[UC] Secret war funding

[Glenn]

This concerns secret funding in preparation for war with Iran. This pulitzer 
prize winning investigator also gives a nice snapshot of state sponsored 
terrorism by a rogue nuclear armed regime.  This is very important 

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh


You can listen to an interview with the author on www.democracynow.org  You can 
check the declassified portion of the national intelligence estimate.  This is 
the US intelligence agencies own report.  Copied below

Key Judgments

A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear 
weapons

program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a 
minimum is

keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high 
confidence

that the halt, and Tehran's announcement of its decision to suspend its 
declared uranium

enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation

Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing

international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's previously

undeclared nuclear work.

. We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military 
entities were

working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.

. We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. 
(Because of

intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC

assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities 
represents a halt

to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)

. We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear 
weapons

program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to 
develop

nuclear weapons.

. We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not 
currently

have a nuclear weapon.

. Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less 
determined

to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment

that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international 
pressure

suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged

previously.

B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at 
least

some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high 
confidence it

has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has 
acquired

from abroad-or will acquire in the future-a nuclear weapon or enough fissile 
material

for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons 
it would

need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously-which we 
judge

with high confidence it has not yet done.

C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce 
enough

fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its 
declared centrifuge