Hi Mohit,
a couple of comments for the WGLC also from my side.
0. Abstract:
IMO it would be nice (but it's of course not strictly needed) to
refer to the Lightweight CMP profile already in the abstract,
maybe this way after the first sentence:
It details the CoAP transfer option mentioned in the Lightweight CMP
Profile.
1. Section 1:
encryption of messages -> protection of messages (because
authenticity is the predominant requirement)
between CAs -> between RAs (between CAs
makes little sense, but there may be more than one RA involved)
2. Section 2.6:
the Block-Wise transfer [RFC7959 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7959>] mode
MUST be used for the CMP Transactions over CoAP
I do not have a strong opinion here, but I fear that strictly
requiring block-wise transfer may needlessly exclude simple
implementations,
which may be sufficient in scenarios where the payloads are known to
be rather small.
Writing SHOULD or RECOMMENDED would state that implementors can
deviate from the recommendation,
but only if they are aware of the consequences and are willing to
cope with them.
So what you could do - if others agree - is to replace
In order to avoid IP fragmentation of messages exchanged
between EEs and RAs or CAs, the Block-Wise transfer [RFC7959
<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Frfc7959&data=04%7C01%7C3fc86e35-ce5e-4719-beb0-5253a4681d60%40ad011.siemens.com%7C9d2a8b2f3d184b9897e508d90b0cf135%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637552972467884509%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=ukHaAdsU7gvXCCVKMDqwL6JA%2FvbPcICBT7Srwc0OR1g%3D&reserved=0>]
mode
MUST be used for the CMP Transactions over CoAP.
by a strengthened recommendation with a motivation/warning, e.g.,
Block-wise transfer [RFC7959
<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Frfc7959&data=04%7C01%7C3fc86e35-ce5e-4719-beb0-5253a4681d60%40ad011.siemens.com%7C9d2a8b2f3d184b9897e508d90b0cf135%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637552972467884509%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=ukHaAdsU7gvXCCVKMDqwL6JA%2FvbPcICBT7Srwc0OR1g%3D&reserved=0>]
mode
SHOULD be used for the CMP Transactions over CoAP.
This is strongly recommended to avoid IP fragmentation of messages
and the block-wise option is a critical option as per RFC 7959.
3. Section 3:
Nice to see that you streamlined the text regarding DTLS.
4. Section 4:
cross protocol proxy -> cross-protocol proxy
pre configured servers -> pre-configured servers
5. Section 5:
In order to protect themselves against DDoS attacks, the
implementations SHOULD avoid sending or receiving very small packets
containing partial CMP PKIMessage data.
Sounds good, but the point is not distributed DoS (only) but DoS in
general, so: DDoS -> DoS
and there is no real protection against DoS, just reduction of risks
they impose.
Moreover, the recipient has little influence on the size of packets.
I'd further suggest streamlining the sentence, arriving at, e.g.,:
"In order to reduce the risks imposed by DoS attacks,
implementations SHOULD minimize fragmentation of messages,
i.e., avoid packets containing partial CMP PKIMessage data."
And better starting a new paragraph thereafter because using a
CoAP-to-HTTP proxy is a different topic.
Regards,
David
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