Re: [ANNOUNCE] mod_ssl 2.8.19 for Apache 1.3.31

2004-07-21 Thread Joe Orton
On Tue, Jul 20, 2004 at 06:19:13PM +0200, Juergen Weigert wrote:
 On Jul 17, 04 08:57:09 +0200, Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
  On Fri, Jul 16, 2004, Joe Orton wrote:
   [...] I think it's portable to  assume time_t is a long...
   [...]
 
 I'd appreciate  
 assert(sizof(time_t) == sizeof(long));
 near that. 

Casting the value to a long would be better than a runtime assertion if
you're worried about it, there's only one place it happens.

joe
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Re: [ANNOUNCE] mod_ssl 2.8.19 for Apache 1.3.31

2004-07-20 Thread a k
I would prefer either:

#if ...
#error ...
#endif
or
if( ... ) {
log some easy to understand error
 exit(1)
}



--- Juergen Weigert [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 On Jul 17, 04 08:57:09 +0200, Ralf S. Engelschall
 wrote:
  On Fri, Jul 16, 2004, Joe Orton wrote:
   [...] I think it's portable to  assume time_t is
 a long...
   [...]
 
 I'd appreciate  
 assert(sizof(time_t) == sizeof(long));
 near that. 
 I could not find any glibc supported architecture,
 where 
 that would not hould.
 
 cheers,
 Jw.
 
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Re: [ANNOUNCE] mod_ssl 2.8.19 for Apache 1.3.31

2004-07-17 Thread Ralf S. Engelschall
On Fri, Jul 16, 2004, Joe Orton wrote:

 I'm checking an older version of mod_ssl but there are a couple of other
 uninteresting format string warnings from gcc.  I think it's portable to
 assume time_t is a long...
 [...]

Yes, although they are not security related, they could crash the
server, too. So we should fix those formatting bugs, too. A little bit
of extra casting might be required, I think. I've now committed to my
CVS for mod_ssl 2.8.20 the following patch. Thanks for your feedback.
Please commit a similar patch to mod_ssl for Apache 2.x, please.

Index: ssl_engine_io.c
===
RCS file: /e/modssl/cvs/mod_ssl/pkg.apache/src/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c,v
retrieving revision 1.36
diff -u -d -r1.36 ssl_engine_io.c
--- ssl_engine_io.c 11 May 2004 18:44:15 -  1.36
+++ ssl_engine_io.c 17 Jul 2004 06:52:22 -
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@
 }
 if (trunc  0)
 ssl_log(srvr, SSL_LOG_DEBUG|SSL_NO_TIMESTAMP|SSL_NO_LEVELID,
-| %04x - SPACES/NULS, len + trunc);
+| %04lx - SPACES/NULS, len + trunc);
 ssl_log(srvr, SSL_LOG_DEBUG|SSL_NO_TIMESTAMP|SSL_NO_LEVELID,
 
+-+);
 return;
@@ -704,21 +704,21 @@
 || cmd == (BIO_CB_READ |BIO_CB_RETURN) ) {
 if (rc = 0) {
 ssl_log(s, SSL_LOG_DEBUG,
-%s: %s %ld/%d bytes %s BIO#%08X [mem: %08lX] %s,
+%s: %s %ld/%d bytes %s BIO#%08lX [mem: %08lX] %s,
 SSL_LIBRARY_NAME,
 (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN) ? write : read),
 rc, argi, (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN) ? to : from),
-bio, argp,
+(long)bio, (long)argp,
 (argp != NULL ? (BIO dump follows) : (Ops, no memory 
buffer?)));
 if (argp != NULL)
 ssl_io_data_dump(s, argp, rc);
 }
 else {
 ssl_log(s, SSL_LOG_DEBUG,
-%s: I/O error, %d bytes expected to %s on BIO#%08X [mem: %08lX],
+%s: I/O error, %d bytes expected to %s on BIO#%08lX [mem: 
%08lX],
 SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, argi,
 (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN) ? write : read),
-bio, argp);
+(long)bio, (long)argp);
 }
 }
 return rc;
Index: ssl_engine_kernel.c
===
RCS file: /e/modssl/cvs/mod_ssl/pkg.apache/src/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c,v
retrieving revision 1.146
diff -u -d -r1.146 ssl_engine_kernel.c
--- ssl_engine_kernel.c 27 May 2004 13:13:32 -  1.146
+++ ssl_engine_kernel.c 17 Jul 2004 06:50:10 -
@@ -1793,10 +1793,10 @@
  * Log this cache operation
  */
 ssl_log(s, SSL_LOG_TRACE, Inter-Process Session Cache: 
-request=SET status=%s id=%s timeout=%ds (session caching),
+request=SET status=%s id=%s timeout=%lds (session caching),
 rc == TRUE ? OK : BAD,
 SSL_SESSION_id2sz(pNew-session_id, pNew-session_id_length),
-t-time(NULL));
+(long)(t-time(NULL)));

