Hi Roman, 

This commit 
https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/commit/222879c5d8fab836a7cb1d35cb128821ca790370
 tries to address your feedback. The full discussion is in 
https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/154 

Let us know if it does not make sense. 

Rgs,
Panos


-----Original Message-----
From: Ace <ace-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)
Sent: Sunday, December 22, 2019 11:41 PM
To: Roman Danyliw <r...@cert.org>; The IESG <i...@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-...@ietf.org; i...@augustcellars.com; 
ace-cha...@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-17: 
(with COMMENT)

Hi Roman,

Thank you for the thorough review. 

Please check the response to your feedback in 
https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/154 There we include the fixes 
we will make and our thoughts on a couple of your comments. 

Please let us know if you have any further objections.

Panos


-----Original Message-----
From: Ace <ace-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
Sent: Monday, December 16, 2019 5:02 PM
To: The IESG <i...@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-...@ietf.org; i...@augustcellars.com; 
ace-cha...@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: [Ace] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-17: 
(with COMMENT)

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-17: No Objection

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Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
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The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

* Section 4.  Per “the DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST 
messages that are relatively close to each other”, I think the text means that 
some EST messages are more likely to occur one after another.  It would be 
worth being clearer what these would be.

* Section 5.1. Per “These URIs are shorter than the ones in [RFC7030]”, does 
Table 1 imply that when using EST-coaps the “longer names” from RFC7030 
wouldn’t be valid?

* Section 5.2  Per “The latter ones are deemed to expensive …”, was difficult 
to parse as the sentence prior has three things (instead of two).  Is this 
sentence referring to the “not specified functions” only?

* Section 5.3, Per “30% smaller payload for DER-encoded ASN.1”, if you can cite 
this metric, please do.

* Section 5.8.  Per “In summary, the symmetrically encrypted key is included in 
the encryptedKey attribute in a KEKRecipientInfo structure”, if this is done in 
a server-side key generation scenario, where is the client getting the key to 
decrypt the server computed key material?  Should the DecryptKeyIdentifier/ 
AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier attributes be populated in the CSR per Sections
4.4.1.1/4.4.1.2 of RFC7030?

* Section 10.1.  Per “When server-side key generation is used, the constrained 
device depends on the server to generate the private key randomly, but it still 
needs locally generated random numbers for use in security protocols, as 
explained in Section 12 of [RFC7925].”, is the “security protocols” referenced 
here anything beyond DTLS?

* Section 10.1.  Per “In such occasions, checking the certificate revocation 
status or authorizing the client using another method is important for the 
server to ensure that the client is to be trusted.”

-- does this text suggest that expired+revoked certificates should not be used?

-- to word-smith:
s/for the server to ensure that the client is to be trusted/for the server to 
raise its confidence that the client can be trusted/

* Section 10.1.  Per “More information about recommendations of TLS and DTLS
are included in   [BCP195]”, thanks for referencing BCP195.  Could you please
clarify with normative language if these recommendations SHOULD/MUST be 
followed?

* Editorial
- Section 4.  Per “Authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys requires resources 
on low- end endpoints and consumes valuable bandwidth”, I’m not sure this 
sentence is needed.  Technically, “authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys 
requires resources” on any endpoint.

- Section 4.
OLD: Given that after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a new EST 
transaction will take place after a significant amount of time, NEW: Given that 
after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a new EST transaction 
will not take place for a significant amount of time,

- Section 5.5. Typo.  s/successfull/successful/

- Section 5.8.  s/Such scenarios could be when it is …/Such scenarios apply 
when it is …/

- Section 5.8.  s/ client, or when the resources/client, when the resources/

- Section 5.8. s/Then the private key/The private key/


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