Hi Malisa,
A suggestion to make the text clearer.
section 4 exchange number 3.
The pledge sends packets to the layer 2 address of the JP with the layer
3 address of the JRC.
That makes clearer what goes on. In a first pass of the text, I wondered
how the routing was done.
Greetings,
Peter
Mališa Vučinić schreef op 2017-06-19 15:12:
Hi Peter,
I’m missing context on how would that happen. The pledge selects *one*
JP based on the Join Metric in the received EBs. It fills the
destination IPv6 address in the packet with JP’s link-local address
and sends it. How would multiple proxies forward the message in that
case?
Mališa
On 19 Jun 2017, at 14:52, peter van der Stok <[email protected]>
wrote:
Hi Malisa,
I have a question about the join protocol described in sections 5-6.
The pledge sends a EDHOC message_1 to JRC via a stateless proxy.
It is not clear to me what happens when more than 1 proxy forwards the
message to the JRC.
Peter
Mališa Vučinić schreef op 2017-06-15 11:05:
All,
We have just submitted a new version of the minimal-security draft in
preparation for the plugtest that will be held in Prague. This
version
(-03) will be referenced by the official test description of the
plugtest.
The most notable changes are:
- pledge-initiated EDHOC handshake with optional separate response
- JRC’s IPv6 address is now included in the Join Response structure
- Separate section specifying MTI algorithms
Regards,
Mališa
On 15 Jun 2017, at 10:55, [email protected] wrote:
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE
802.15.4e of the IETF.
Title : Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
Authors : Malisa Vucinic
Jonathan Simon
Kris Pister
Michael Richardson
Filename : draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-03.txt
Pages : 24
Date : 2017-06-15
Abstract:
This document describes the minimal mechanisms required to support
secure enrollment of a pledge, a device being added to an IPv6 over
the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) network. It assumes that
the pledge has been provisioned with a credential that is relevant
to
the deployment - the "one-touch" scenario. The goal of this
configuration is to set link-layer keys, and to establish a secure
end-to-end session between each pledge and the join registrar who
may
use that to further configure the pledge. Additional security
behaviors and mechanisms may be added on top of this minimal
framework.
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security/
There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-03
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-03
A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-03
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
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