Re: [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)
On Oct 1, 2013, at 12:51 PM, Adam Back wrote:
[Discussing how NSA might have generated weak curves via trying many choices
till they hit a weak-curve class that only they knew how to solve.]
...
> But the more interesting question I was referring to is a trapdoor weakness
> with a weak proof of fairness (ie a fairness that looks like the one in FIPS
> 186-3/ECDSA where we dont know how much grinding if any went into the magic
> seed values). For illustration though not applicable to ECDSA and probably
> outright defective eg can they start with some large number of candidate G
> values where G=xH (ie knowing the EC discrete log of some value H they pass
> off as a random fairly chosen point) and then do a birthday collision
> between the selection of G values and diffrent seed values to a PRNG to find
> a G value that they have both a discrete log of wrt H and a PRNG seed.
> Bearing in mind they may be willing to throw custom ASIC or FPGA
> supercomputer hardware and $1bil budgt at the problem as a one off cost.
This general idea is a nice one. It's basically a way of using Merkle's
puzzles to build a private key into a cryptosystem. But I think in general,
you are going to have to do work equal to the security level of the thing
you're trying to backdoor. You have to break it once at its full security
level, and then you get to amortize that break forever. (Isn't there something
like this you can do for discrete logs in general, though?)
Consider Dual EC DRBG. You need a P, Q such that you know x that solves xP =
Q, over (say) P-224. So, you arbitrarily choose G = a generator for the group,
and a scalar z, and then compute for
j = 1 to 2^{112}:
T[j] = jz G
Now, you have 2^{112} values in a group of 2^{224} values, right? So with
about another 2^{113} work, you can hit one of those with two arbitrary seeds,
and you'll know the relationship between them.
But this takes a total of about 2^{113} work, so it's above the claimed secuity
level of P-224. I suspect this would be more useful for something at the 80
bit security level--a really resourceful attacker could probably do a 2^{80}
search.
> Adam
--John
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Re: [Cryptography] [cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote: > If the NSA had the capability to pick weak curves while covering their > tracks in such a way, why wouldn’t they have pulled the same trick with > Dual_EC_DRBG? > They wanted us to think they were incompetent, so we would expect that Dual_EC_DRBG was their failed attempt to tamper with a cryptographic standard, and so we would overlook the more sinister and subtle attempts to tamper with the NIST curves -- Tony Arcieri ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)
On 10/1/13 at 8:47 AM, [email protected] (Tony Arcieri) wrote: If e.g. the NSA knew of an entire class of weak curves, they could perform a brute force search with random looking seeds, continuing until the curve parameters, after the seed is run through SHA1, fall into the class that's known to be weak to them. Or NSA could have done what it did with DES and chosen a construct that didn't have that weakness. We just don't know. Cheers - Bill --- Bill Frantz| I don't have high-speed | Periwinkle (408)356-8506 | internet. I have DSL.| 16345 Englewood Ave www.pwpconsult.com | | Los Gatos, CA 95032 ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Adam Back wrote: > Right but weak parameter arguments are very dangerous - the US national > infrastructure they're supposed to be protecting could be weakened when > someone else finds the weakness. As the fallout from the Snowden debacle has shown (with estimates of the damage to US businesses in the tens of billions) the NSA seems to be unconcerned with the blowback potential of doing things that are potentially damaging when discovered. I wouldn't put it past them to intentionally weaken the NIST curves. That said, my gut feeling is they probably didn't. -- Tony Arcieri ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 08:47:49AM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 3:08 AM, Adam Back <[1][email protected]> wrote: But I do think it is a very interesting and pressing research question as to whether there are ways to plausibly deniably symmetrically weaken or even trapdoor weaken DL curve parameters, when the seeds are allowed to look random as the DSA FIPS 186-3 ones do. See slide #28 in this djb deck: If e.g. the NSA knew of an entire class of weak curves, they could perform a brute force search with random looking seeds, continuing until the curve parameters, after the seed is run through SHA1, fall into the class that's known to be weak to them. Right but weak parameter arguments are very dangerous - the US national infrastructure they're supposed to be protecting could be weakened when someone else finds the weakness. Algorithmic weaknesses cant be hidden with confidence, how do they know the other countries defense research agencies arent also sitting on the same weakness even before they found it. Thats a strong disincentive. Though if its a well defined partial weakening they might go with it - eg historically