Mr. Dumain, Even though I rarely reply to this list, I subscribe to it mostly because of your essays. I was wondering if you could collect all of your "polemics" in re Rosa and post them on your website?
Jerry On 3/5/06, Ralph Dumain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > For my previous installments of this review, see my prior posts on > [EMAIL PROTECTED] It is a shame that Rosa came on so > belligerently and quickly unsubscribed, dismissing the possibility of > productive feedback at the outset. This speaks to not only the ignorance > and incompetence rife among marxists, but also the deleterious influence > of > provincialism and sectarianism in marxist milieux and the world at > large. Rosa marks one stage in the rectification of the fragmentation of > knowledge, but she would not stay around to take the process up a > notch. Oh dear. > > http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm > Formal Logic > > This project is inherently frustrating on so many levels, as Homer Simpson > would say. On the one hand Rosa shows up the shameful ignorance of a > century of Marxism-Leninism, marshaling in the process a prodigious array > of sources on logic and mathematics, and also on the sciences, information > that is urgently needed by her audience in view of the ignorance she > contests. On the other, that so much energy should be invested to prove > so > little is tragic. > > Just about all that Marxists have written on the limitations of formal > logic and dialectical logic as its corrective is total rubbish. Rosa > occasionally acknowledges partial exceptions, but she has been so > traumatized by the mountains of Trotskyist drivel she was force-fed, as > well as its Stalinist counterpart, she rarely gets beyond that to see what > else might be done or has been done with the dialectical tradition. In > this chapter she shows up the mountains of nonsense written by marxists, > including their near total ignorance of what has been accomplished in > modern logic since Frege. Yes there is so much more to say. I'll touch > on > these issues as I proceed. > > One should note that while occasionally Rosa recognizes some > differentiation, she could be more effective in exposing the temptations, > contradictions, and occasional good sense of her opponents. Both > Stalinists and Trotskyists are inheritors of the same flawed > tradition. One can only argue which is worse in defined contexts. She > mostly picks on her fellow Trots, with additional cites from Stalinists, > and the predecessors of both. But as we know, there are arguments within > this tradition as well, such as the Soviet arguments over the 'two logics' > in the '50s. Plus there is the curious partisan schizophrenia whereby one > argues intelligently with other specialists while failing to abjure the > bad > popularizations that abound. Certainly, advocates of diamat have also > criticized flawed thinking among their ranks. Erwin Marquit, in several > journal articles as well as in his contribution to DIALECTICAL > CONTRADICTION, argues against the flawed Hegelian misreading of the > paradox > of motion. > > Rosa points out at the outset that logic has historically been conflated > with metaphysics, whereas its proper province is the study of valid > inference. This is an essential point, and Marxists get tripped up on it. > > Yet Rosa could make an even more damning case, but one which would apply > to > a range of ideological phenomena in the 20th century. The suppression of > the nature of abstraction, which can already be found in Engels' > conflation > of the logical and the empirical (noted by Van Heijenoort), is > characteristic of all the horrendous indoctrination perpetrated by > Marxism-Leninism. But the same phenomenon can be found across the board, > from Alfred Korzybski's General Semantics to Alan Watts' New Age > disquisitions. There needs to be a better accounting for the whole > shebang, rather than simply to fall back on formal logic and ordinary > language. Clearly something is amiss. > > There must be some reason for the persistence of such conspicuous > erroneous > thought patterns, and there must be some gap, some non-mystical need, that > dialectical thought attempts to supply. There must be something rather > difficult about the transposition of real world thinking into formal > propositional form that analytical philosophers have failed to capture. > > Inversely, as any acquaintance with mathematicians and logicians will show > (not to mention philosophers trained in logic), the integration of > formal-logical apparatus and real world thinking of aforementioned > individuals is largely a failure, and furthermore shows up the > self-enclosed, alienated minds produced by specialization and the dismal > socialization that prevails in society. > > Had Rosa not so precipitously dismissed 'academic Marxism', while > copiously > citing from other academics with expertise in mathematics, logic, and > analytical philosophy, she would be better positioned to exploit their > contributions as well as pinpoint their weaknesses. The whole history of > critical theory is an