Hi Cigdem,

This works for me. Thanks for the responses.

Yours, Daniel
________________________________
From: Ace <[email protected]> on behalf of Cigdem Sengul 
<[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2020 9:10 AM
To: Daniel Migault <[email protected]>
Cc: Ace Wg <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [Ace] WGLC draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile

Hello Daniel,

My responses are as follows:

<mglt>
Just one clarification. TLS 1.3 provides two ways to authenticate the client. 
One way is sending a certificaterequest during the TLS handshake and another 
way is to send it after the handshake occurs. The ability to support the first 
authentication is not advertised by the TLS client. The ability to support the 
second is advertised with the post_handshake_auth extension. I just wanted to 
make sure we agreed there are two ways.
</mglt>

[Cigdem: Yes, I agree. In both cases, what I read is: "If the client does not 
send any certificates (i.e., it sends an empty
   Certificate message), the server MAY at its discretion either
   continue the handshake without client authentication or abort the
   handshake with a "certificate_required" alert."
I suggest continue the handshake and fallback to MQTT Connect authentication 
for the RPK case.
]


[Cigdem : Yes, actually, this is what I described above. Due to absence of a 
certificate, I suggest it can fall back to CONNECT]

<mglt>
You are correct. What might need to be specified is that the server MUST 
support the two ways to authenticate the client. It MUST try during the 
handshake and if the client as not provided the sufficient credentials and the 
client has the post_handshake_auth, it MUST send one after the hanshake. The 
reason I think that maybe more text is needed is that I have the impression  a  
minimal TLS server implementation may not necessary support both 
authentications. This would prevent  the use of an TLS implementation that only 
supports post_authentication for example.
Similarly, I am wondering if the MQTT client does not have similar requirements 
regarding the support of TLS authentication as well as the CONNECT or if it may 
support only one. I tend to think that the client may only support only one way.

To sum up, I am just trying to evaluate how to prevent a situation where the 
client will not be abel to authenticate itself to the server.
</mglt>

[Cigdem: I think what I would prefer is that: the MQTT client will support one 
way (one of PSK, or RPK, or over MQTT Connect then).
The server MAY support multiple ways.
Given we recommend the MQTT Connect for client authentication, the server MUST 
implement that.
(That's why if RPK fails, MQTT connect can be fallback.)

If we agree, I will revise the document.
]

Kind regards,
--Cigdem
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