Thanks Ludwig. Paul
On 12 Jun 2017 6:46 am, "Ludwig Seitz" <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2017-06-11 08:04, Paul Fremantle wrote: > ~snip~ > >> This, as stated by Ludwig, was put in to support /authz-info of >> ACE. It was to support the PoP keys to be used in TLS handshake >> between the client and the broker. But yes, the MQTT server needs >> to be resistant to DoS attempts pre-authorisation. MQTT needs to >> resist DoS before and during CONNECT (TCP holding, excess data). >> MQTT with /authz-info needs to implement similar resistance, for >> example dropping connections that fail to authenticate in a timely >> fashion, and blocking repeated offenders, so there's little >> difference in theory - although resistance pre-CONNECT may already >> exist in some broker implementations. A discussion can be put in >> Security Considerations >> >> >> I agree that a discussion of the pros and cons of this approach would be >> valuable. I'm not clear on the benefits of using POP keys in TLS >> handshakes. Can you please point me where to look? >> >> > The idea is to use the key used in the TLS handshake (e.g. the pre-shared > key when an RFC 4279 handshake is used or the raw public key for a RFC 7250 > handshake) as the POP key. > This way the TLS handshake provides the proof of possession (for > asymmetric keys you need to require client authentication). > > Have a look at https://tools.ietf.org/html/dr > aft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-07 for more background on PoP. > > /Ludwig > > > -- > Ludwig Seitz, PhD > Security Lab, RISE SICS > Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51 > > _______________________________________________ > Ace mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace >
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