This is off-topic of Detroit techno in so much that there is no talk of music but it's not off-topic if we are to link it to the messages within Detroit techno:
freedom of expression, equal rights for all regardless of race/age/sex/sexual orientation/etc, working toward a positive future for our country and the world This needs to be brought to light beyond the internet! http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65563,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_8 http://www.newstarget.com/002076.html http://www.blackboxvoting.org/ http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/WO0411/S00055.htm http://www.independentmediasource.com/ http://www.opednews.com/thoreau_110404_diebold.htm http://www.tnimc.org/newswire/display/3347/index.php http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci1022484,00.html http://www.thehilltoponline.com/news/2004/11/02/BusinessTechnology/Swing.States.Wary.Of.Electronic.Voting-791451.shtml http://slate.msn.com/id/2086455/ check this report http://www.avirubin.com/vote.pdf Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We identify several problems including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software development processes. We show that voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal software. Furthermore, we show that even the most serious of our outsider attacks could have been discovered and executed without access to the source code. In the face of such attacks, the usual worries about insider threats are not the only concerns; outsiders can do the damage. That said, we demonstrate that the insider threat is also quite considerable, showing that not only can an insider, such as a poll worker, modify the votes, but that insiders can also violate voter privacy and match votes with the voters who cast them. We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election. Any paperless electronic voting system might suffer similar flaws, despite any certification it could have otherwise received. We suggest that the best solutions are voting systems having a voter-verifiable audit trail, where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter. this is just the tip of the iceberg people MEK
