NOTE:    THIS LAND MARK JUDGEMENT PROVIDES GREAT RELEIF TO ALL THOSE EMPLOYEES, 
WHO HAVE MISSED THE CHANCE FOR GETTING PROMOTION AND OTHER BENEFITS DUE TO NOT 
HAVING TIMELY INFORMATION ABOUT STATUS OF THEIR ACR BY CONCERNED AUTHORITY, AS 
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SAID IN PARAGRAPH 39 OF THIS FOLLOWING 
JUDGEMENT:

 “------   39. In the present case, we are developing the principles of natural 
  justice by holding that fairness and transparency in public   administration 
requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average,   good or very good) in 
the Annual Confidential Report of a public   servant, whether in civil, 
judicial, police or any other State service   (except the military), must be 
communicated to him within a reasonable   period so that he can make a 
representation for its upgradation. This   in our opinion is the correct legal 
position even though there may be   no Rule/G.O. requiring communication of the 
entry, or even if there is   a Rule/G.O. prohibiting it, because the principle 
of non-arbitrariness   in State action as envisaged by Article 14 of the 
Constitution in our   opinion requires such communication. Article 14 will 
override all rules   or government orders.------“



Supreme Court of India - CIVIL APPEAL CASE NO 7631/2002 Dev Dutt vs Union Of 
India (Uoi) And Ors. on 12-5-2008









Supreme Court of India

    Dev Dutt vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 12/5/2008 JUDGMENT    
Markandey Katju, J.    1. This appeal by special leave has been filed against 
the impugned   judgment of the Gauhati High Court dated 26.11.2001 in Writ 
Appeal No.   447 of 2001. By the aforesaid judgment the Division Bench of the   
Gauhati High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal of the appellant filed   against 
the judgment of the Learned Single Judge dated 21.8.2001.    2. Heard learned 
Counsel for the parties and perused the record.    3. The appellant was in the 
service of the Border Roads Engineering   Service which is governed by the 
Border Roads Engineering Service Group   'A' Rules, as amended. As per these 
rules, since the appellant was   promoted as Executive Engineer on 22.2.1988, 
he was eligible to be   considered for promotion to the post of Superintending 
Engineer on   completion of 5 years on the grade of Executive Engineer, which 
he   completed on 21.2.1993. Accordingly the name of the appellant was   
included in the list of candidates eligible for promotion.    4. The 
Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) held its meeting on   16.12.1994. In 
that meeting the appellant was not held to be eligible   for promotion, but his 
juniors were selected and promoted to the rank   of Superintending Engineer. 
Hence the appellant filed a Writ Petition   before the Gauhati High Court which 
was dismissed and his appeal before   the Division Bench also failed. 
Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed   by special leave before this Court.    
5. The stand of the respondent was that according to para 6.3(ii) of   the 
guidelines for promotion of departmental candidates which was   issued by the 
Government of India, Ministry of Public Grievances and   Pension, vide Office 
Memorandum dated 10.4.1989, for promotion to all   posts which are in the pay 
scale of Rs. 3700-5000/- and above, the   bench mark grade should be 'very 
good' for the last five years before   the D.P.C. In other words, only those 
candidates who had 'very good'   entries in their Annual Confidential Reports 
(ACRs) for the last five   years would be considered for promotion. The post of 
Superintending   Engineer carries the pay scale of Rs. 3700- 5000/- and since 
the   appellant did not have 'very good' entry but only 'good' entry for the   
year 1993-94, he was not considered for promotion to the post of   
Superintending Engineer.    6. The grievance of the appellant was that he was 
not communicated the   'good' entry for the year 1993-94. He submitted that had 
he been   communicated that entry he would have had an opportunity of making a  
 representation for upgrading that entry from 'good' to 'very good', and   if 
that representation was allowed he would have also become eligible   for 
promotion. Hence he submits that the rules of natural justice have   been 
violated.    7. In reply, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that a 
'good'   entry is not an adverse entry and it is only an adverse entry which 
has   to be communicated to an employee. Hence he submitted that there was no   
illegality in not communicating the 'good' entry to the appellant.    8. 
Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on a decision of this   Court in 
Vijay Kumar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 1988 (Supp) SCC   674 in which it 
was held that an un-communicated adverse report should   not form the 
foundation to deny the benefits to a government servant   when similar benefits 
are extended to his juniors. He also relied upon   a decision of this Court in 
State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Suryakant   Chunilal Shah 1999 (1) SCC 529 in 
which it was held:      Purpose of adverse entries is primarily to forewarn the 
government     servant to mend his ways and to improve his performance. That is 
    why, it is required to communicate the adverse entries so that the     
government servant to whom the adverse entry is given, may have     either 
opportunity to explain his conduct so as to show that the     adverse entry was 
wholly uncalled for, or to silently brood over the     matter and on being 
convinced that his previous conduct justified     such an entry, to improve his 
performance.    On the strength of the above decisions learned Counsel for the  
 respondent submitted that only an adverse entry needs to be   communicated to 
an employee.    9. We do not agree. In our opinion every entry must be 
communicated to   the employee concerned, so that he may have an opportunity of 
making a   representation against it if he is aggrieved.    10. In the present 
case the bench mark (i.e. the essential requirement)   laid down by the 
authorities for promotion to the post of   Superintending Engineer was that the 
candidate should have 'very good'   entry for the last five years. Thus in this 
situation the 'good' entry   in fact is an adverse entry because it eliminates 
the candidate from   being considered for promotion. Thus, nomenclature is not 
relevant, it   is the effect which the entry is having which determines whether 
it is   an adverse entry or not. It is thus the rigours of the entry which is   
important, not the phraseology. The grant of a `good' entry is of no   
satisfaction to the incumbent if it in fact makes him ineligible for   
promotion or has an adverse effect on his chances.    11. Hence, in our 
opinion, the 'good' entry should have been   communicated to the appellant so 
as to enable him to make a   representation praying that the said entry for the 
year 1993-94 should   be upgraded from 'good' to 'very good'. Of course, after 
considering   such a representation it was open to the authority concerned to 
reject   the representation and confirm the 'good' entry (though of course in a 
  fair manner), but at least an opportunity of making such a   representation 
should have been given to the appellant, and that would   only have been 
possible had the appellant been communicated the 'good'   entry, which was not 
done in this case. Hence, we are of the opinion   that the non-communication of 
the 'good' entry was arbitrary and hence   illegal, and the decisions relied 
upon by the learned Counsel for the   respondent are distinguishable.    12. 
Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that under the Office   Memorandum 
21011/4/87 [Estt.'A'] issued by the Ministry of   Personnel/Public Grievance 
and Pensions dated 10/11.09.1987, only an   adverse entry is to be communicated 
to the concerned employee. It is   well settled that no rule or government 
instruction can violate Article   14 or any other provision of the 
Constitution, as the Constitution is   the highest law of the land. The 
aforesaid Office Memorandum, if it is   interpreted to mean that only adverse 
entries are to be communicated to   the concerned employee and not other 
entries, would in our opinion   become arbitrary and hence illegal being 
violative of Article 14. All   similar Rules/Government Orders/Office 
Memoranda, in respect of all   services under the State, whether civil, 
judicial, police, or other   service (except the military), will hence also be 
illegal and are   therefore liable to be ignored.    13. It has been held in 
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.    that arbitrariness violates Article 
14 of the   Constitution. In our opinion, the non-communication of an entry in 
the   A.C.R. of a public servant is arbitrary because it deprives the   
concerned employee from making a representation against it and praying   for 
its up-gradation. In our opinion, every entry in the Annual   Confidential 
Report of every employee under the State, whether he is in   civil, judicial, 
police or other service (except the military) must be   communicated to him, so 
as to enable him to make a representation   against it, because 
non-communication deprives the employee of the   opportunity of making a 
representation against it which may affect his   chances of being promoted (or 
get some other benefits). Moreover, the   object of writing the confidential 
report and making entries in them is   to give an opportunity to a public 
servant to improve his performance,   vide State of U.P. v. Yamuna Shankar 
Misra . Hence   such non-communication is, in our opinion, arbitrary and hence  
 violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.    14. In our opinion, every 
entry (and not merely a poor or adverse   entry) relating to an employee under 
the State or an instrumentality of   the State, whether in civil, judicial, 
police or other service (except   the military) must be communicated to him, 
within a reasonable period,   and it makes no difference whether there is a 
bench mark or not. Even   if there is no bench mark, non-communication of an 
entry may adversely   affect the employee's chances of promotion (or getting 
some other   benefit), because when comparative merit is being considered for   
promotion (or some other benefit) a person having a `good' or `average'   or 
`fair' entry certainly has less chances of being selected than a   person 
having a `very good' or `outstanding' entry.    15. In most services there is a 
gradation of entries, which is usually   as follows:      (i) Outstanding      
(ii) Very Good      (iii) Good      (iv) Average      (v) Fair      (vi) Poor   
 A person getting any of the entries at items (ii) to (vi) should be   
communicated the entry so that he has an opportunity of making a   
representation praying for its upgradation, and such a representation   must be 
decided fairly and within a reasonable period by the concerned   authority.    