excellent case in point, perhaps the best case. The > Frankfurt School, their precursors, associates, and successors, all fell > down on logic and mathematics. Nonetheless, they provided the tools to > decipher the ideological phenomena of their time. > > Now, let's continue with Rosa's exposition of logic and linguistic > philosophy. > > >Alas, absurd sentences like this are to metaphysicians what carrots are > to > >donkeys; based on linguistic monstrosities like C4, some hastily conclude > >that language -- or 'thought' (or 'reality', or 'everything') -- must be > >defective, or must be contradictory. With reasoning like that you might > as > >well argue that if a metre rule is made incorrectly the same must be true > >of all it measured! > > > > From linguistic sins of our philosophical ancestors like this most of > > Metaphysics has descended without modification by unnatural selection; > DM > > is unfortunately not the only progeny of mutant syntax like this.15 > > Again, the attribution of metaphysical errors to linguistic flaws (based > on > Indo-European grammar). While there is no doubt that all ideological and > metaphysical errors take on the form of flawed logical reasoning, it is > nonetheless not entirely convincing to convert this into a causal > explanation. She also adduces political explanations, viz. the nature of > ruling class ideology. Presumably the two combine. Yet her version of > their combination remains rather crude, incomplete at the very least. > > Most fascinating to me is the combination of the validation of both formal > logic and ordinary language. > > >In Second Order Logic, expressions for concepts become variables ranged > >over by Third Order quantifiers, and so on.17 > > > >Even so, such systems only indirectly relate to the ordinary use of words > >for change in the vernacular. Indeed, despite what certain Philosophers > >(and DM-theorists) claim, ordinary language is perfectly capable of > >expressing change; this is partly because the word "change" is a > >vernacular term itself, and partly because ordinary language was invented > >by those who daily interface with material reality in collective labour > >(etc.); i.e., workers. In fact, as will be demonstrated in Essay Six, > >ordinary language is capable of expressing change far better than the > >obscure language found in Hegel, and in DM. The vernacular contains > >literally thousands of different words that are capable of depicting > >change in almost limitless detail. > > Now this is very odd. Ordinary people are just as metaphysical and > superstitious as the educated, though there is evidence to indicate that > special types of superstitious thinking may be endemic to certain > classes. But clearly ordinary language, its richness notwithstanding, is > inadequate as is, due to imprecision as well as its ideological content, > including inappropriate metaphorical content. At the very least, why else > would we need the apparatus of formal logic, mathematics, notational > systems, technical terminology, ideology critique? > > Furthermore, the dichotomy of formal logic and ordinary language does not > combine into an integrated picture. It takes more than gluing the early > and late Wittgenstein together to make a complete whole. Why is it only > that (idealist) philosophers are wrong when they try to interject a third > factor into this dynamic, with their bad metaphysics and obscure > terminology? (Note my previous post on the footnotes to chapter 2, part > 2, > on abstraction, wherein Rosa defends ordinary language.) There must be > other reasons, for example, why dialectical thinking, bad as it appears to > be, is such a temptation to otherwise intelligent minds. I'll come back > to > this later. > > Rosa switches to other claims about dialectics, e.g. viz. dialectical > biology. > > >Admittedly, certain 'dialectical' biologists have claimed that DL has an > >important role to play in the study of living systems -- for instance, > the > >authors of DB -- along with several notable members of the Communist > Party > >from several generations ago (e.g., Haldane, Levy and Bernal). > > > >Unquestionably, organic wholes and interconnectedness clearly make sense > >both in the life sciences and in the analysis of social development. > >However, this admission does not mean we have to accept the entire > >DM-enchilada, and opt for universal Holism. [On this, see Essay Eleven.] > >Anyway, as is demonstrated throughout this site, the concepts found in DL > >and DM are far too vague or incoherent for them to play a useful role in > >any of the sciences. In fact, they do not even make the list. > > These are very good points. Inter alia, we see a reason for the appeal of > dialectical thought--in this instance an objective dialectic or dialectic > of nature, independently of logic, perhaps? As Rosa is also known to > reject emergent materialism, apparently this will not satisfy her > either. But here's what miffs her about dialectical biology. > > >[DB = The Dialectical Biologist.] > > > >Nevertheless, DB advances certain claims (which TAR quotes approvingly; > >e.g., p.4) that