Michael Richardson writes: > > Kris Pister <[email protected]> wrote: > > Things that a mote might start with (one or more of): > > A) nothing > > B) PSK(s) > > C) raw public/private key > > D) certificate(s) from > > i) manufacturer/distributor/installer > > ii) consortium (e.g. Corner Grocers Alliance) > > iii) end user/owner (e.g. Charlie's Market) > > iv) desired network(s) > > > Things that a mote might end with: > > 1) L2 key(s) for MIC (and optionally encryption) > > 2) DTLS session with JCE if present > > 3) DTLS session with PCE if present > > 4) L2 keys for 6top communication to neighbors > > 5) locally-significant certificate for future joins > > I agree with your characterisation, but (A) can't be correct. > > > We need a way for people who say "I don't want the hassle of security, > > and I can't afford a chip with ECC" (e.g. start state A) to still > > transition to something > > that is > > secure after the join process is over. > > I can design/pick an online protocol where such a device that has been > provisioned at manufacturing time with a (larger) symmetric key could join. > To make this work requires that the manufacturer always be online and > available, that the devices are never resold or repurposed without the > participation of the manufacturer, and the privacy footprint of the solution > may poor. Such a join process may lack PFS, and maybe some forms of replay > attack may be possible; that suggests that the device, once provisioned may > never be factory defaultable. > > I would prefer to leave (A) out for now.
Note, that A is from the security point of view, exactly same as well-known shared key. -- [email protected] _______________________________________________ 6tisch mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6tisch
