Benjamin Kaduk <[email protected]> wrote: > Thanks for these updates! I see you had one question at the end...
>> > visible. Encrypting the schedule does not prevent an attacker from
>> > jamming, but rather increases the energy cost of doing that jamming.
>>
>> > Perhaps also the side effects/collateral damage of the jamming.
>>
>> I'm not sure what you are saying/suggesting here.
> If the attacker doesn't know the schedule, they use more power ("energy
> cost") to jam all the time, in some sort of always-on broadband jamming
> technique. This broadband jamming could end up blocking traffic the
> attacker doesn't care about, in addition to the target of the jamming;
> that in turn might make the fact that the attacker is jamming at all
easier
> to detect. I'm suggesting that the attacker's decision process about
> whether/how to jam is much more complicated if they don't have the
schedule
> available, and there are additional factors that would come into play that
> might discourage the attacker from jamming even though (as is already
> noted) it does not "prevent" the attacker from jamming.
So, just to be clear, the schedule is happening thanks to RFC8180, section 4.5.
What this document adds is the ability to determine which EB are from the
same network, even if they have different PANID.
There is a very good discussion about the jamming costs in:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling/
Unfortunately, it isn't clear if this work can go ahead in the IETF as it
apparently makes changes that the IEEE is responsible for. At the same time,
it must coordinate with (re-)keying , which the IEEE is not responsible for.
I don't know what else I could say in enhanced beacon about this.
The topic of selective jamming is a bit distant from this document.
--
] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh networks [
] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | IoT architect [
] [email protected] http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails [
--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]>, Sandelman Software Works
-= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ 6tisch mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6tisch
