Hi Rene, Michael and Jonathan, I am working on the text for the security section in the minimal draft. I included Rene's suggestion but I still have doubts as during the IETF meeting there was some discussion about it.
the security section is composed of 2 paragraphs. As this document refers to the interaction between Layer 3 and Layer 2 protocols, this interaction MUST be secured by L2 security mechanisms as defined by [IEEE802154e]. Two security mechanisms are considered, authentication and encryption, authentication applies to the all packet content while encryption applies to header IEs and MAC payload. *Key distribution is out of scope of this document, but* * examples include pre-configured keys at the nodes, shared keys among* * peers or well-known keys*. Refer to the 6TiSCH architecture document [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] for further details on key distribution and advanced security aspects. The present document assumes the existence of two cryptographic keys, which can be pre-configured. One of the keys (K1) is used to authenticate EBs. As defined in Section 4, EBs MUST be authenticated, with no payload encryption. This facilitates logical segregation of distinct networks. A second key (K2) is used to authenticate DATA, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, MAC COMMAND frame types and respective header IEs, with payload encryption. Depending on security policy, these keys could be the same (i.e., K1=K2). The second paragraph is what Rene proposed and had consensus on the ML. In red is my doubt that raises from the discussions during the WG meeting at the IETF in Dallas. I think that someone was opposing to the text indicating *well-known keys.* can you please advice me on that? thanks! Xavi
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