they explicitly had a go at in public requiring use of eg "differential cryptography" where some of the key bits of lotus notes were encrypted to the NSA public key (which I have as a reverse-engineering trophy here[1]). Like for examle they dont really want foreign infrastructure to have more than 80 bits or something close to the edge of strength and they're willing to tolerate that on US infratructure also. Somewhat plausible. But the more interesting question I was referring to is a trapdoor weakness with a weak proof of fairness (ie a fairness that looks like the one in FIPS 186-3/ECDSA where we dont know how much grinding if any went into the magic seed values). For illustration though not applicable to ECDSA and probably outright defective eg can they start with some large number of candidate G values where G=xH (ie knowing the EC discrete log of some value H they pass off as a random fairly chosen point) and then do a birthday collision between the selection of G values and diffrent seed values to a PRNG to find a G value that they have both a discrete log of wrt H and a PRNG seed. Bearing in mind they may be willing to throw custom ASIC or FPGA supercomputer hardware and $1bil budgt at the problem as a one off cost. Adam [1] http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/hacks/lotus-nsa-key.html ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 3:08 AM, Adam Back wrote: > But I do think it is a very interesting and pressing research question as > to > whether there are ways to plausibly deniably symmetrically weaken or even > trapdoor weaken DL curve parameters, when the seeds are allowed to look > random as the DSA FIPS 186-3 ones do. See slide #28 in this djb deck: http://cr.yp.to/talks/2013.05.31/slides-dan+tanja-20130531-4x3.pdf Specifically: http://i.imgur.com/C7mg3T4.png If e.g. the NSA knew of an entire class of weak curves, they could perform a brute force search with random looking seeds, continuing until the curve parameters, after the seed is run through SHA1, fall into the class that's known to be weak to them. -- Tony Arcieri ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
[Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 06:35:24PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote: Having read the mail you linked to, it doesn't say the curves weren't generated according to the claimed procedure. Instead, it repeats Dan Bernstein's comment that the seed looks random, and that this would have allowed NSA to generate lots of curves till they found a bad one. That is itself a problem, the curves are in fact, not fully veriably fairly chosen. Our current inability to design a plausible mechanism by which this could have been done is not proof that it was not done. Also bear in mind unlike the NSA the crypto community has focused more on good faith (how to make thing secure) and less on bad faith (how to make things trapdoor insecure while providing somewhat plausible evidence that no sabotage took place). Ie we didnt spend as much effort examining that problem. Now that we have a reason to examine it, maybe such methods can be found. Kleptography is a for the open community a less explored field of study. Conversely it would have been easy to prove that the curve parameters WERE fairly chosen as Greg Maxwell described his surprise that the seed was big and random looking: Considering the stated purpose I would have expected the seed to be some small value like … “6F” and for all smaller values to fail the test. Anything else would have suggested that they tested a large number of values, and thus the parameters could embody any undisclosed mathematical characteristic whos rareness is only bounded by how many times they could run sha1 and test. So the question is rather why on earth if they claim good faith, did they not do that? Another plausible explanation that Greg mentions also, is that perhaps it was more about protecting the then secrecy of knowledge. eg weak curves and avoiding them without admitting the rules for which curves the knew were weak. Clearly its easier to weaken a system in symmetric way that depends only on analysis (ie when someone else figures out the class of weak curves they gain the advantage also, if its public then everyone suffers), vs a true trapdoor weakening, as in the EC DRBG fiasco. So if that is their excuse, that the utility of NSA input one can get due to institutional mentality of secrecy, is hardening but with undisclosed rationale, I think we'd sooner forgoe their input and have fully open verifiable reasoning. Eg maybe they could still prove good faith if they chose to disclose their logic (which may now be public information anyway) and the actual seed and the algorithm that rejected all iterations below the used value. However that depends on the real algorithm - maybe there is no way to prove it, if the real seed was itself random. But I do think it is a very interesting and pressing research question as to whether there are ways to plausibly deniably symmetrically weaken or even trapdoor weaken DL curve parameters, when the seeds are allowed to look random as the DSA FIPS 186-3 ones do. Adam ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
