Thomas Watteyne writes: > I feel very unconfortable with the idea of receiving a packet for > which authentication fails, but nevertheless use the data inside it. > I know that you can read the 15.4 state machine to do this, but I > just disagree with it completely.
This is explictly allowed in 802.15.4 just to allow joining secured networks, and still allow EBs to be protected for those who are already part of the network. > Option 4 involves a secret key for EBs which the joining node > doesn't have, but then trusts the EBs nevertheless, and then learns > the key from the JCE when it's already joined. I don't get why this > offers any more security than no MIC at all. For joining device it is exactly same as what option 1 and 3 are, i.e. he cannot trust EBs as the sender of EB and joining device do not have trust assocation with each other yet. For nodes who are part of the network, it is same as option 2, i.e. they know that only members of the network can fake EBs, and they can trust them. -- [email protected] _______________________________________________ 6tisch mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6tisch
