Thank you all for the follow-up. Yours, Daniel ________________________________ From: Roman Danyliw <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2021 9:34 AM To: Stefanie Gerdes <[email protected]>; The IESG <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-16: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Hi Steffi! Thank you for the explanations below and edits made in -17 in response to my review. All of my feedback is addressed and I've cleared my ballot. Thanks, Roman > -----Original Message----- > From: iesg <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Stefanie Gerdes > Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 8:42 AM > To: Roman Danyliw <[email protected]>; The IESG <[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] > Subject: Re: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-16: > (with > DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > Hi Roman, > > Thank you for your detailed comments. We addressed most of your comments > in the latest version. Please find my comments inline. > > On 3/23/21 4:32 AM, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker wrote: > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > DISCUSS: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > (A simple editorial fix) Per Section 5.8.2 of > > [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the name of the parameter in the C-to-AS > > communication is “ace_profile” (not “profile”). The “ace_profile” parameter > is mistakenly referenced as “profile” > > in the following places: > > > > -- Section 3.2.1: > > The response MAY contain a "profile" parameter with the value > > "coap_dtls" to indicate that this profile MUST be used for > > communication between the client and the resource server. > > > > -- Section 3.3.1: > > If the > > profile parameter is present, it is set to "coap_dtls". > > Yes, you are correct. The name of the parameter changed in > ace-oauth-authz-25 and this occurrence must have slipped through. > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > COMMENT: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Thank you to Russ Mundy for the SECDIR review, and thank you to the > > authors for responding to it. > > > > ** Does this profile only cover part of the oauth-authz framework? > > Section 3.3 explicitly says “the use of introspection is out of scope > > for this specification.” It might be helpful to note in the > > introduction that this profile only covers C-to-AS and C-to-RS > > communication. > > We added to the introduction that introspection is out of scope for this > specification. > > > > > ** Section 3.2.1 Figure 3, uses the “req_aud” parameter, but this was > > renamed to “audience” in -20 of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz > > Yes, fixed. > > > > > ** Section 3.2.1. Per ‘The response MAY contain a "profile" parameter > > with the value "coap_dtls" to indicate that this profile MUST be used > > for communication between the client and the resource server’, this is > > true (see the DISCUSS above though). However, it might be worthwhile > > to point out that per Section > > 5.8.2 of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-38, this “MAY” is actually a MUST > > if the request has an empty “ace_profile” parameter. > > Okay, fixed. > > > > > ** Section 3.2.2. Per “This specification therefore mandates > > implementation support for curve25519 ...”, perhaps RFC2119 language > > should be used here > > Okay, changed to MUST. > > > > > ** Section 3.3.1. Per all of the text after “The method for how the > > resource server determines the symmetric key from an access token > > containing only a key identifier is application-specific; the > > remainder of this section provides one example”, consider removing all > > of the RFC2119 language is this text as its an example. > > The Gen-ART review from Paul Kyzivat of 19 Jul 2020 suggested to include the > normative language to avoid ending up with unclear specifications. > (The normative language has been added in > https://protect2.fireeye.com/v1/url?k=6154f2cc-3ecfca1e-6154b257-866132fe445e-003c0148b9c30169&q=1&e=2e35afc9-ad97-4505-ac7e-3c595783ec1b&u=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Face-wg%2Face-dtls- > profile/commit/9ab383c0e08f8d4bff5335cbfadb1c6b48289472) > > > > > ** Section 3.3.2. Per “When the resource server receives an access > > token, it MUST check if the access token is still valid ...”, a > > reference to Section > > 5.10.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] for additional verification > > procedures might be helpful > > Okay, done. > > > > > ** Section 3.2.2. and 7: > > > > (a) Section 3.2.2. > > To be consistent with [RFC7252] which allows for shortened MAC tags > > in constrained environments, an implementation that supports the RPK > > mode of this profile MUST at least support the ciphersuite > > TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC7251]. > > > > (b) As this specification aims at constrained devices and > > uses CoAP [RFC7252] as transfer protocol, at least the ciphersuite > > TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC6655] should be supported > > > > The text in (b) is weaker on the mandatory required of the > > ciphersuite. In (b), likely s/should be supported/must be supported/. > > Okay, changed b to MUST support. > > > > > ** Section 7. Per “For longer-lived access tokens, DHE ciphersuites > > should be used”, perhaps add a parenthetical at the end of this > > sentence of “(i.e., ciphersuites of the form TLS_DHE_PSK_*)”. > > Fixed as suggested. > > > > > ** Section 7.1. Session resumption is noted to be NOT RECOMMENDED. > > Is there a reason this can’t be stronger (MUST NOT)? > > Session resumption can be very useful for very constrained clients. We > therefore changed it as follows: > > OLD: > > Therefore, the use of session resumption is NOT RECOMMENDED for > resource servers. > > NEW: > > Therefore, session resumption should be used only in combination with > reasonably short-lived PoP keys. > > > > > ** Section 7.2. No issues with the guidance here. Is there anything > > DTLS specific that suggests that developers "SHOULD" avoid multiple > > access tokens per client? That guidance isn’t in the core framework. > > I made the comment on the core framework that perhaps this text should be > there (too?). > > We moved the respective paragraph to the framework document. > > > > > ** Please reviews all of the reference numbers to > > [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] as a number of them seem to be incorrect (likely > due to renumbering). For example: > > Okay, checked and fixed. > > > > > -- Section 2. Per “the client MUST upload the access token to the > > authz-info resource, i.e. the authz-info endpoint, on the resource server > before starting > > the DTLS handshake, as described in Section 5.8.1 of > > [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]”, Section 5.8.1 is not the right reference. > > It’s likely 5.10.1. > > > > -- Section 3.4. Per “The authorization server may, e.g., specify a "cti" > > claim for the access token (see Section 5.8.3 of > > [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]) to employ a strict order”, Section 5.8.3 > > is the wrong section in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. > > > > -- Section 3.4. Per “The response SHOULD include AS Request Creation > > Hints as described in Section 5.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].”, > > there is no Section 5.1.1. The appropriate section is either 5.2 to > > reference this behavior or 5.3 for the details of the hints. > > > > -- Section 3.4. Per “Incoming CoAP requests received on a secure DTLS > > channel that are not thus authorized MUST be rejected according to > > Section 5.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]”, Section 5.8.2 is not the right > reference here. > > > > ** idnits returned the following: > > > > == Unused Reference: 'RFC8152' is defined on line 1148, but no explicit > > reference was found in the text > > Fixed (added reference in the draft) > > > > > == Unused Reference: 'RFC8613' is defined on line 1212, but no explicit > > reference was found in the text > > Fixed (removed) > > > > > ** Nits > > -- Section 7.1. Typo. s/renogiation/renegotiation/ > > Fixed. > > Thank you for your time, > Steffi
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