to be a serious security problem. Would it be possible to have
a flag-day softfork included in Bitcoin Core as soon as 0.14.1? I think that a
trigger
3-6 months from release should be sufficient for enough of the economy to
upgrade,
given the severity of the issue.
BIP 141 says that
With the feedback on Proof-of-Loss (always privately to my email), I realized
the article was hard to understand for lacking:
* A more explicit definition of transaction rights.
* An overview of how the algorithm works.
As an abstract could not contain all that, I wrote an introduction with
Softforks and hardforks are usually defined in terms of block validity (BIP99):
making valid blocks invalid is a softfork, making invalid blocks valid is a
hardfork, and SFs are usually considered as less disruptive as it is considered
to be “opt-in”. However, as shown below this technical
Hi Y'all,
Thanks to luke-jr and jl2012 for publishing your analysis of the
xblocks proposal. I'd like to also present some analysis but instead focus
on the professed LN safety enhancing scheme in the proposal. It's a bit
underspecified, so I've taken the liberty of extrapolating a bit to fill
in
Hi Greg,
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 09:37:45PM +, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Reverse engineering of a particular mining chip has demonstrated
> conclusively that ASICBOOST has been implemented
> in hardware.
>
> On that basis, I offer the following BIP draft for discussion.
> This
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