16. If we hold that only `poor' entry is to be communicated, the   consequences 
may be that persons getting `fair', `average', `good' or   `very good' entries 
will not be able to represent for its upgradation,   and this may subsequently 
adversely affect their chances of promotion   (or get some other benefit).    
17. In our opinion if the Office Memorandum dated 10/11.09.1987, is   
interpreted to mean that only adverse entries (i.e. `poor' entry) need   to be 
communicated and not `fair', 'average' or 'good' entries, it   would become 
arbitrary (and hence illegal) since it may adversely   affect the incumbent's 
chances of promotion, or get some other benefit.    18. For example, if the 
bench mark is that an incumbent must have `very   good' entries in the last 
five years, then if he has `very good' (or   even `outstanding') entries for 
four years, a `good' entry for only one   year may yet make him ineligible for 
promotion. This `good' entry may   be due to the personal pique of his 
superior, or because the superior   asked him to do something wrong which the 
incumbent refused, or because   the incumbent refused to do sycophancy of his 
superior, or because of   caste or communal prejudice, or for some other 
extraneous   consideration.    19. In our opinion, every entry in the A.C.R. of 
a public servant must   be communicated to him within a reasonable period, 
whether it is a   poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. This is because 
  non-communication of such an entry may adversely affect the employee in   two 
ways : (1) Had the entry been communicated to him he would know   about the 
assessment of his work and conduct by his superiors, which   would enable him 
to improve his work in future (2) He would have an   opportunity of making a 
representation against the entry if he feels it   is unjustified, and pray for 
its upgradation. Hence non-communication   of an entry is arbitrary, and it has 
been held by the Constitution   Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi 
v. Union of India (supra)   that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the 
Constitution.    20. Thus it is not only when there is a bench mark but in all 
cases   that an entry (whether it is poor, fair, average, good or very good)   
must be communicated to a public servant, otherwise there is violation   of the 
principle of fairness, which is the soul of natural justice.   Even an 
outstanding entry should be communicated since that would boost   the morale of 
the employee and make him work harder.    21. Learned Counsel for the 
respondent has relied on the decision of   this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. 
Prabhat Chandra Jain .   We have perused the said decision, which is cryptic 
and does not go   into details. Moreover it has not noticed the Constitution 
Bench   decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra) which 
  has held that all State action must be non-arbitrary, otherwise Article   14 
of the Constitution will be violated. In our opinion the decision in   U.P. Jal 
Nigam (supra) cannot be said to have laid down any legal   principle that 
entries need not be communicated. As observed in Bharat   Petroleum Corporation 
Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani AIR 2004 SC 4778 (vide   para 9):      Observations of 
Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's Theorems     nor as provisions of the 
statute, and that too, taken out of their     context.    22. In U.P. Jal 
Nigam's case (supra) there is only a stray observation   "if the graded entry 
is of going a step down, like falling from 'very   good' to 'good' that may not 
ordinarily be an adverse entry since both   are a positive grading". There is 
no discussion about the question   whether such 'good' grading can also have 
serious adverse consequences   as it may virtually eliminate the chances of 
promotion of the incumbent   if there is a benchmark requiring 'very good' 
entry. And even when   there is no benchmark, such downgrading can have serious 
adverse effect   on an incumbent's chances of promotion where comparative merit 
of   several candidates is considered.    23. Learned Counsel for the 
respondent also relied upon the decision of   this Court in Union of India and 
Anr. v. S.K. Goel and Ors.    and on the strength of the same submitted that 
only   an adverse entry need be communicated to the incumbent. The aforesaid   
decision is a 2- Judge Bench decision and hence cannot prevail over the   
7-Judge Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v.   Union 
of India (supra) in which it has been held that arbitrariness   violates 
Article 14 of the Constitution. Since the aforesaid decision   in Union of 
India v. S.K. Goel (supra) has not considered the aforesaid   Constitution 
Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra), it cannot   be said to have 
laid down the correct law. Moreover, this decision also   cannot be treated as 
a Euclid's formula since there is no detailed   discussion in it about the 
adverse consequences of non-communication of   the entry, and the consequential 
denial of making a representation   against it.    24. It may be mentioned that 
communication of entries and giving   opportunity to represent against them is 
particularly important on   higher posts which are in a pyramidical structure 
where often the   principle of elimination is followed in selection for 
promotion, and   even a single entry can destroy the career of an officer which 
has   otherwise been outstanding throughout. This often results in grave   
injustice and heart-burning, and may shatter the morale of many good   officers 
who are superseded due to this arbitrariness, while officers   of inferior 
merit may be promoted.    25. In the present case, the action of the 
respondents in not   communicating the 'good' entry for the year 1993-94 to the 
appellant is   in our opinion arbitrary and violative of natural justice, 
because in   substance the `good' entry operates as an adverse entry (for the 
reason   given above).    26. What is natural justice? The rules of natural 
justice are not   codified nor are they unvarying in all situations, rather 
they are   flexible. They may, however, be summarized in one word : fairness. 
