Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-router-16: Discuss
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-router/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DISCUSS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 11. Can assumptions of the about the security properties of the links be clarified. This specification applies to LLNs and a backbone in which the individual links are protected against rogue access, e.g., by authenticating a node that attaches to the network and encrypting at the MAC layer the transmissions that may be overheard. In particular, the LLN MAC is required to provide secure unicast to/from the Backbone Router and secure Broadcast from the Backbone Router in a way that prevents tampering with or replaying the RA messages. -- what are the specific assumptions about the protections that will be on the link. Is the list of properties in the “e.g.” the full list? -- As the second sentence references the only the LLN MAC, using Figure 1 and 2 as a reference (realizing they are non-normative), what’s expected properties of the links between the router-and-6BBR or IPv6 node-and-6BBR (i.e., the links connecting to the “backbone side”)? _______________________________________________ 6lo mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6lo
