Isn't that exactly authorization, for which (Half of) the A in ACE stands for?
On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Qin Wang <[email protected]> wrote: > To address Kris's question, I agree with Tero that there are two security > elements involved, one is something like DTLS to secure the network access; > another is ACL to guarantee right access to the database in devices. > > Thanks > Qin > > > > > On Thursday, May 7, 2015 9:46 PM, Thomas Watteyne < > [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > > > Kris, > > You're asking the right questions... > > To keep 6TiSCH focused, we chose to "outsource" all centralized management > to CoMI/CoAP, and focus on the data model. > The assumption here is that everything you describe (for the centralized > case) is handled by CoAP's security mechanism. > The authorization aspect being currently handled by ACE. > Unfortunately, I haven't been following the ACE work closely. > Can anyone shine a light on whether ACE is handling all of Kris' concerns? > > For the distributed CoAPIE case, > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wang-6tisch-6top-coapie-00 doesn't > focus on security (it's a -00). IMO, there are two options: > - we consider CoAPIE security to be part of L2 security. That is, a > network-wide PSK, or neighbor-by-neighbor keys installed by the JCE > - the CoAPIE also encapsulates the DTLS record. Packet will be (much) > bigger, and neighbor-to-neighbor authentication would be needed. > > Thomas > > On Thu, May 7, 2015 at 9:29 AM, Mališa Vučinić <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > > Kris, > > Some comments inline. > > Regards, > Mališa Vučinić > > On 06 May 2015, at 17:34, Kris Pister <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > > Mote M has a number of CoAP resources, including temperature and light > sensors > coap://M/S/T and /S/L > as well as 6top resources such as slotframes and cells > /6t/6/sf1 and /6t/4/c12_14 (I don't actually know the format). > > I might want to allow anyone (host A) on the internet to access the > temperature, /S/T, > but only a select few to access anything in /6t. Maybe some with READ (L2 > neighbors, B), > maybe only one with DELETE (e.g. the PCE, C). > > Today the assumption is that we will have a DTLS session to protect these > resources. > Some problems that I see: > What is the mechanism that the mote uses to differentiate between A, B, > and C? > Let's assume that the hand-off between the DTLS module and the CoAP module > tells CoAP if the packet was properly encrypted (vs. the hand-off from > UDP). My > mote needs some sort of table that binds resources to security > requirements. That > takes care of host A asking for temperature (OK) vs. slotframe info (not > allowed if > not protected with DTLS). > > But how does the mote differentiate between a READ and a DELETE from mote B > or C? Both will be encrypting their requests with DTLS. Does the mote > need a > table of hosts, each with a list of resources, each resource with a 4 bit > flag of > permissions? > > > If we want to avoid additional packet exchanges with JCE, I believe it is > necessary to locally keep such a table. We could for instance optimize this > with some sort of .htaccess for 6top. > > However, I am a bit skeptical of having DTLS sessions with both B and C, > where B can be the set of all the radio neighbors of the mote. Consider > that DTLS handshake exchanges 10+ packets and for instance in tinyDTLS > implementation, each session occupies around 400B of RAM. This session > overhead is certainly necessary with PCE and JCE but I am not sure if it’d > be wise to do it for each radio neighbor. > > > And what about OTF, where we will be sending CoAP packets as MLME IEs > protected > at layer2? > > I know that ACE is working on this, and I'm trying to understand the three > competing > solutions and their impact on 6TiSCH. No matter what they do, it won't > completely > solve the OTF/coapIE problem. > > > I agree - this is very specific to 6TiSCH and I don’t really see how we > could leverage [1] / DTLS to differentiate OTF CoAP exchanges within the > IEs. Outside of ACE, I noticed some work around COSE (CBOR Object Signing > and Encryption) [2] that should provide an optimized cryptographic format > which 6TiSCH could use at any layer (generic formats for encryption, MIC, > signature). IEs carrying CoAP could therefore have the CoAP payload > encrypted/authenticated/replay-protected with COSE and by managing > different keys we could differentiate the access to different resources. > [3] in fact specifies how a generic crypto format such as COSE could be > used to also encrypt/authenticate parts of the CoAP header. > > [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize-02 > [2] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cose/current/maillist.html > [3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-selander-ace-object-security-01 > > > > > _______________________________________________ > 6tisch mailing list > [email protected] <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6tisch > > > > _______________________________________________ > 6tisch mailing list > [email protected] <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6tisch > > >
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