Hi Jim,

thanks for the comments. See my reactions below.
Jim Schaad schreef op 2018-03-10 22:15:
I agree with Hannes, this version of the document is much cleaner and much clearer. I think that it has solved most of the problems that I initially had with the draft. It is not ready to progress as there are still sections that are marked as TODO. But it is much closer to finishing that it was.

That sounds hopeful. Agree about the TODOs

I still have a couple of comments from a quick read through of the document.

In section 2 - There will be a problem in that the port format extension is being eliminated in TLS 1.3 - We may want to divide this into a 1.2 and 1.3
section for clarity.

You mean for backward compatibility?


In section 3- Should we be looking at the use of COSE rather than CMS for
encryption of key services?

That is a question that needs some discussion by others.
In the recent draft-richardson-anima-ace-constrained-voucher-03, we encrypt the CBOR serialized voucher with either CMS or COSE, as signaled in the content format. Also there is a new draft draft-selander-ace-coap-est-oscore-00 that discusses the use of OSCORE for est over coap Introduction of COSE in est-coaps draft may need alignment with the other drafts.

You suggest to use COSE for server key generation only to better protect the keys, and all other services to be encrypted with CMS?


*  Do you have the option to additionally support the long name for the
service as well as the short name? MUST have short name MAY have long name?

Agree, should work that out in more detail.

* In section 6- All proxies are required by CoAP blocking to re-assemble the entire message at the proxy. It can re-block things going to the next proxy. While there is no requirement that the proxy get the entire message
before sending on pieces, this should be common practice and would be
required for a CoAP/HTTP proxy.

Agree fully, we need to clarify that.

* Should probably add a note in section 6 that any proxy that terminates the DTLS connection is going to be required to act as an RA. RAs are required
to have the entire request for adding authentication as necessary.

This is visible in the figure of section 6, but needs elaboration in the text.

Jim


Many thanks, this helps to get our text more concrete and complete.

Peter

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