In   other words, what they require is fairness by the authority concerned.   
Of course, what is fair would depend on the situation and the context.    27. 
Lord Esher M.R. in Voinet v. Barrett (1885) 55 L.J. QB 39, 39   observed: 
"Natural justice is the natural sense of what is right and   wrong."    28. In 
our opinion, our natural sense of what is right and wrong tells   us that it 
was wrong on the part of the respondent in not communicating   the 'good' entry 
to the appellant since he was thereby deprived of the   right to make a 
representation against it, which if allowed would have   entitled him to be 
considered for promotion to the post of   Superintending Engineer. One may not 
have the right to promotion, but   one has the right to be considered for 
promotion, and this right of the   appellant was violated in the present case.  
  29. A large number of decisions of this Court have discussed the   principles 
of natural justice and it is not necessary for us to go into   all of them 
here. However, we may consider a few.    30. Thus, in A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. 
Union of India and Ors.   , a Constitution Bench of this Court held:      The 
concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change     in recent 
years. In the past it was thought that it included just     two rules, namely 
(1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo     debet csse judex propria 
causa), and (2) no decision shall be given     against a party without 
affording him a reasonable hearing (audi     alteram partem). Very soon 
thereafter a third rule was envisaged and     that is that quasi-judicial 
enquiries must be held in good faith,     without bias and not arbitrarily or 
unreasonably. But in the course     of years many more subsidiary rules came to 
be added to the rules of     natural justice.      (emphasis supplied)    31. 
The aforesaid decision was followed by this Court in K.I. Shephard   and Ors. 
v. Union of India and Ors. . It was held in   this decision that even 
administrative acts have to be in accordance   with natural justice if they 
have civil consequences. It was also held   that natural justice has various 
facets and acting fairly is one of   them.    32. In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam 
Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant AIR 2001 SC   24, this Court held (vide para 2):     
 The doctrine (natural justice) is now termed as a synonym of     fairness in 
the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted     methodology of a 
governmental action.      (emphasis supplied)    33. In the same decision it 
was also held following the decision of   Tucker, LJ in Russell v. Duke of 
Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109:      The requirement of natural justice must 
depend on the circumstances     of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the 
rules under which the     tribunal is acting, the subject- matter that is being 
dealt with,     and so forth.    34. In Union of India etc. v. Tulsiram Patel 
etc.  a   Constitution Bench of this Court referred to with approval the   
following observations of Ormond, L.J. in Norwest Holst Ltd. v.   Secretary of 
State for Trade (1978) 1, Ch. 201:      The House of Lords and this Court have 
repeatedly emphasized that     the ordinary principles of natural justice must 
be kept flexible and     must be adapted to the circumstances prevailing in any 
particular     case.      (emphasis supplied)    Thus, it is well settled that 
the rules of natural justice are   flexible. The question to be asked in every 
case to determine whether   the rules of natural justice have been violated is 
: have the   authorities acted fairly?    35. In Swadesh Cotton Mills etc. v. 
Union of India etc.   , this Court following the decision in Mohinder Singh   
Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner and Ors.    held that the soul 
of the rule (natural justice) is   fair play in action.    36. In our opinion, 
fair play required that the respondent should have   communicated the 'good' 
entry of 1993-94 to the appellant so that he   could have an opportunity of 
making a representation praying for   upgrading the same so that he could be 
eligible for promotion.   Non-communication of the said entry, in our opinion, 
was hence unfair   on the part of the respondent and hence violative of natural 
justice.    37. Originally there were said to be only two principles of natural 
  justice : (1) the rule against bias and (2) the right to be heard (audi   
alteram partem). However, subsequently, as noted in A.K. Kraipak's case   
(supra) and K.L. Shephard's case (supra), some more rules came to be   added to 
the rules of natural justice, e.g. the requirement to give   reasons vide S.N. 
Mukherji v. Union of India . In   Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra) (vide 
paragraphs 56 to 61) it   was held that natural justice is part of Article 14 
of the   Constitution.    38. Thus natural justice has an expanding content and 
is not stagnant.   It is therefore open to the Court to develop new principles 
of natural   justice in appropriate cases.    39. In the present case, we are 
developing the principles of natural   justice by holding that fairness and 
transparency in public   administration requires that all entries (whether 
poor, fair, average,   good or very good) in the Annual Confidential Report of 
a public   servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State 
service   (except the military), must be communicated to him within a 
reasonable   period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation. 
