On Sep 28, 2011, at 12:20 PM, OrionWorks - Steven V Johnson wrote:
I think that the end of the hoax is approaching.
I doubt we are witnessing a hoax, though it's possible I am in error.
Another thought came to mind in regards to the megawatt reactor
design: Why for their first generation of "products" are they building
a 1 MW module? Many have stated many times that a smaller less
complicated configuration that generates a more modest amount of heat
of say 10 - 50 kilowatts of energy would be more than sufficient to
prove their point.
One theory as to why the 1 MW reactors is being designed for prime
time is to prove to prospective investors that the technology can be
scaled up immediately. That may be true, but perhaps a more subtle
point might be that by assembling a bunch of eCat cores under one hood
the engineers increase their chances that at least a decent number of
the individual reactors will work. Maybe there are far more individual
eCat cores than what ought to be necessary in order to generate 1 MW
of heat under the hood. Maye the engineers have discovered the fact
that statistically speaking only about 50% - 75% of the individually
assembled reactor cores work. I wonder if they have installed enough
additional reactor cores to more-or-less guarantee that the entire
module will, statistically speaking, generate at a minimum 1 Megawatts
Just a thought... and I suspect it has already been raised by
Steven Vincent Johnson
Looking at the other side of the coin, the probability of
catastrophic failure, suppose there is a 0.1% chance per hour one of
the E-cats can blow up spreading steam throughout the container.
There is thus a 0.999 probability of success, i.e. no explosion for
one E-cat, operating for one hour. The probability that all 52 E-
cats perform successfully for a 24 hour test period is then 0.999^
(52*24) = .287. That means there is a 71.3% chance of an explosion
during a 24 hour test.
The fact it is more difficult to manually monitor 53 E-cats than a
single E-cat also means the probability a single E-cat of the 53
blows up in a given hour would be higher than it would be for that E-
cat operated singly. It is not even clear facilities to monitor
individual critical E-cat conditions, like internal pressure or flow,
are present in the 1 MW E-cat. If no individual monitoring is
feasible then the probability of individual failure in a given hour
should be much larger than when independently operated.
Then there is the feasibility of the 1 MW unit producing over a MW
just from the huge thermal mass it has, even if all nuclear reactions
are shut down. A significant back pressure due to the seam vent pipe
being too small could reduce input water flow resulting in suddenly
increased boil off of the water in the E-cats resulting in a
catastrophic feedback loop and multiple E-cat explosion. The
individual probabilities of failure can be made larger in a combined
configuration due to additional shared parts.