 /*
  * return 0 which means to OpenSSL that the pNew is still

   Ralf S. Engelschall
   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   www.engelschall.com

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Re: [ANNOUNCE] mod_ssl 2.8.19 for Apache 1.3.31

2004-07-17 Thread Joe Orton
On Sat, Jul 17, 2004 at 08:57:09AM +0200, Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
 Yes, although they are not security related, they could crash the
 server, too. So we should fix those formatting bugs, too. A little bit
 of extra casting might be required, I think. I've now committed to my
 CVS for mod_ssl 2.8.20 the following patch. Thanks for your feedback.
 Please commit a similar patch to mod_ssl for Apache 2.x, please.

Actually it should just use %pp for printing addresses since the 1.3
ap_snprintf does support that (the 2.0 code does this already).

joe

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[ANNOUNCE] mod_ssl 2.8.19 for Apache 1.3.31

2004-07-16 Thread Ralf S. Engelschall
We've today found an ssl_log() related format string vulnerability in
the mod_proxy hook functions of mod_ssl for Apache 1.3.x (mod_ssl for
Apache 2.x is not affected). A mod_ssl 2.8.19 for Apache 1.3.31 was
created which fixes this potential security hole.

Get mod_ssl-2.8.19-1.3.31.tar.gz from:

o http://www.modssl.org/source/
o  ftp://ftp.modssl.org/source/

Yours,
   Ralf S. Engelschall
   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   www.engelschall.com
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Re: [ANNOUNCE] mod_ssl 2.8.19 for Apache 1.3.31

2004-07-16 Thread Joe Orton
I'm checking an older version of mod_ssl but there are a couple of other
uninteresting format string warnings from gcc.  I think it's portable to
assume time_t is a long...

--- ./ssl_engine_io.c.warnings  2002-02-23 18:45:45.0 +
+++ ./ssl_engine_io.c   2004-07-16 22:02:32.0 +0100
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
 }
 if (trunc  0)
 ssl_log(srvr, SSL_LOG_DEBUG|SSL_NO_TIMESTAMP|SSL_NO_LEVELID,
-| %04x - SPACES/NULS, len + trunc);
+| %04lx - SPACES/NULS, len + trunc);
 ssl_log(srvr, SSL_LOG_DEBUG|SSL_NO_TIMESTAMP|SSL_NO_LEVELID,
 
+-+);
 return;
--- ./mod_ssl.h.warnings2004-07-16 21:52:26.0 +0100
+++ ./mod_ssl.h 2004-07-16 21:58:19.0 +0100
@@ -806,7 +806,9 @@
 /*  Logfile Support  */
 void ssl_log_open(server_rec *, server_rec *, pool *);
 BOOL ssl_log_applies(server_rec *, int);
-void ssl_log(server_rec *, int, const char *, ...);
+void ssl_log(server_rec *, int, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf,3,4)));
+
 void ssl_die(void);
 
 /*  Variables  */
--- ./ssl_engine_kernel.c.warnings  2004-07-16 21:52:26.0 +0100
+++ ./ssl_engine_kernel.c   2004-07-16 22:00:41.0 +0100
@@ -1807,7 +1807,7 @@
  * Log this cache operation
  */
 ssl_log(s, SSL_LOG_TRACE, Inter-Process Session Cache: 
-request=SET status=%s id=%s timeout=%ds (session caching),
+request=SET status=%s id=%s timeout=%lds (session caching),
 rc == TRUE ? OK : BAD,
 SSL_SESSION_id2sz(pNew-session_id, pNew-session_id_length),
 t-time(NULL));

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