This   in our opinion is the correct legal position even though there may be   
no Rule/G.O. requiring communication of the entry, or even if there is   a 
Rule/G.O. prohibiting it, because the principle of non-arbitrariness   in State 
action as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution in our   opinion requires 
such communication. Article 14 will override all rules   or government orders.  
  40. We further hold that when the entry is communicated to him the   public 
servant should have a right to make a representation against the   entry to the 
concerned authority, and the concerned authority must   decide the 
representation in a fair manner and within a reasonable   period. We also hold 
that the representation must be decided by an   authority higher than the one 
who gave the entry, otherwise the   likelihood is that the representation will 
be summarily rejected   without adequate consideration as it would be an appeal 
from Caesar to   Caesar. All this would be conducive to fairness and 
transparency in   public administration, and would result in fairness to public 
servants.   The State must be a model employer, and must act fairly towards its 
  employees. Only then would good governance be possible.    41. We, however, 
make it clear that the above directions will not apply   to military officers 
because the position for them is different as   clarified by this Court in 
Union of India v. Major Bahadur Singh   . But they will apply to employees of 
statutory   authorities, public sector corporations and other instrumentalities 
of   the State (in addition to Government servants).    42. In Canara Bank v. 
V.K. Awasthy , this Court held   that the concept of natural justice has 
undergone a great deal of   change in recent years. As observed in para 8 of 
the said judgment:      Natural justice is another name for common-sense 
justice. Rules of     natural justice are not codified canons. But they are 
principles     ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the     
administration of justice in a common-sense liberal way. Justice is     based 
substantially on natural ideals and human values.    43. In para 12 of the said 
judgment it was observed:      What is meant by the term "principles of natural 
justice" is not     easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in R. 
v. Local     Govt. Board (1914) 1 KB 160 : 83 LJKB 86 described the phrase as   
  sadly lacking in precision. In General Council of Medical Education     & 
Registration of U.K. v. Spackman (1943) AC 627 : (1943) 2 All ER     337, Lord 
Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt "to     force it into any 
Procrustean bed".    44. In State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern for 
Governance Trust and   Ors. , it was observed (vide para 39):      In our 
opinion, when an authority takes a decision which may have     civil 
consequences and affects the rights of a person, the     principles of natural 
justice would at once come into play.    45. In our opinion, non-communication 
of entries in the Annual   Confidential Report of a public servant, whether he 
is in civil,   judicial, police or any other service (other than the military), 
  certainly has civil consequences because it may affect his chances for   
promotion or get other benefits (as already discussed above). Hence,   such 
non-communication would be arbitrary, and as such violative of   Article 14 of 
the Constitution.    46. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that both 
the learned   Single Judge as well as the learned Division Bench erred in law. 
Hence,   we set aside the judgment of the Learned Single Judge as well as the   
impugned judgment of the learned Division Bench.    47. We are informed that 
the appellant has already retired from   service. However, if his 
representation for upgradation of the `good'   entry is allowed, he may benefit 
in his pension and get some arrears.   Hence we direct that the 'good' entry of 
1993-94 be communicated to the   appellant forthwith and he should be permitted 
to make a representation   against the same praying for its upgradation. If the 
upgradation is   allowed, the appellant should be considered forthwith for 
promotion as   Superintending Engineer retrospectively and if he is promoted he 
will   get the benefit of higher pension and the balance of arrears of pay   
along with 8% per annum interest.    48. We, therefore, direct that the 'good' 
entry be communicated to the   appellant within a period of two months from the 
date of receipt of the   copy of this judgment. On being communicated, the 
appellant may make   the representation, if he so chooses, against the said 
entry within two   months thereafter and the said representation will be 
decided within   two months thereafter. If his entry is upgraded the appellant 
shall be   considered for promotion retrospectively by the Departmental 
Promotion   Committee (DPC) within three months thereafter and if the appellant 
  gets selected for promotion retrospectively, he should be given higher   
pension with arrears of pay and interest @ 8% per annum till the date   of 
payment.    49. With these observations this appeal is allowed. No costs. ____ 

To unsubscribe send a message to [email protected] with 
the subject unsubscribe.

To change your subscription to digest mode or make any other changes, please 
visit the list home page at
  http://accessindia.org.in/mailman/listinfo/accessindia_accessindia.org.in

Reply via email to