require brief comment: > > > >[1] DB's authors maintain that something they call the "Cartesian mode" > >[i.e., Cartesian Reductionism, CAR] has dominated post-renaissance > >science. Unfortunately, they failed to substantiate this claim and simply > >left it as a bald assertion: > > > >"The dominant mode of analysis of the physical and biological world and > by > >extension the social world...has been Cartesian reductionism. This > >Cartesian mode is characterised by four ontological commitments...: > > > >"1. There is a natural set of units or parts of which any whole system is > >made. > > > >"2. These units are homogeneous within themselves, at least in so far as > >they affect the whole of which they are the parts. > > > >"3. The parts are ontologically prior to the whole; that is, the parts > >exist in isolation and come together to make wholes. The parts have > >intrinsic properties, which they possess in isolation and which they lend > >to the whole. In the simplest case the whole is nothing but the sum of > the > >parts; more complex cases allow for interactions of the parts to produce > >added properties of the whole. > > > >"4. Causes are separate from effects, causes being the properties of > >subjects. and effects the properties of objects. While causes may respond > >to information coming from the effects.... there is no ambiguity about > >which is causing subject and which is caused object...." [Levins and > >Lewontin (1985), p.269.] > > > >However, these allegations are themselves couched in rather broad, > general > >and somewhat vague terms. While it is undeniable that some philosophers > >and scientists have adopted parts of the world-view that DB's authors > >attribute to CAR, many have rejected it. Indeed, since most of the > >theorists who allegedly adopted this mode of thought (if it is one) were > >devout Christians, they could hardly posit 'parts separate from wholes' > >given what they found in the book of Genesis. [On this, see below.] It is > >worth noting that the authors of DB cite no sources for their views > >(primary or secondary) -- and no wonder; they would have disconfirmed the > >picture they painted. > > Here Rosa is correct. It's a shame that Lewontin and Levins and others > would mar their arguments with such sloppy reasoning, since there are much > tighter cases against 'reductionism' that could be sustained. > > > DB's authors also ignore the fact that many scientists and philosophers > > (these two roles were not really distinguished until the middle of the > > 19th century) up until about 100 years ago often depicted the unity of > > the world in theological terms. . . . . In fact, it is arguable that DM > > represents a regressive return to such an enchanted view of nature. . . > . .. > > >Finally, DB omits any mention of the strong Organicist and Holistic > >tradition in modern science (represented most notably in the works of > >people like Goethe, Schelling and Oken). Emerging out of the > >aforementioned Hermetic and NeoPlatonist philosophies of the Renaissance, > >this strand of thought underpinned Nat�rphilosophy, just as it inspired > >Vitalist and Romantic views of nature. As is clear, this view of the > world > >dominated much of the thought of the Romantic Movement from whom Hegel > >derived many of his own ideas. This alone casts doubt on DB's simplistic > >picture of the development of science since Descartes. > > A simplistic picture hardly unique to Marxists. Certainly New Age thought > and various idealist fads are predicated on similar grounds. > > >However, it is also clear that DB's authors have themselves adopted a > >revisionist view of Engels's work in this regard; they even go so far as > >to say that "much of what he wrote about [the physical world] seems > >quaint" [DB, p.279], and this appears to include Engels's views on change > >through contradiction. True, DB's authors interpret contradictions as > >opposing forces [DB, p.280], but in Essay Eight it will become clear how > >unwise a move this is. Nonetheless, in their characterization of CAR, > DB's > >authors pointedly failed to argue that the absence of an appeal to > >"contradictions" (to account for change) was one of its weaknesses. > >Perhaps this was an oversight, but it does ruin the neat picture Rees > paints. > > I imagine so. > > >Finally, it is worth noting that, Graham Priest's work aside, the best > >defence of the 'dialectical view' of contradictions I have encountered in > >the literature (i.e., that found in Lawler (1982)) will be discussed in > >detail in Essay Eight. > > Keep Priest and Lawler in mind for later installments. > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > -- Jerry Monaco's Philosophy, Politics, Culture Weblog is Shandean Postscripts to Politics, Philosophy, and Culture http://www.livejournal.com/users/monacojerry/ His fiction, poetry, weblog is Hopeful Monsters: Fiction, Poetry, Memories http://www.livejournal.com/users/jerrymonaco/ Notes, Quotes, Images - From some of my reading and browsing http://www.livejournal.com/community/jerry_quotes/
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